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Abstract
This study exammes, m stages of development, the existing law regarding
humanitarian intervention, problems in respect of this law and cases of intervention.
More specifically, intervention in human rights abuses not breaching international
peace and security but rather posing a so-called threat to peace is examined. This
information is used to consider whether more adequate provision can be made
regarding circumstances of intervention to stop situations of grave human rights
abuses sooner. From the law regarding humanitarian intervention, it is evident that
the institution of intervention is illegal under the present UN legal system. Yet, in a
time when the human rights culture has become so important that it forms part of
the basis of international law, effective intervention is not being authorised by the
Security Council. As a result, other actors have been intervening in cases of grave
human rights abuses. These interventions need to be appropriate and well managed.
Since the protection of human rights is as valid in non-democracies, as in any
democratic state form, the study finds that human rights will benefit from
dependence on legitimate authority. Attributing more importance to the Uniting for
Peace Resolution could expand the role of the General Assembly. Humanitarian
intervention also needs to be coupled with a commitment to address the causes of
human rights abuses through conflict resolution and social reconstruction. The
study concludes with some criteria/guidelines for the establishment of the
legitimacy of intervention.
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Opsomming
Hierdie studie is - binne 'n raamwerk van ontwikkelingstydperke - 'n ondersoek na
die bestaande reg aangaande humanitêre ingryping, probleme tenopsigte daarvan en
gevalle van ingryping. Veral ingrypings in menseregte-skendings wat nie
internasionale vrede en sekuriteit skend nie, maar eerder 'n sogenaamde bedreiging
vir vrede is, word ondersoek. Die inligting wat so bekom is, word gebruik om te
oordeel of meer gepaste voorsiening gemaak kan word waarvolgens situasies van
growwe menseregte-skendings deur ingryping gouer beëindig kan word. Die reg
aangaande humanitêre ingryping toon dat ingryping onwettig is in die bestaande
regsisteem van die Verenigde Nasies. In 'n tyd waarin menseregte so belangrik
geword het dat dit ten grondslag lê van internasionale reg, word effektiewe
ingrypings nogtans nie gemagtig deur die Veiligheidsraad nie. Gevolglik gryp
ander partye in om teen situasies van growwe menseregte-skendings op te tree.
Hierdie ingrypings moet daarom gepas wees en goed bestuur word.
Aangesien die beskerming van menseregte net so geldig is in ander staatsvorms as
in demokrasieë, bevind die studie dat menseregte sal baat daarby indien dit
afhanklik is van legitieme gesag. Voorts kan die rol van die Algemene Vergadering
aangaande die beskerming van menseregte uitgebrei word deur groter waarde te
heg aan die "Uniting for Peace"-resolusie. Dit is verder nodig dat humanitêre
ingryping gekoppel word aan 'n verbintenis om die oorsake van menseregte-
skendings aan te pak deur konflik-resolusie en sosiale heropbou. Ter afsluiting
word riglyne neergelê om te help met die bepaling van die legitimiteit van
. .mgrypmg.
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CHAPTER ONE
Introduction
"Individuals everywhere want the same essential things: to have sufficient
food and shelter; to be able to speak freely; to practise their own religion or
to abstain from religious belief' to feel that their person is not threatened by
the state; to know that they will not be tortured or detained without charge
and that, if charged, they will have afair trail. I believe there is nothing in
these aspirations that is dependant upon culture, or religion, or stage of
development. They are as keenly felt by the African tribesman as by the
European city-dweller, by the inhabitant of a Latin American shanty-town
as by the resident of a Manhattan apartment. ,,]
- Rosalyn Higgins
11 Introduction
One of the issues on the centre stage of international law today, is humanitarian
intervention; armed intervention without the Security Council authorisation
necessary under the United Nations (UN) system, with the aim to end gross human
rights abuses within the borders of a country. While it seems evident and desirable
that civilians subject to gross human rights abuses should receive assistance, the
problem is that the unilateral use of force violating the borders of a country is
prohibited under present international law. International law actors are currently
trying to find an answer to the question whether civilians subject to abuses, such as
those in the two cases below, can be protected under international law in the event
that authorisation for armed intervention is not given by the Security Council. This
is especially important since the world was sickened by the holocaust that
accompanied the Second World War. The extent of the massacres was
unimaginable and people hoped that this would never happen again. This hope did
not survive for long. Some 25 years after the founding of the United Nations one of
the more memorable cases of gross human rights abuses started.
1 Higgins Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use it (1996) 97
1
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The 1971 coup d'état that brought Idi Amin to power in Uganda was followed by
the expulsion of 75 000 Ugandan Asians at 90 days' notice in 1972. Of these
people, a third consisted of Ugandan citizens, and even they were roughly treated
and a number killed. The following years saw people from tribal groups other than
that of Amin "arbitrarily massacred, political opponents liquidated, and elite and
religious leaders annihilated. Whole villages were destroyed't' Amnesty
International estimates that between 100 000 and 500 000 people died during
Amin's eight year rule.'
In the media Amin was known as a caricature rather than a brutal dictator. His
activities, including his expulsion of the 75 000 Ugandan Asians in 1972, were
brought to the attention of various UN organs, but only in 1977 did the UN
Secretary-General act on the complaints by asking Amin to carry out an
investigation into his own activities, In the same year the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) deferred deliberations regarding Amin's
behaviour to the following year. This resulted in the investigation procedures into
Amin's rule only starting in March 1978, shortly before the toppling of his
government in 1979. 4
During Idi Amin's 1975/76 term as chairperson of the Organisation for African
Unity (OAU), the twelfth summit of the organisation was held in Uganda. The mere
fact that he was elected as chairperson of the OAU at the height of his regime of
human rights abuses gave legitimacy to his murderous rule. Tanzania was one of
only three African countries that boycotted the summit.
When loyalists pursued Ugandan mutineers over the Tanzanian border in 1978 and
some Tanzanians were killed in the annihilation that followed, the Tanzanian
government drove the invading forces out. The Tanzanian president accused Amin
of murdering more black Africans than South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and
urged the Ugandan people to overthrow the dictator. Amin's rule was finally
brought to an end in 1979 as Kampala fell to a force combining Ugandan exiles and
2 Ramsbotham & Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict (1996) 4
3 ibid
4 idem 5
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Tanzanian troops.i At the sixteenth summit of the OAV in 1979, most states
refrained from criticising the Tanzanian intervention and thus seemed to tacitly
approve of the intervention. Criticism from the broader international community
was soon muted as countries recognized the new Vgandan government. 6
The most noteworthy action taken to help the people of Vganda thus happened after
approximately 7 years of tyranny, slaughter and displacement of nationals and only
because the disturbance spilled over the border of Uganda into Tanzania.
In light of the human rights abuses committed by Amin, Kuper wrote the following
while contemplating the role of the UN:
"[T]he United Nations is not a humanitarian, but a political organization,
and its humanitarian goals are at the play of political forces, pressure
groups and blocks, in an area where delegates pursue the divisive
interests of the state they represent. Added to this, its ideological
commitment to the protection of the sovereignty of the state, with the
corollary of non-intervention in its domestic affairs, stands in the way of
effective action against 'domestic' (internal) genocide.l"
This critique of the UN left the international community wondering how and if
people subject to gross human rights abuses, like the Ugandan people, were going
to be helped in future. The tragedy in Kosovo, another instance of such human
rights abuses, reached its height almost twenty years later in the nineties. Although
the hope existed that the questions left by the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda
would be answered, the intervention in Kosovo seemed to leave more questions
than answers.
"Kosovo was one of the eight constituent units of Yugoslavia; there
were six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia,
and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and two autonomous provinces in Serbia
(Vojvodina and Kosovo). The removal of autonomy from Kosovo and
5 idem 6
6 idem 52
7 idem 5
3
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Vojvodina in 1989 was a key moment in a series of events leading to ...
the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and eventually
Kosovo".8
The difference between the republics and the provinces now was that in contrast
with the provinces the republics had the right to secede from the federation and
were seen as bearers of Yugoslav sovereignty. The provinces did not have this right
as the Albanians in Kosovo, like the Hungarians in Vojvodina, were considered a
nationality rather than a nation, as their homeland was supposedly somewhere else.9
In truth, demonstrations demanding republic status for Kosovo, seemingly forming
part of a greater Albanian national awakening, started years before the autonomy of
the province was in fact removed. These 1981 demonstrations were brutally
crushed. A state of emergency was declared and while hundreds of people were
tried and imprisoned, thousands of teachers and university professors were
dismissed and "[t]he provision of Albanian professors and Albanian textbooks was
stopped". '0
By 1989 Yugoslavia's President Slobodan Milosevic had revoked Kosovo's
autonomy, following his allegations that the Serb minority in Kosovo was at risk."
This was followed by an increase in human rights abuses and discrimination against
Kosovar Albanians, including the dismissal of thousands of them from public
employment and the virtual elimination of their language from use in educational
facilities and the media.'2 Despite attempts to reconcile the parties through, among
others, the 1991 Brioni agreement.P the 1992 Common Statement by Kosovar
Albanians and the federal government" and the efforts to open dialogue through
the establishment of Missions of Long Duration by the Organization of Security
8 lICK The Kosovo Report (2000) 34
9 idem 36
10 idem 36, 37
IIWedgwood "NATO's Campaign in Yugoslavia" 1999 Vol93 AJIL 828828
12 lICK The Kosovo Report 41, 42
13 The EU brokered this agreement, but attempts to fmd a global approach to the crisis in Yugoslavia
came to an end after Yugoslav forces destroyed the Croatian town ofVukovar in 1991
14 Communications ended after the rector of the university of the parallel state was arrested in 1992
4
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and Co-operation (OSCE) in 1992, the descent into war and ethnic cleansing could
not be stopped.f
During the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) bombing campaign to stop
the Serb ethnic cleansing aimed at purging Kosovo of the Albanians living there,
the following human rights abuses, among others, were documented by a number of
organizations including the Independent International Commission on Kosovo
(IICK).16 Approximately 863 000 people, of which most became refugees, were
displaced, while more than 590 000 people became internally displaced persons
within Kosovo. Reports and statistics from different organizations came to the
conclusion that an estimated 11 000 people were killed. Of these people an
overwhelming number were Kosovar Albanians. More than 500 villages were
burned and at least 54 were almost or entirely destroyed. Human Rights Watch
confirmed 96 cases of rape, but note that the stigma attached to rape in traditional
Albanian society may mean that this figure only represents a fraction of actual
cases. Especially men of so-called 'fighting age' were detained and as many as
2000 of the people that disappeared during the NATO campaign were seized by
Serb forces.!"
The bombing campaign lasted 78 days and was brought to an end as the Yugoslav
government finally accepted a peace plan based on principles set forth by the G8
countries. IS While the campaign thus eventually ended the ethnic cleansing, it did
not have prior Security Council authorisation and however necessary it might have
been, was therefore still illegal in terms of international law, because it happened
outside of the UN system as required by the UN Charter." The question then is,
how effectively is human rights protected under the current UN system?
15 lICK The Kosovo Report 55,57,58
16 Some of the organizations include the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the Centre for Disease Control,
Physicians for Human Rights and Human Rights Watch
17 lICK The Kosovo Report 301 - 309
18 idem 96, The G8 is the Group of Eight and includes the Heads of State or Government from
France, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Italy, Canada and
Russia
19 Dugard International Law: A South African Perspective 2nd ed (2000) 416
5
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1 2 The United Nations Charter and the Protection of Human Rights
When the UN came into existence in 1945, its basis was the UN Charter. Because
several organs performing basic functions within the international arena, originate
in the Charter, this document is usually also considered as a constitution for the
international community.i" Another reason for the constitutional dimension of the
Charter is the fact that the UN has comprehensive international obligations and
responsibilities with regard to multiple areas of interest. Some of these areas
include human rights, peace and security, economic relations, international disputes
and international cooperation." The fact that most countries in the world are
members of the UN further supports the view of the Charter as a constitution for the
international community. Most importantly, however, the Charter is an
international treaty, which was signed voluntarily, making signatories voluntary
members of this international organisation.f In doing so, the now more than 180
signatory countries subject themselves to the regulations set out in the Charter.
It should be noted that the UN was established to maintain international peace and
security. The concept of international peace and security, which was aimed at
peaceful relations between states, was central in the minds of international law
actors after the devastation caused by the aggression between states in World War
II. This consideration was acknowledged in the wake of the Second World War, at
the Moscow Conference in 1943 where the creation of the UN was first
contemplated.r' When the UN finally came into being, however, this was not the
only purpose of the organisation. Where the protection of human rights in situations
like those in Uganda and Kosovo is concerned, one of the purposes of the UN is of
particular importance:
"To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
20 Conforti The Law and Practice of the United Nations (2000) 10
21 United Nations, United Nations Charter, Article 1,2
22 Conforti Law and Practice 10
23 idem 2
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fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion ... ,,24
With the ever-increasing focus on human rights, the relevance of this purpose is
even more evident today. Because this purpose is one of the bases of the Charter, it
might have been expected that signatories of the Charter would intervene to stop
atrocities such as those that happened in Uganda and Kosovo. However, this was
not the case.
In addition, as a result of the massive human rights abuses that were part of the
atrocities of World War II, the Charter contains further human rights clauses. These
include article 13, which obliges the General Assembly to make recommendations
and initiate studies for the promotion of international cooperation with regard to
human rights. Article 55 requires the UN to promote universal respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms and the observance of these rights, while article
56 contains a pledge by members to "take joint and separate action in co-operation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in article 55"_25
Although it would be impossible to help everybody whose human rights are being
abused, it is difficult to understand in the light of these clauses, why the human
rights of people in nations that are signatories to them, could have been so severely
abused.
1 2 1 Armed Intervention and other Protection Mechanisms
According to the Encyclopedia of Public International Law, the concept of
humanitarian intervention in its classic state, entailed the "use of armed force by a
State against another State for the purpose of protecting the life and liberty of the
citizens of the latter State unwilling or unable to do so itself,.26 Both the
interventions in Uganda and Kosovo show some of the above characteristics, such
as the 'use of armed force' and the protection of 'life and liberty of the citizens of
24 UN Charter, Article 1
25 idem Article 56
26 Beyerlin Humanitarian Intervention in Bernardt (ed) EPIL Volume 2 (1995) 926 926
7
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
the latter State unwilling or unable to do so itself. Because the international
community eventually approved both interventions, they seem to give some
answers as to when armed intervention can be used as a protection mechanism.
Both Uganda and Kosovo were situations of large-scale abuses. Terms like
massacre/Ï and ethnic cleansing'" have been used to describe them. International
approval of the interventions in Uganda and Kosovo suggests that this is the kind of
abuses, which would justify armed intervention. Other abuses of this kind seem to
include massive deportation, apartheid, torture, cruel and degrading punishment,
the arbitrary arrest of thousands of persons, suppression of freedom of expression
and association, political mass murder and enslavement or massacre of political
opponents, national minorities and religious sects_29It would seem that the test to
establish whether such abuses have reached the magnitude at which they can be
called gross human rights abuses, would be the same for determining whether a
crime against humanity has been committed. Article 7 of the Rome Statute,
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC),3o defines crimes against
humanity to include extermination, enslavement, deportation, torture, rape,
persecution against any identifiable group and apartheid." It would entirely depend
on the facts whether the abuses happening have reached this level of brutality.
While armed intervention is used as a means to protect human rights, it is not the
only protection mechanism that exists. The UN has developed several other human
rights instruments and protection mechanisms. The Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) for example, established the UNCHR in 1946_32 A mandate to draft an
International Bill of Rights ensued, and resulted in The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights.v' This recommendatory resolution inspired among others the
27 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background: Supplementary
Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001)
61
28 nCK The Kosovo Report 88
29 Conforti Law and Practice 144,244; Ramsbotham & Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention 21;
Walzer Just and Unjust War in Ishay (ed) The Human Rights Reader: Major Political Essays,
Speeches, and Documentsfrom the Bible to the Present (1997) 358 365
30 Rome Statute of the International Court 1998 article 7
31 ibid
32 Dugard International Law 240
33 ibid; UN, Universal Declaration of Human Rights UN Doc. Al811
8
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).34 _
The impact of the Universal Declaration can also be seen in the fact that it served as
a model for the Bills of Rights of numerous countries." including South Africa.
Because of the impact of the Universal Declaration on standards by which human
rights conduct is measured, some of the more basic principles of the Declaration are
seen as customary international law. These include non-discrimination, the
prohibition on torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and the right to a
fair tria1.36An instrument such as the Universal Declaration, acquire the status of
custom through state practice and opinio juris. This means that there must be
lasting state practice or constant and uniform use of a certain rule, thus widespread
acceptance in the first place. States must in addition feel bound to the rule to such
an extent that its general application is accepted as law.37 Where these conditions
exist, even countries that have not signed a specific human rights instrument are
bound by such instrument and thus have no justification for not observing the
human rights of their citizens.
International human rights instruments, as any number of other treaties, usually
provide their own mechanisms for the protection of human rights as well as
sanctions in the event of non-compliance with the treaty terms. These protection
mechanisms could take on a number of different appearances depending on the
preferences of the signatories. A few examples include the Human Rights
Committee, international supervisor of the ICCPR, which makes general comments
and seeks to settle disputes amicably if states accuse one another of non-compliance
with the Covenant." Mechanisms in the UN Charter include expulsion from the
organization for persistently violating the principles, including the human rights
principles, contained in the Charter.f The UNCHR provides a public forum for
debating human rights questions and investigates information regarding human
34 Dugard International Law 240
35 ibid
36 idem 241
37 idem 28, 31
38 idem 244, 245
39 UN Charter, Article 6
9
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rights abuses. Such investigations are followed by recommendations to ECOSOC.4o
In 1970, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities was authorised by Res. no 1503-XLVIII of ECOSOC. This Sub-
Commission is allowed to appoint working groups to investigate and reveal existing
gross human rights abuses, which are reported back to the UNCHR and ECOSOC
along with recommendations and may even result in UN General Assembly
resolutions.41
Another protection mechanism that developed in the aftermath of the Second World
War is the notion of international criminal liability aimed at bringing the
perpetrators of crimes against humanity to justice.42 This notion is supported by the
universal jurisdiction that exists with regard to customary international law norms
and was furthermore established in the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols relating to specifically to war crimes.l'' Even though the biggest parts of
these Conventions and Protocols relate only to international atrocities, common
article 3 to all of the Conventions makes provision for a minimum standard of
humane treatment for all civilians and non-combatants in armed conflict that is not
of an international character.44 However, the Conventions and Protocol I only make
provision for the punishment of those responsible for grave breaches of the
conventions, that is war crimes, in international armed conflicts.45 While Protocol II
does not provide for such punishment flowing from war crimes committed in
internal armed conflicts, it seems that the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) concluded in the Tadic case that "customary
international law today imposes criminal liability for the violation of the laws and
customs of war in both internal and international armed conflicts"."
The concept of universal jurisdiction has a permissive quality in that it allows
states, whose national legislation confers such jurisdiction to their courts, to
40 Dugard International Law 253
41 Conforti Law and Practice 244
42 ICISS Supplementary Volume 118
43 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty (2001) 6
44 Robertson Crimes against humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice (1999) 177
45 Dugard International Law 437
46 ibid
10
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lawfully exercise such jurisdiction to prosecute crimes under customary
international law such as "piracy, slave-trading, war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide and torture".47 The conviction in Belgium, of Rwandan nuns
for their involvement in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 is indicative of the effects
of universal jurisdiction." Even though the Belgian parliament has now repealed
their landmark "universal jurisdiction" legislation of 1993 that permitted victims to
file complaints in Belgium for atrocities committed abroad, this legislation "had
made Belgium a leader in the struggle for international justice'<" according to
human rights groups'". This developing trend of international criminal
accountability has eventually led to the establishment of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (lCTR), the ICTY and recently the ICC where individuals can
now be held accountable before an international tribunal for such crimes. However,
a significant difference between the first two tribunals and the ICC is that while the
first two were established by the Security Council in terms of Chapter VII of the
UN Charter." the Rome Statute establishing the ICC is a separate multilateral
treaty52. All UN members have to comply with resolutions under Chapter VII,
while only those states that have ratified the Rome Statute, will evidently be bound
by its provisions. Nevertheless, the fact that the ICC for instance have specific
jurisdiction regarding genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.t'
indicates a universal justice which is especially beneficial for the protection of
human rights. The importance of the developments with regard to international
criminal jurisdiction is that new means are being established to enforce the growing
human rights trend.
A further development regarding the protection of human rights is the fact that the
UN Security Council is increasingly dealing with gross human rights abuses as
47 idem 141
48 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 6
49 http://www.hrw.orgipress/2003/08/belgium080103.htm [Accessed 2 March 2004]
50 These groups include Amnesty International Belgium, La Ligue des Droits de I'Homme, Liga voor
Mensenrechten, la Fédération Internationale des Droits de I'Homme, Avocats sans Frontiëres and
Human Rights Watch
51 Dugard International Law 152
52 idem 153
53 ibid
11
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threats to international peace and security; the latter serving as a basis for action
taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. 54 Because of this wider interpretation, the
term threats to international peace, which were originally seen as "limited to overt
cross-border aggression", 55 are in a process of transformation. The Security
Council, for example, described the situation in Somalia in 1992,56 in Bosnia in
1992,57 in Iraq in 199158 and in Kosovo in 1999 as a threat to international peace
and security. 59 Intervention under Chapter VII was considered in all these
circumstances. The actions under Chapter VII include non-armed force such as
severance of diplomatic relations and complete or partial interruption of economic
relations and different means of communications.ï" It also includes force as deemed
necessary to restore international peace and security."
As a part of the various protection mechanisms that exists, the aspect of prevention
of human rights abuses is receiving progressively more attention. In their report
about the abuses and subsequent NATO intervention in Kosovo, the lICK makes
specific reference to the lack of preventative efforts from the international
community in the face of a range of early warnings.f Such efforts would have
included more sufficient support for the non-violent resistance and sufficient
political will to support the diplomatic initiatives.63 The International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in particular, emphasizes the need
and responsibility to prevent conflicts and human rights abuses. According to the
commission, this responsibility lies within the sovereign state, as "[a] firm national
commitment to ensuring fair treatment and fair opportunities for all citizens
provides a solid basis for conflict prevention'V" The importance attached to
prevention is further seen by the resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly
54 Conforti Law and Practice 244
55 Thomashausen Humanitarian Intervention in an Evolving World Order: The Cases of Iraq,
Somalia, Kosovo and East Timor (2002) 10
56 Ramsbotham & Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention 207, Security Council Resolution 794
57 idem 177, 178, SCR 770
58 idem 71, SCR 688
59 nCK The Kosovo Report 325, SCR 1244
60 UN Charter, Article 41
61 idem Article 42
62 nCK The Kosovo Report 1
63 ibid
64 lCISS The Responsibility to Protect 19
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and Security Council in this regard. The Report of the Panel on United Nations
Peace Operations for example, highlights the need for prevention in the effort to
avoid armed interventions, while the 2001 report of the Secretary General on
Prevention of Armed Conflict focused on cooperation for successful preventative
efforts. A great number of organisations have become involved in establishing
preventative mechanisms, including the African Union that established the Peace
and Security Council, which attach particular importance to efforts preventing
conflict and abuses.65 However, according to the Carnegie Commission on
Preventing Deadly Conflict, "the international community spent approximately
$200 billion on conflict management in seven major interventions in the
1990s ... but could have saved $130 billion through a more effective preventative
approach." The ICISS forwards three conditions for prevention, namely knowledge
of the instability and risk associated with the situation, an understanding of "policy
measures available" that are capable to be effective and the political will to apply
these measures/" Along with support from the international community in the form
of, for example, supporting local initiatives to advance human rights, the rule of law
or good governance, mediation efforts and efforts to address the root causes of
conflict." it might be possible for these conditions to make a difference in
situations of impending conflict.
In light of all these legal remedies and the increasing focus on prevention, it is
debatable whether armed intervention outside of the UN system is a preferable
protection mechanism in cases of gross human rights abuses, especially with the
commitment of the UN to international peace and security and the controversy
about the legality of the institution.
However, the fact is that armed interventions for the protection of human rights
happen and that several problems exist with regard to such interventions. This
thesis investigates the remedy of armed intervention in accordance with the
65 http://www.au2002.gov.zaJdocs/summitcouncil/secprot.htm [Accessed 30 January 2004]
66 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 20, These interventions were in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, the Persian Gulf, Cambodia and El Salvador
67 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 20
68 idem 19
13
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
classical definition, thus humanitarian intervention. More specifically, it deals with
humanitarian intervention in human rights abuses not breaching international peace
and security; but rather in cases where abuses pose a so-called threat to
international peace. Although some argue that humanitarian intervention includes
economic force69 and other forms of coercion that do not include the threat of
armed force, these kinds of force are liberally used to further states' economic and
political interests. The decision of the United States of America (US) to suspend
military aid to South Africa, because of South Africa's decision not to give
Americans immunity from prosecution by the International Criminal Court in The
Hague, is a case in point. 70 Even if such force were used to coerce states into
observing human rights, it would not be illegal and thus is of no consequence to
this study. However, the Secretary General in his Millennium Report did make it
clear that such economic sanctions need to be smarter by targeting them better.Ï' If
for instance the aim of sanctions is to coerce a tyrannical leader into ending the
human rights abuses of his people, the parties introducing the sanctions need to
make sure that the sanctions are indeed targeting that leader. This is because
vaguely defined sanctions against that state as a whole would hurt the already
suffering people even more.
1 2 2 Humanitarian Intervention
1 2 2 1 Problems with Humanitarian Intervention
It has been mentioned that problems exist with regard to armed interventions
without Security Council authorisation and thus humanitarian intervention. The
first problem concerns sovereignty.
The international community of nations under the regime of the UN Charter is
based on the equal sovereignty of states. This means that no state is superior to any
69 Ramsbotham & Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention 114, 115
7°http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?click id=6&art id=vn20030702044421419C243131&set id= 1
[Accessed 9 July 2003]
71http://www.un.orglmillennium/sglreportlsumm.htm [Accessed 2 March 2004]
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other and, as such, one state cannot take decisions as to how another state must be
governed. In the Island of Palmas72 case the arbitrator described the meaning of
sovereignty as follows.
"Sovereignty in the relations between states signifies independence.
Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is a right to exercise
therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the function of a state".73
Although this description begs the question as to what exactly the function of a
state is, suffice it for the moment to recognize the dimension of independent
governance. From this principle it follows that when states decide to launch an
armed intervention into another state, the sovereignty of the latter state is breached.
Although nothing prohibits any state to ask for help in the form of armed
intervention from other states, such interventions will become a violation of
sovereignty if it is done without consent or request from the state in which is
intervened. This kind of action could undermine the whole system of states.
Sovereignty is also protected by article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which prohibits
intervention by the UN in matters falling within a state's domestic jurisdiction.
Because of this principle of non-intervention, humanitarian intervention is illegal
under the UN system.
Another problem with humanitarian intervention is that article 2(4) of the Charter
prohibits the "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations". Although force is allowed in two situations, it is enough to
note here that one of the situations include self-defence.74 Even though force could
include both armed and economic force, the idea that 'force' refers to 'armed force'
is strengthened by the qualification of force as armed force in the Preamble of the
Charter, where it is stated that "armed force shall not be used, save in the common
nIsland of Palm as Case (Netherlands v USA), 2 RIAA 829 (1928)
73 Dugard International Law 112
74 UN Charter, Article 51
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interest ... ,,75This study, as stated earlier, will look only at the use of armed force
because of the role it plays in humanitarian intervention.
Although the classical definition refers to humanitarian intervention as intervention
to protect citizens of another state." the self-defence exception to the use of force is
sometimes used to justify humanitarian intervention for the protection of a state's
own citizens in another state." Higgins argues that a state is harmed through injury
suffered by its nationals. Thus, the right to self-defence can be utilised as a
justification for intervention where a state's nationals in another country suffer
injury.78 Where armed intervention is used in these situations, it is uncertain
whether these armed interventions constitute humanitarian intervention. Since the
ground for intervention in such cases is self-defence and not the protection of
human rights, these situations should probably be seen as situations of self-defence
rather than humanitarian intervention. Because of the injury suffered by the state,
however, it is accepted by some authors that intervention on the ground of self-
defence in these cases is lawful. This lawfulness is not accepted in cases of
humanitarian intervention, because the individuals being rescued have no such
connection to the intervening state. 79
Such a situation of intervention based on self-defence, occurred in the June/July
1976 Entebbe incident where an Israeli civilian airliner was hijacked and held
hostage in Entebbe, Uganda. While the Jewish passengers were threatened,
Ugandan president, Idi Amin, provided more weapons for the Palestinian hijackers.
Israel's forcible intervention to rescue its nationals'" satisfied the customary
intemationallaw requirements for intervention in such circumstances. There was an
immediate danger of injury to Israel's nationals, the territorial sovereign, Uganda,
75 idem Preamble
76 See n 43
77 Higgins Problems and Process 246
78 ibid
79 Ronzitti Rescuing Nationals abroad through Military Coercion and Intervention on grounds of
Humanity (1985) XIV
80 Dugard International Law 422
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failed or was unable to protect Israel's nationals and the measures taken by Israel
were confmed to the protection of their nationals against injury."
While such self-defence claims are made by individual states, self-defence pacts
such as NATO collectively defend all their members. Such collective self-defence
is accepted in article 51 of the UN Charter. The problem is that sometimes their
interventions are launched in defence of non-members. One such an example is
NATO's humanitarian intervention in Kosovo in 1998, which should be seen as
humanitarian intervention and not self-defence.
It is clear that there are many uncertainties, opnuons and problems regarding
humanitarian intervention. The UN Charter itself does not mention humanitarian
intervention. It does however make specific mention of the idea of non-intervention
and the use of force.
1222 The United Nations Charter and Humanitarian Intervention
The Charter states that force may only be used in two circumstances. The first is
under the authority of the Security Council under chapter VII and article 53, which
deals with regional arrangements, and the second is in circumstances of individual
or collective self-defence under article 51.82 Force under the authority of the
Security Council is allowed after the council has decided two things. The first
decision is that the situation poses a threat to international peace and security, or is
a breach of such security, or is an act of aggression. The second decision is that
force is the best way to deal with the situation.V
Of the three situations that justify the use of armed force, only acts that pose a
threat to international peace and security are relevant here. The reason for this is
that both acts of aggression and situations that breach international peace and
security involve the use of armed force between states. This is indicated by attempts
81 ibid
82 idem 416
83 UN Charter, Article 39
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to define acts of aggression.t" as well as by the different situations described as acts
of aggression. These include military invasion, the deployment of bands of
mercenaries and "a State allowing its territory to be used for attacks against another
State's territory ... ,,85 In the case of situations that breach international peace and
security, Security Council resolutions indicate that these are situations of invasions.
The North Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950, the Argentinean invasion of
the Falkland Islands in 1982 and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 are examples
of such a breach.86 Another situation regarded as a breach of peace as a result of
Security Council resolutions, was the Iraq-Iran war in 1987.87 Again it seems that a
breach of peace includes military operations or the use of armed force between
states.
As the gross human rights abuses relevant here are committed by perpetrators living
in the same country as those whose rights they are violating, the acts described
above fall outside the scope of this study. The only legal justification that remains
for armed intervention under the Security Council therefore is a threat to
international peace and security. Because gross human rights abuses happen within
the borders of a single country, it would therefore necessarily have to be classified
as a threat to peace for armed intervention to be legal.
Humanitarian intervention, which is not accounted for in the Charter, can never be
legal under the current UN system while the basis of the intervention is the
protection of human rights, as it happens without Security Council authorisation.
Armed intervention authorised by the Security Council thus, does not constitute
humanitarian intervention and remains the only legal form of armed intervention
for the protection of human rights. The fact is however, that the classification of
abuses as a threat to international peace and security is a legal fiction used to justify
Security Council authorisation for armed intervention'f in situations of which the
desperate nature of the abuses happening is generally accepted. Because the second
84 UN United Nations Consensus Definition of Aggression, UN Doc. A/9890 (1974)
85 Conforti Law and Practice 174
86 Shaw International Law (1997) 858, SCR's 82, 502 and 660
87 ibid, SCR 598
88 Higgins Problems and Process 255
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half of article 2(7) states that the non-intervention principle shall not "prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII", this fiction is also used to
overcome the non-intervention principle.
This anomaly means that the only legitimate legal protection for victims lies with
the Security Council decision that the abuses in their country pose a threat to
international peace and security. As stated earlier, it is this situation that led to the
unauthorised NATO intervention in Kosovo. Yet even the decision that abuses pose
a threat, can be vetoed by any of the permanent members of the Security Council.
The present situation under the UN Charter is therefore that armed intervention is
accepted only when a threat is posed to international peace and security and the
intervention is authorised by the Security Council.
1 3 The Humanitarian Intervention Debate
Some of the problems regarding humanitarian intervention precede the UN Charter.
One of these is the more than one hundred-year-old debate between pluralists and
monists. This debate, which concerns the legitimacy of intervention, is at the core
ofthe problems relating to humanitarian intervention.
Pluralists believe in a society where autonomous, interdependent groups exist as
equals, all groups decide how to govern themselves and none are superior to the
other. Monists, on the other hand, focus on unity in support of the common good
between such autonomous groups. In the intervention debate, monists maintain that
sovereignty is conditional to "the ends to which, in principle, all states, nations and
peoples should be committed, and the means by which international society should
be upheld.t''" Where humanitarian intervention is concerned, sovereignty will be
conditional to the protection of the human rights of a state's citizens. In contrast,
pluralists maintain that sovereignty demands "non-interference in the domestic
affairs of other states. ,,90 There is merit in both arguments as seen by the previous
89 Mayall Introduction in Mayall (ed) The new Interventionism 1991 - 1994: United Nations
experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somalia (1996) 1 3
90 ibid
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discussion on sovereignty. In addition, the fact that interventions can cause
considerable loss of life is not denied. Nevertheless, it cannot be' disregarded that
the lack of timely intervention brought about by the length and vehemence of the
debate, has caused millions of lives that might have been saved, to be lost.
14 Conclusion
Against this background, the study attempts to bring greater legal certainty to a
field in international law, where many opinions exist, but few definite rules. The
lack of legal basis has caused a very pragmatic approach towards humanitarian
intervention. Even in cases where the Security Council authorises armed
intervention after deciding that the situation poses a threat to international peace
and security, the form that intervention will take and the point at which it will
happen is never certain. Even though the UN, according to Kofi Annan." then
United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, seems to
want the flexibility of a case-by-case development, "pragmatism must have its
limits if contributors and protagonists are to know what to expect".92 It appears that
everything is dictated by the politics of the moment and not by the importance that
the community of nations attributes to principles of human rights." Unless there is
a legal basis for action, the law cannot be developed to solve this problem in a more
structural and meaningful way.
Even where abuses are of such a serious nature that humanity cries out against it,
legal commentators differ about what should be done. Having scrutinized the
arguments in favour of and against the NATO intervention in Kosovo, Falk comes
to the conclusion that:
91 http://www.nato.intldocuJreview/1993/9305-l.htm [Accessed 2 March 2004]
92 Higgins "Peace and Security, Achievements and Failures" 1995 Vol6 EJIL 445459
93 Ramsbotham & Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention 52, Tanzania was shunned by some
African countries for the intervention in Uganda that led to the fall of Idi Amin. Furthermore, the
OAU chairman ordered Uganda's President Binaisa's call for open discussions about human rights
issues, to be deleted from the record at the sixteenth OAU summit. At the same time African
countries voiced very different sentiments about action, including military action, against South
Africa for the human rights abuses happening under the apartheid regime
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"Putting these two major lines of interpretation together leaves one with
the disturbing impression that humanitarian intervention on behalf of
Albanian Kosovars was necessary but, under the circumstances,
impossible. ,,94
This leaves some very uncomfortable questions. When do the right circumstances
for humanitarian intervention exist? What exactly is the law regarding intervention
in these circumstances? How are these rules currently applied, if at all and how can
the law be refined?
1 5 Exposition
A vigorous debate is still being waged on what international law actually says
regarding humanitarian intervention and how it should be applied and used. In an
attempt to improve the present situation, this study applies a new perspective to a
very old problem. The aim is to set out in stages of development, the law, related
problems and cases of humanitarian intervention. In addition, it will be considered
whether more adequate provision can be made to stop situations of grave human
rights abuses sooner. It is further considered what adequate provisions might entail
and under which circumstances intervention would be justified. Finally, the
responsibilities of the intervening parties after intervention are explored.
Chapter Two examines the early development of humanitarian intervention until
World War I. At this time, there was no real doctrine of humanitarian intervention,
thus the focus is on the ideas that formed the basis for such intervention and the
debate around it. The few instances of intervention that may qualify as
humanitarian intervention are also discussed. In Chapter Three the development
regarding humanitarian intervention between World War I and II is investigated,
while Chapter Four explores the establishment of the United Nations and the
Security Council along with their responsibilities. In Chapter Five an in depth
examination of the influences of the United Nations Charter is made, after which
94 Falk "Kosovo, World Order and the Future of Intemational Law" 1999 Vol93 AJIL 847 852
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the law and practices up to today are reviewed. InChapter Six the present position
is interpreted and some recommendations are made for developing the law.
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CHAPTER TWO
Early developments until World War I
"[Tja regard the textual barriers to humanitarian intervention as decisive
in the face of genocidal behaviour is politically unacceptable, especially in
view of the qualifications imposed on unconditional claims of sovereignty
by the expanded conception of international human rights. "J
- Richard A. Falk
2 1 Introduction
According to Dugard, one of the principal aims of modem international law is the
protection of human rights? This is in fact a relatively new point of view.
Although the protection of human rights through humanitarian intervention was
recognized as early as 1625 by Hugo de Groot in his De Jure Belli ac Pacts.'
international law principally concerned itself with the relations among states and
not with individuals. Despite the fact that quite a few writers accept the idea of
lawful humanitarian intervention, there was considerable confusion with regard to
the legal basis of the institution, with a result that this situation persisted for almost
three centuries. During the time prior to World War I, a minority of scholars
explicitly rejected the institution on the grounds of the non-intervention principle."
Only in the aftermath of the Second World War and the holocaust, did it become
evident to the international community that in such grave circumstances the plight
of individuals is too horrendous to feign either indifference or helplessness. With
the developing human rights culture of the last century, the pressure on countries
able to intervene in gross human rights abuses mounted. However, regardless of the
amount of pressure there might be to intervene, the system of international law has
been one of participation through consensus from the beginning. As such, a
1 Falk 1999Vol93 AlIL 853
2 Dugard International Law 234
3 ibid
4 Beyerlin Humanitarian Intervention 927
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consensus between states about humanitarian intervention would be a considerable
victory over the uncertainty in this regard.
To understand some of the arguments and problems regarding humanitarian
intervention today and why they exist, it is necessary to consider the development
of the concept over time. Modem international law is generally agreed to have
started in the late fifteenth' early sixteenth century at the time when the influential
works of Machiavelli and Bodin appeared, the European maritime powers started
their overseas expansion and the theories of the late Spanish scholars emerged." It is
from approximately this time onwards that some of the influences, which would
eventually lead to the idea of humanitarian intervention and the controversy
surrounding such intervention, are explored. It should be noted that some of the
factors causing problems with regard to humanitarian intervention, which include
the "threat to international peace and security", the Security Council discretion and
the veto, emerged out of the UN system itself. As this chapter only explores the
developments until World War I, these problems will not feature as much here as
some of the problems with a more explicit older history, such as the balance
between protecting states' sovereignty and intervention, human rights, the use of
force and the responsibilities of intervening forces after intervention.
2 2 The Development of Relevant Theories and Views
221 The Just War
The legitimate use of force and what exactly that might mean has been the subject
of many debates. Before the just war theory, the use of force was not prohibited'
The just war theory seems to have been the classical attempt to determine when the
use of force would be acceptable in a time when the international order that we
have today did not yet exist. While the international order of today, "based on
independent 'nation [s]tates' of equal rank", has been developed by the thirteenth
5 Preiser History of the Law of Nations: Basic Questions and Principles in Bernardt (ed) EP/L
Volume 2 (1995) 716 717
6 ibid
7 Randelzhofer Use of Force in Bernardt (ed) EPIL Instalment 4 (1982) 265266
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century.' medieval features including great numbers oflords, bishops, counts, kings
and knights, existed instead of sovereign states." At the time, the church had the
role of "executive, judge and legislator" until at least the thirteenth century and in
the absence of sovereignty, natural law obligations ensured a kind of "moral and
legal unity".10 By the early sixteenth century "Britain, France and Sweden all
looked very much like sovereign states, while princes in Germany and the
Netherlands" enjoyed many of the privileges of sovereignty.i' However, it seems
that the observance of certain rules and customs within communities was mainly
due to religious sanctions.V Unfortunately, the just war theory did not have the
long-lasting regulatory effect that might have been hoped for.
The focus of international law in the early middle ages was not really on the
development of a system of sovereign equal subjects.'? However, by the thirteenth
century, the idea of sovereignty was incorporated in St Thomas Aquinas' writings
on the justness of war in certain situations. According to St Aquinas there were
three principles of, or conditions for, a just war. These were that:
"[t]he war must be declared by a sovereign prince and waged by his
order; the other party must have provided a iusta causa for the war by
culpable conduct; and, to be able to rely on the iusta causa to justify the
war, the prince must have a just intention ... which only exists when the
aim of the war is to punish the wicked, to help the good and thereby to
restore peace as soon as possible.t''"
It should be noted that the "sovereign prince" St. Aquinas is talking about, did not
have the same attributes as the leader of a sovereign state today. It was the church
and not the sovereign for example, that could "guarantee treaties, devise principles
8 Preiser History of the Law of Nations: Ancient times to 1648 in Bemardt (ed) EPiL Volume 2
(1995) 722 739
9 Philpott "Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History" 1995 Vol 48 No 2 Journal of
International Affairs 353 362
10 ibid
II ibid
12 http://www.questia.comIPM.gst?action=openPageViewer&docId= 14834136 [Accessed 19
November 2003]
13 Preiser Ancient times to 1648 733
14 idem 736
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Igoverning war, abrogate any law opposed to the natural law and mediate wars".IS
Thus, religious considerations played a significant role in law and politics and the
just war doctrine "formed the core of the Christian international law of war.,,16
Since the idea was that only a just war was permitted, the doctrine prevented
private wars'" as well as senseless violence between sovereigns. However, since the
beginning the problem with a just cause, was that every person had a different idea
of what such a just cause would be.
In the early sixteenth century the Spanish renaissance theologian, Francis de Vitoria
developed a doctrine saying that it was lawful to take action against a state denying
its own citizens their essential rights.i" At the time this view was part of the
development of the laws of war. Matias de Paz, a Spanish Valladolid professor,
took this development further in his 1512 treaties, De dominio regum Hispaniae
super Indos. While writing about the Spanish efforts to convert the Indians to
Christianity, he stated:
"that a war with those who were to be converted could be a just war for
both sides: for the Spanish, because they were fighting for Christ, and
for the barbarians because they were defending their country without
knowing the Holy Name 'for [the] sake of which war was being waged
against them",19
Vitoria generalised this argument, after which it became an accepted idea that a
"war could be just for both sides ... " Although the theory was never really accepted
as a valid and proper legal rule, any benefit of preventing war, which it might have
had, was thus lost and the doctrine was abandoned in practice.i" The use of force
was therefore even without the little regulation provided by the just war theory,
with a result that states could resort to war whenever they wanted to. This situation
was supported by the legal positivistic command theory of John Austin in the
15 Philpott 1995 Vol48 No 2 Journal of International Affairs 362
16 Preiser Ancient times to 1648 736
17 ibid
18 Scupin History of the Law of Nations: 1815 to World War I in Bemardt (ed) EPIL Volume 2
(1995) 767 771; http://augustl.comllectures/pil/lect-O 1/notes l.htm [Accessed 8 May 2003]
19 Preiser Ancient times to 1648741
20 Randelzhofer Use of Force 265,266
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eighteen hundreds. His theory included the idea that the only positive law was the
commands given by the sovereign or the subordinates of the sovereign.i' This
meant that the sovereign itself would be "legally despotic", as the sovereign power
in any country would not be subject to any command.v' Because the use of force
was without international regulation, it is not surprising that the commands of
sovereigns were the only law regarding the use of force at this time. This was the
legal situation until almost 1919 after World War 1.23
At the beginning of the twentieth century the scene was thus set for the use of force
at any given time. In an attempt to remedy this situation, the Hague Peace
Conferences were held in 1899 and 1907_24Attempts to restrict the use of force
stemmed from an assortment of Conventions. Hague Convention III, for example,
administered the Opening of Hostilities and stated that the contracting powers could
not resort to war without issuing an explicit warning. This warning could be in the
form of either "a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum containing a
conditional declaration of war." This meant that warfare was acceptable as long as a
warning was given before the war commenced. Hague Convention II prohibited the
use of force only for the recovery of specifically contract debts in Article 1. Here
the use of force was not prohibited for the recovery of debts other than contract
debts_25 Declarations dealing with warfare on sea and land as well as peaceful
settlement of international disputes were also made.i" but reference to potential and
present conflicts were avoided. Thus the potential problems "waited in vain for the
difficulties to be lessened by [the] modernization of .. .law.',27
In the light of the reason for holding these conferences, it seems strange that the
attempts to restrict the use of force were at most modest.
21 Van Blerk Jurisprudence: An Introduction (1996) 30
22 idem 32
23 Randelzhofer Use of Force 266
24 ibid
25 ibid
26 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonllawofwar/lawwar.htm [Accessed 28 May 2003]
27 Scupin 1815 to World War 1787
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2 2 2 The Developing Conflict between Sovereignty and Intervention
2 2 2 1 The Sovereign State
While the idea of sovereignty was considered earlier, as seen in the work of St
Aquinas, the concept of a sovereign state was actually given force by the fifteenth
century writings of the Florentine, Niccoló Machiavelli. His political theory
included the idea that "the maintenance of power internally or the preservation of
the State against external enemies ... " must have preference above morals and
law.28 While St Aquinas' approach would possibly support humanitarian
intervention for the protection of individuals' rights as citizens of their state,
Machiavelli's reference to the sub ordinance of morals and law to the preservation
of the state would support the idea that the state and its sovereignty, rather than its
obligations and responsibilities towards its citizens, comes first.
In the sixteenth century Frenchman Jean Bodin emphasized the internal and
external independence of the state, the importance of upholding international
agreements undertaken by states as well as the binding force of such agreements.
This is in contrast with Machiavelli for whom the law seemed to be just a tool in
the game of politics and who attached little value to international agreements and
obligations when the maintenance of state power was involved_29 While the
writings of Machiavelli appeared before those of Bodin, it was nevertheless Bodin
who was regarded as the theoretical founder of the idea of the state's unlimited
power and from whose theory the modern concept of sovereignty was derived.3o
This modern concept of sovereignty was the notion that "there can only be one
ultimate source oflaw in a nation".3l
In the first half of the seventeenth century, the bloody religious wars in Europe
reached their height in the Thirty Years War.32 Extensive peace negotiations led to
28 Preiser Ancient times to 1648 740
29 ibid
30 ibid
31 Luban Just War and Human Rights in Ishay (ed) The Human Rights Reader: Major Political
Essays, Speeches, and Documentsfrom the Bible to the Present (1997) 368 368
32 Verosta History of the Law of Nations: 1648 to 1815 in Bemardt (ed) EPIL Volume 2 (1995) 749
749
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the assembling of a conference of states that eventually drafted the 1648 Peace of
Westphalia.f Through this treaty, members of the "so called Holy Roman Empire,
whose princes had since 1452 consistently elected a Habsburg as German King and
Roman Emperor. .. ,,34gained a status fast approaching today's sovereignty, in that
they could form alliances with foreign powers. As such, the international
community of states as it is known today, "based upon the ideas of territorial
sovereignty, nationality, and the legal equality of states",35 as well as a type of just
war with regard to transgression of the treaty provisions, seems to date from the
Treaties of Westphalia." This treaty made sovereign statehood a legitimate and
practiced norm and gave the sovereign princes, although still part of the Roman
Empire, the power to make foreign alliances, the "freedom of action outside their
borders" vital to sovereignty."
At first only Christian states were accepted into the European Christian civilization,
but after the acceptance of Turkey in 1856 into the community of nations that
existed at the time, "international law ceased to be a law between Christian states
only".38 The notion of the sovereignty of states did not "emerge in a moral
vacuum", but had to be justified. These justifications appeared to take the form of
appeals to values defining the "identity or raison d'être of the state, whether they
entail the pursuit of justice, the achievement of civic glory, the protection of a
divinely ordained social order, or the advancement of individual's rights and the
celebration of the nation".39 Sovereignty is therefore a secondary principle based on
existential values and not in itself, the basis of the society of states.t"
In this time, many different views existed about the rights and duties of states with
regard to their own citizens, as well as regarding other states. Hedley Bull
33 idem 750
34 ibid
35 http://www.guestia.com/PM.gst?action=openPageViewer&docId=27948629 [Accessed 19
November 2003]
36 Verosta 1648 to 1815749, 750
37 Philpott 1995 Vol 48 No 2 Journal of International Affairs 363
38 Dugard International Law 71
39 Reus-Smit "Human Rights and the social construction of sovereignty" 2001 Vol 27 No 4 RIS 519
528
40 ibid
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compared the views of Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant and Hugo de Groot in this
respect." The opposing views of Hobbes and Kant stem from their differences
about a possible international society. Hobbes felt that in an international context,
states were beyond any kind of society and thus the rules of society, including
moral and legal obligations, did not apply to states. States were therefore free to
pursue their goals without the restrictions imposed by such obligations. 42 Kant on
the other hand, saw the citizens or the "peoples" of the later UN Charter'r' as the
community of humankind. He emphasized the link between individuals the world
over as nationals of states and saw the aforementioned community as the core of
international politics and the "object of the highest moral endeavour." In stark
contrast with Hobbes, Kant maintains that relations between states are inferior to
the requirements of this morality."
De Groot tried to find a middle ground between Hobbes and Kant. He described the
international domain as a society of states and contended that states had to conform
to the rules of this society, but that states and not individuals were the primary
members of such a society. States were consequently bound by morals and law, but
rather than the state system being overthrown by "a universal community of
mankind ... " as proposed by Kant's universalist tradition, states should yield to "the
requirements of coexistence and co-operation in a society of states. ,,45
In retrospect, the different views of Hobbes and Kant were a clear indication of the
conflict to come in the debate about humanitarian intervention, which posed the
claim to absolute sovereignty in protecting the state against intervention to protect
the rights of citizens. The balance found in the views of De Groot shows the kind of
compromise that is necessary for something positive to come out of this debate.
41 Bull The Idea of International Society in Williams, Goldstein & Shafritz (ed) Classic Readings of
International Relations (1994) 20 20-23
42 idem 21
43 UN Charter, Preamble
44 Bull The Idea of International Society 21
45 idem 21, 22
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2 2 2 2 Intervention
Before the Peace of Westphalia, non-intervention did not exist as a legal rule and
interventions, including those aimed at protecting "religious brethren", were
considered lawful. In truth, the admissibility of religious interventions was only
terminated at the Peace of Westphalia." The legal concept of intervention
developed after the rise of the sovereign state,47 after which it became the principal
instrument in the power struggles between the European Powers during the
eighteenth century. It was established early on that the right to self-preservation of
intervening states was not an accepted justification for intervention." The fact that
some states continued to pursue their own interests in the name of humanitarian
intervention, then led to the "abstractly formulated prohibition of intervention ... "
which developed as the non-intervention principle not long after.49 This idea gained
support through the writings of, among others, Emmerich de Vattel, an eminent
advocate of sovereignty. The non-intervention principle was nevertheless subject to
significant exceptions including "the right to intervene in order to maintain the
European balance of'power't.i''
In 1793 the French Constitution enshrined the non-intervention principle, but at the
same time reserved the right to intervene by means of assisting other people in their
struggle for liberty" This is telling of the way governments tried to find a balance
between respecting and protecting sovereignty, on the one hand, and trying to
reserve the right to protect the rights of individuals. The doctrine of non-
intervention has been the principal means of prohibiting the use of specifically
armed force since this time. 52 This principle probably stemmed from one of the
biggest concerns with regard to humanitarian intervention, namely that states would
abuse the institution in an attempt to "coerce and dominate their neighbours ... ,,53 In
truth, this concern included such attempts towards any country that might not be
46 Steinberger Sovereignty in Bemardt (ed) EPIL Instalment la (1987) 397 401
47 Opperman Intervention in Bemardt (ed) EPIL Volume 2 (1995) 1436 1436
48 Scupin 1815 to World War 1770
49 idem 771
50 Steinberger Sovereignty 403
51 Schroder Non-intervention, Principle ofin Bemardt (ed) EPIL Instalment 7 (1984) 358 358
52 idem 359
53 Walzer Just and Unjust War 365
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able to defend itself against abusing countries who had the ultimate goal of
furthering their own political and economic interests. It should be noted, however,
that the non-intervention principle was subject to exceptions from the beginning
and was, whatever its advocates might have said, never an absolute rule. 54
De Groot's take on the concerns regarding intervention in De jure belli ac pacis is
that "[t]he right to intervene in order to enforce another's right, such as that of an
oppressed people against their oppressor. .. does not cease to exist simply because
'evil men' might use it as a pretext to seek private ends".55 In "The law of Nations
or the Principles of Natural Law, Applied to the Conduct and to the Affairs of
Nations and Sovereigns" of 1758, even De Vattel approved of unilateral action by a
foreign power against a tyrant to aid oppressed people in their uprising against such
a tyrant. 56 It should be noted, however, that this was endorsed only if "good offices
and mediation fail to be of remedy.t''"
Sovereignty and the nation state became inextricably linked in the nineteenth
century when the institution of option of nationality came to an end. This institution
developed out of the Peace of Westphalia in a time when territories were ceded and
new states formed. People were given the option to "emigrate to any remaining part
of their State of origin while retaining their old citizenship or acquiring the
citizenship of a successor State of their choice.,,58 In the early nineteenth century
however, with the development of the nation state, rulers started to demand fierce
national loyalty. 59 The state that demanded maintenance of absolute sovereignty
was now the same entity that demanded national loyalty from individuals living
within its borders.
One of the consequences of the modern nation state was that intervention by other
states was seen as both hostile and an infringement of the right to self-
54 Schrëder Non-intervention 359
55 Polat "International Law, the Inherent Instability of the International System, and International
Violence" 1999 Vol 19 (Nr 1) OJLS 51 62
56 idem 63
57 ibid
58 Scupin 1815 to World War 1778
59 Younger Intervention: The Historical Development I in Jaquet (ed) Intervention in International
Politics (1971) 12 16
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determination.i" Nevertheless, while governments were claiming the right to deal
with their citizens as they pleased, external powers were progressively taking an
interest in the world at large. This gave rise to the increased invoking of the
protection of human rights and the right to self-determination, especially where
minorities were involved, to intervene in domestic conflict.61 At this time,
arguments including "[c]onsent, self-help against breaches of international law,
humanitarian grounds ... and self-defence" were regarded as valid reasons for
intervention.62
2 2 3 Human Rights and the Focus on the Individual
The weakening of the idea of absolute sovereignty increased through Jean Jacques
Rossouw's "The Social Contract" of 1762. He shifted the focus from the ruler to
the citizens and made sovereignty dependent on a social contract. This involved the
idea that citizens continually reaffirm their consent to be governed by the
democratically elected government. While the day-to-day running of affairs was in
the hands of a few, "sovereignty was retained by the people ... ,,63 Government as
executive power were exercised by those officers whose job it was to give
expression to the will of the people'" and to protect the people's rights. In doing so
they ensured the government's continuing governance.
The idea of government being legitimised by giving effect to the will of the people
was part of the movement towards focusing on the rights of the people and how
governments should give effect to and protect these rights. This view itself was not
in conflict with the relatively newly found sovereignty that leaders of the young
nation states so jealously guarded. However, the protection of these rights by
foreign powers, when the seemingly legitimate government violated the social
60 idem 17
61 ibid
62 Opperman Intervention 1436
63 Kostakopoulou "Floating Sovereignty: A Pathology or a Necessary Means of State Evolution?"
2002 Vo!22 (Nr 1) OJLS 135 141
64 ibid
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contract, formed the reason for the humanitarian interventions that breached this
sovereignty.
The move towards focus on individuals and humanitarian principles reached its
peak in the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 190665. These conventions dealt with
the consequences of war and tried to make it as humane as possible in making
provision for the handling of the wounded and sick in war situations. Another such
humanitarian treaty is the Declaration of St Petersburg and dealt with the use of
explosives in battle."
In the nineteenth century the demands for the protection of minority rights and the
treaties that followed, imposed conditions on states that wanted to enter into the
European system. However, "it was not until the 1878 Treaty of Berlin that
minority protection came to be a normal condition placed on new states", and while
it did not mean that minorities were not persecuted anymore, it was still seen as a
legitimate norm.67
2 3 Humanitarian Interventions
The concerns that existed about intervention as discussed above were not
unfounded. Some of the interventions in this era displayed a use of force, which
was entirely unproportional. One example occurred as a result of the ransacking of
the house of a British citizen, Daniel Pacifico, in Athens in 1827. Greece paid no
heed to his claims to reparation and referred him to the Greek courts. This ended in
the British Mediterranean fleet turning up just outside of the Greek ports and this
led to the citizen recovering damages from the Greek govemment"
Despite the ulterior political motives often involved, some of these interventions
indeed served humanitarian purposes. One such an intervention was carried out by
65 http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalonilawofwar/geneva04.htm [Accessed 2 March 2004]
66 Scupin 1815 to World War 1780, 781
67 Philpott 1995 Vol 48 No 2 Journal of International Affairs 365; This treaty was concluded
between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia and Turkey
68 Shwarz Intervention: The Historical Development II in Jaquet (ed) Intervention in International
Politics (1971) 2933
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the Holy Alliance69 in favour of Greece. Under the Ottoman administration the
oppressed Christian population of Greece and the conquered Balkan countries were
vanquished in a number of ways. Without revolt, they lived "within a context of
relative liberty dictated by the Islamic Law principles ... " which involved their
children being Islamised and the able bodied integrated into the Turkish army's
infantry. Furthermore the Greek farmers were subservient to the power of Turkish
military feudalism, which was established at the best land properties. When the
Ottoman Empire spread Islamization and "massacres, immigration and subjugation
of entire areas ... " increased, the Greeks had only the orthodox monastery
mountains left.7o
The rebirth of the classical definition of humanitarian intervention stemmed from
the Holy Alliance intervention that followed. The Navies of Britain, Russia and
France united and destroyed the Turkish/Egyptian Navy in Navarino in a
synchronized naval battle that paved the way to the substantial liberation of
Greece.Ï' This kind of intervention once again became the doctrine of De Vitoria,
which held that it was lawful to take action against a state denying its own citizens
their essential rights.72 Today this is known as Humanitarian Intervention.r'
After the intervention, the Greek General Assembly approved the new Constitution
and elected Ioannis Kapodistrias as the first President of the Greek Republic in
1827. Considering that Britain, France and Russia were part of the intervening
forces; it is ironic that they recognized the sovereignty and independence of Greece
only by 1830. This happened as a result of the London protocol, issued by the three
major forces, which ensured Greece's independence. Only "[t]wo years later [were]
the borders of the new state traced - far [more] restricted than what the Greeks had
69 Verosta Holy Alliance in Bernardt (ed) EPIL Volume 2 (1995) 861 861 The Holy Alliance was
part of a series of treaties concluded in 1814 between Austria, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia in
an attempt to restore the balance of power in Europe and [ironically] bring an end to the
interventions that laid Europe to waist
70 http://www.mfa.gr/english/greece/through tirne/history/ottoman.htrnl [Accessed 22 May 2003]
71 ibid
72 Scupin 1815 to World War 1771
73 ibid
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expected: the northern border [was] just over the Corinth Gulf'. 74When Greece
became a monarchy under Otto of Bavaria, the 1827 constitution became obsolete.
The three mentioned European forces assumed the role of protectors of the new
Greek administration, but while they guaranteed the borders of the country, this
actually restrained its independence. The Greek State was now acknowledged, but
the actual constitutional regime, degree of independence and exact territory
remained obscure, since there was no legitimate constitution at this point. This led
to political instability and despite an improved constitution accepted in 1864, the
impact of royal interventions, appointed "minority governments and abusive
dissolution of the parliament" destabilized the country bit by bit. 75Only in 1897
was King George I forced to accept the 'Principle of Parliamentary Majority'
officially, "a key issue, pertaining to the parliamentary system, which had been
torturing the political life of the country for over 40 years.,,76
The conduct of the intervening forces after intervention did not arise out of any
agreement between international parties, but was rather the outcome of decisions
regarding only this situation and the interests of the intervening parties. When
France intervened in Syria in 1860 to protect the Christians, this pragmatic
approach was also taken.77 The aristocracy and peasants from different groups
retaliated after initial successes in a Christian peasant uprising in part of Syria."
Instead of just aiming to stop the uprising in its tracks, the Muslim retaliators
started butchering Christians by the village. In Dayr-al-Qamar 2 200 Christians
were slaughtered in a day. In Hasbayya, the Druzes besieged the resisting
Christians. Because the Christians were without any help, they finally entrusted
themselves to the Ottoman garrison, which disarmed them before handing them
over to the Druzes, who killed every one of them. "In Lebanon alone, 360 Christian
villages were destroyed in a premeditated attempt to alter the geographic repartition
of the population: 250 Christians were killed in battlefield; 11 000 treacherously
74 http://www.mfa.grIenglish/greece/through time/history/ottoman.html [Accessed 22 May 2003]
75 ibid
76 ibid
77 Beyerlin Humanitarian Intervention 927
78 These groups consisted of among others Druzes, Shiis, Sunnis, Bedouins and eventually also
some of the Ottoman contingent soldiers who were supposed to protect the Christians
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butchered and 4 000 died of hunger; 6 000 widows and 10 000 orphans; 100 000
homeless. The Druzes had lost 1 300 men in battlefield and in contrast with the
Christians, only 176 Druzes [had been] murdered".79
A French expeditionary force was sent to Lebanon to restore peace and protect the
Christians and arrived in Beirut harbour in August 1860. After the intervention, the
Europeans and the Ottomans "agreed to reorganize the Lebanese political
system".80 An autonomous entity, called Moutasarrifia, which "included a
population of 300 000 with an overwhelming Christian majority (89%)" was
established and ruled by a non-Lebanese Christian Ottoman official.81
As seen in these examples, as well as the previous discussion about developing
theories that have an influence on humanitarian interventions today, the conduct
and responsibilities of the intervening parties after intervention has never been a
focus of development.
2 4 Conclusion
It seems that a large number of the influences on what would eventually become
humanitarian intervention have a long history and were still fervently debated until
World War 1. The most important influence on the use of force in this era,
however, seemed to have been the just war theory. As this theory had lost all its
influence, the regulation of the use of force had reached an all time low directly
before World War 1. As wayward forcible interventions were wreaking havoc, the
international community used the non-intervention principle as an instrument to
stop interventions of any kind. This principle did not succeed, as there were no
standards by which to judge the interventions that followed and no authority to
enforce the non-intervention principle. Instead of trying to remedy the situation the
international community claimed helplessness and looked on while the unregulated
use of force drove the world to ruin. It became critical that some sort of review was
79 http://www.lebanese-forces.orgllebanonlhistory.htm [Accessed 21 May 2003]
80 ibid
81 ibid
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developed to determine when the use of force would be acceptable in international
relations.
At the same time, the idea of sovereignty developed and states started to demand
the rights to internal and external sovereignty. This meant that inside the state's
territorial borders the sovereign unit had the exclusive law-making and law-
enforcing authority. Outside the borders, independent states equal in status
recognised one another as inviolable and authoritative bodies.82 The Peace of
Westphalia made the sovereign state "a legitimate political unit... It implied that
basic attributes of statehood such as the existence of a government with control of
its territory were now, along with Christianity, the criteria for becoming a state ...
[It] removed all legitimate restrictions on a state's activities within its territory.,,83
However, the realization of these demands was severely limited because of the
claimed helplessness with regard to unregulated interventions, with a result that the
prospects for absolute sovereignty looked less and less likely. Ultimately it seems
that the pre-World War I society of states and the existing concept of sovereignty
did not pass the "test of the fundamental ideas of a universal international legal
order", as it could not maintain international peace.f" The conflict between
protecting the sovereignty of states and humanitarian intervention did not look
ready to be resolved.
Nevertheless, the awareness of the right of citizens to be protected by their own
government and the growing denouncement of oppressing governments by state
leaders left a need for some kind of intervention to relieve the plight of oppressed
people. It also paved the way for the human rights culture and lifted the acceptable
standard of treatment of a state's own nationals considerably. Even though the
standard from which it was lifted was very low, the effect of the expanding
humanitarian consciousness should not be underestimated. It is to be expected that
many growing pains would accompany the birth of any institution with a
potentially vast impact on international relations. Although the picture seemed
82 Kostakopoulou 2002 Vo122 (Nr 1) OJLS 135
83 Philpott 1995 Vol 48 No 2 Journal of International Affairs 364
84 Steinberger Sovereignty 407
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structurally dismal, the idea of intervention for humanitarian purposes provided a
possible meaningful addition to the international arena.
One of the things that had the potential to nullify any positive effect this kind of
intervention could have was the uncertainty about the post-intervention
responsibilities of intervening forces towards the people for the sake of whom they
intervened. At the beginning of World War I there were no guidelines for how this
would be done and questions regarding the responsibility of rebuilding institutions
and/or the economy, promoting reconciliation and punishing war criminals were
addressed only when they surfaced. Similar to the debates about the conflict
between sovereignty and intervention, this issue was not the subject of furious
debates, and thus left the world without a yardstick by which the process could be
evaluated.
While the differences with regard to the influences on humanitarian intervention
did not seem to be near any kind of resolution, other important developments were
taking place. In the nineteenth century the intense focus on theory decreased, for
example, and international law developed the characteristic of considering state
practice.f This would become a very significant part of establishing customary
international law, as explained in Chapter One.
The practice of states to conclude treaties did not seem to be of any immediate
advantage to the future idea of humanitarian intervention. Many were concluded,
most of which focused on keeping peace and on political and economic relations.
None, however, seemed to focus on regulating intervention specifically for
humanitarian purposes.
Another development that occurred in the debate between preserving state power
and the place of morality and law in the international arena was the realization that
law and adherence to it would play a central part in international relations.
Especially the Hague Conventions, the first of which was initiated by Russia and
the second by the United States (US), showed that even seemingly natural enemies
realized the importance of a legal framework in the modem international law.
85 Scupin 1815 to World War 1769
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Unfortunately these conventions were denied the role that they could have played in
peaceful international relations. This was caused by the unwillingness of
participants to address valid potential conflict in a relatively neutral environment
where all relevant players were together.
It should be remembered, that in the beginning there was no real mention of
humanitarian intervention by that name. Even though humanitarian intervention had
been widely discussed, it carried the definition of the Encyclopedia of Public
International Law,86 and seemed to develop as just another specific reason for
intervention. This is probably because the focus on human rights as we know it
today only really came into being in the last century.
Most of the interventions that did happen were not truly humanitarian, but rather
aimed at supporting states' own nationals abroad and was often not proportional to
the injury suffered. Although they were never done in the name of humanitarian
purposes, the possibility of abuse in the name of humanity clearly existed. It is
possible to find a humanitarian approach in almost any situation where justification
is necessary for intervention to actually further economic or political interests.
The examples of humanitarian intervention shown were nevertheless well justified
and set a standard for the kind of situations in which interventions could be
allowed. Even so, this standard was not fixed and would, for the time being, remain
part of the discourse about when such humanitarian intervention was justified. The
fact is that because our international legal order is based on a system of equal,
sovereign states, it is neither possible nor desirable to allow intervention for all
human rights abuses. The situation with regard to interventions and the use of force,
as it stood before World War I is evidence of where such a policy would lead.
However, before World War I it became clear that the world could not stand by and
watch while an entire ethnic group was systematically being wiped out.
At the end of this era the influences, which would eventually lead to the idea of
humanitarian intervention and the controversy surrounding such intervention, were
thus still debated. Although this was true of the use of force and the conflict
86 Beyerlin Humanitarian Intervention 926
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between sovereignty and intervention, the reality was that another influence, the
responsibilities of intervening forces after intervention, was hardly discussed at all.
Nevertheless, one aspect saw some very positive changes in the midst of all this
debate. This was the shift in focus from the state towards the rights of the
individual. De Groot's vision for international relations as discussed above'" might
be seen as an ideal, but the reality is that if a balance between the state and the
individual is not found, possible future humanitarian intervention could remain a
problem instead of becoming the solution that it could be.
87 Bull The Idea of International Society 21, 22
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CHAPTER THREE
Developments from World War I until World War II
"How can 1, as an advocate of human rights, resist the assertion of a moral
imperative on states to intervene in the internal affairs of another state
where there is evidence of ethnic cleansing rape and other forms of
systematic and widespread abuse, regardless of what the Charter mandates
about the use of force and its allocation of competence? "J
- Christine M Chinkin
3 1 Introduction
Until World War I a strong commitment to the sovereign state as the only subject of
international law was a basic quality of the international system. Further elements
of this classic system were the recognition of war as the definitive weapon for law
enforcement and protection of national interest, as well as the disorganised
character of the international community. After World War I a new international
law system developed. The international community was organised within the
League of Nations and the League Covenant restricted war as an executive
instrument. This system was more receptive to the idea of restricted sovereignty
and sensitive to the individual's human rights and its protection? Since the idea of
sovereignty is an integral part of the history of international law, it is not surprising
that some of the core elements of international law are of immense importance to
the exploration of sovereignty itself. One of the elements of specific importance
here is the question " ... whether and to what extent interventions ... by foreign
powers are admissible'v' This question became even more important after World
War I when the community of nations, dismayed at the destruction brought about
by The Great War, tried to prevent such use of force from ever happening again.
I Chinkin "Kosovo: A 'good' or 'bad' war?" 1999 Vo193 AJIL 841 843
2 Grewe History of the Law of Nations: World War I to World War II in Bemardt (ed) EPIL Volume
2 (1995) 839 839
3 Steinberger Sovereignty 397
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Although the Hague Peace Conferences, held for the very reason to prevent the
kind of devastation brought about by World War I and therefore part of the efforts
to limit and regulate the use of force, were commendable, they proved to be
unsuccessful. The outbreak of World War I prevented a planned third conference,"
in which the strategies of the Peace Conferences would have come together.
During this period a concept human rights which, according to Henkin, included
those liberties, immunities and benefits that human beings should be able to claim
"as of right" of the society in which they live, gained support.' Simultaneously,
states claimed the indestructibility of their sovereignty with more and more vigour.
Thus, in the time between the two world wars there seemed to have been a constant
interchange between acknowledging the need to protect individuals and the need to
preserve the state system.
As a newly formed global organisation, the League played a significant role in the
changing views on the relationship between different states and their citizens. In
explaining the value of the League, Rappard compared it with economic
commodities.
"Just as in economic theory the value of a commodity is determined by
the intensity of the need it satisfies or of the privation that would result
from its abolition, so the real nature of a political body is revealed by its
actual contribution to the life of the collectivity or ... the loss that the
community would suffer in its disappearance.t"
While the League did not last, its contribution to the communication between
nations remains invaluable, as shown below.
An examination of the development of the notion of humanitarian intervention
between the two world wars requires consideration of the influence and value of the
League. The factors causing some of the problems with regard to humanitarian
intervention identified in Chapter Two, namely the use of force, sovereignty,
4 idem 407
5 Henkin Human Rights in Bernardt (ed) EP/L Volume 2 (1995) 886 886
6 Rappard What is the League of Nations? in The Professors of the Graduate Institute of
International Studies (ed) The World Crisis (1938) 36 39
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intervention and the responsibilities intervening forces might have after
intervention, are also studied in this chapter. In addition, the roots of the problems
arising from the United Nations system, including the Security Council discretion
with regard to a "threat to international peace and security" are considered.
32 The League of Nations
3 2 1 Establishment of the League
When the League of Nations was established, it was intended to be a global
undertaking for securing international peace and security "by a collective effort in
the form of a permanent universal international organisation't.Ï The origins of the
League are to be found in various private and public schemes during World War I
and in the Paris negotiations aimed at ending the war. The most significant example
of governmental ideals about the organizing of states into an international body is
found in the South African Jan Christiaan Smuts' leaflet, "The League of Nations:
A Practical Suggestion". 8 While a committee established at the Paris Peace
Conference" created the Covenant, it was an integral part of the Treaty of
Versailles, which brought an end to Word War I. The Covenant, the product of
"wartime planning and post-war negotiations" and of emerging trends in
"international life", became effective on 10 January 1920.10 The truth is that in the
formation of the League, the victorious Principal Allied and Associated Powers
were moulding the world under their "oligarchical direction", which meant that the
world would be organized under the leadership of just a few great powers. This is
seen from the provision of permanent membership for five of these great powers. I I
The rest of the members of the League did not have the influence that came with
permanent membership. With its predominantly liberal tone, the League was
7 Steinberger Sovereignty 408
8 Claude Swords into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International Organization 3rd ed
(1964) 37
9 ibid
10 idem 38
Il idem 44
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intimately linked to the ideology and values of a democratic society,12 which
emphasized the existence of the will of all the people and affirmed the idea that
governments are "merely the agents of the collective will, .. ,,13
The collective will of the people underpinning the democratic state is still an
imprecise notion and not very clear. While democratic governments do take public
opinion into account, it is a fictitious assumption that goverments' decisions are
dictated by the will of the people.l" Although the significance of democratic society
should not be lessened, it is important not to forget that governments generally do
what they think their people need and not necessarily what their citizens really
want. Nevertheless, the League strongly defended this ideology and would not
admit any nation that could not show that its institutions were free.15 Despite the
fact that these ideas about democracy were enforced on its members, the League
was never intended to be the kind of revolutionary organisation that would change
the international law system and structure of the time. Rather, it had as goal the
creating of safety devices to prevent anything like the Great War to happen again."
Nevertheless, the power that the League did have to resolve disputes between states
was not necessarily that effective. When a dispute did occur, the League could
essentially resort to one of three sanctions. In the first place, if arbitration or judicial
settlement proved to be unsuccessful, the League could introduce a "verbal
sanction", "warning an aggressor nation that she would need to leave another
nation's territory or face the consequences't.l" If this had no effect "[t]he League
could order League members not to do any trade with an aggressor nation ... " by
introducing economic sanctions, and failing this, military force could be
authorised.i" While this might seem very similar to the UN system, the difference is
that while the League also did not have a military force at its disposal, "no member
12 idem 46
13 Bourquin The Crisis of Democracy in The Professors of the Graduate Institute ofIntemational
Studies (ed) The World Crisis (1938) 60 60
14 ibid
15 Claude Swords into Plowshares 46
16 idem 49
17 http://www.historyleamingsite.co.ukJleagueofnations.htm [Accessed 26 November 2003]; League
of Nations, The Covenant of the League of Nations (1920), Article 15
18 ibid; Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 16
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of the League had to provide [a military force] under the terms of joining" and thus
the League could not implement any of its threats.i"
3 2 2 Influence of the League
3 2 2 1 Sovereignty
Of importance with regard to sovereignty, is the concept of domestic jurisdiction
that appears to have been adopted as a legal notion in article 15(8) of the League
Covenant. The formulation of this notion includes matters "in which the state is free
from international obligations of any kind".2o It is thus clear that domestic
jurisdiction is a relative concept, dependent on the number of treaties signed by the
state, customary international law and the obligations that a state has freely agreed
to.21
Except for the introduction of the concept of domestic jurisdiction, the League
Covenant also introduced the mandate system. This system, under which the
tutelage of Trust territories was assigned to advanced nations, was in truth
disguised colonialism, as reflected in the Covenant's description of the colonies,
"which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of
the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not
yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modem
world" _22Thus "the granting of mandates often represented nothing more than the
granting of spoils to the different victorious allied governments't.r' According to
article 22 of the Covenant, this system allowed a wide discretion regarding the
implementation of different mandates: "The character of the mandate must differ
according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation
of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.v'"
Furthermore, the "degree of authority, control or administration, to be exercised by
19 http://www.historyleamingsite.co.uk/leagueofnations.htm [Accessed 26 November 2003]
20 Conforti Law and Practice 135
21 ibid
22 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22
23 http://www.mideastweb.orglleaguemand.htm [Accessed 26 November 2003]
24 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22
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the Mandatory [were], if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the
League ... explicitly defined in each case by the Council. A permanent Commission
[was additionally]. .. constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the
Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of
the mandates.,,25 This system, however, did not last long in the progressive
development towards the independence and sovereignty of colonies"
In this time, the sovereignty of the advanced nations themselves was being limited
as a result of the "only lasting significance of the peace process,,27 after World War
1. This was a result of the minority clauses included in the peace treaties signed
with enemy states, which required the signatories to grant civil and political rights
as well as religious and cultural tolerance, to minority groups within their countries.
These minorities included people who differed by race or language from the rest of
the population in a country. The observance of these treaties were supervised by the
Council of the League as well as monitored by the Permanent Court of International
Justice (PCIJ), established in 1920. Where states had records of mistreatment of
minorities, their admission to the League was made conditional on their protection
of the rights of these people within their borders. The significance of the minority
clauses was the fact that they were the first human rights limitations enforced by an
international institution on sovereign states_28
While several aspects of the idea of absolute sovereignty was being criticised, the
core elements of sovereignty were being codified in the Montevideo Convention on
the Rights and Duties of States in 1933_29This was done to guide the process of
recognition of states that was earlier heavily influenced by political
considerations. 3D The problems regarding the influence of political considerations
on the recognition of statehood by other states, is specifically seen in the conflict
between the two schools of thought about this issue. While the declaratory school
25 ibid
26 Grewe World War I to World War II 843
27 Robertson Crimes against humanity 16
28 ibid
29 Dugard International Law 72
30 idem 71
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maintains that upon "meeting the factual requirements of statehood't." recognition
by other states simply acknowledges statehood, the constitutive school argues that
recognition by other states is one of the requirements of statehood.Y This has the
effect that a contender for statehood can be both a state and a non-state if it is
recognized by some states and not by others. As a result Lauterpacht reasoned that
when a contender for statehood meets the Montevideo requirements, states should
have the duty to grant recognition.r'
The elements in the Montevideo Convention included four requirements, which
were a permanent population, a defined territory, a functioning government and the
capacity to enter into relations with other states.Ï" It seems that these requirements
assisted in establishing one of the main elements of sovereignty; that a state can
exercise "adequate" authority over its own territory to the exclusion of other
states.35 Hall's emphasis on the state's duty, as arising from the right to its own
sovereign independence, to respect the independence of others, may have added to
this development. 36
Thus, although the idea of sovereignty was being established and supported by
some writers, it was also "limited" by the increasing focus on the individual and
human rights. This tension in international law caused by these conflicting values is
still seen today.
3 2 2 2 Intervention and Responsibilities of Intervening Forces after
Intervention
At this time, the international legal order developed into a political body, influenced
by political interests and dictated by the values of the states part of this order, which
was both more interdependent and more penetrable than its predecessors. These
changes were particularly felt with regard to intervention, as they pierced the non-
31 idem 80
32 ibid
33 idem 81
34 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), Article 1
35 ICISS Supplementary Volume 6
36 Hall A Treatise on International Law 7th ed (1917) 54
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intervention principle." The international community began to see intervention as
the business of the body of nations and not just the business of a single state;" and
thus collective security was introduced. In theory, this meant that intervention by a
single state as an instrument of foreign policy was prohibited, whatever its
justification, while collective intervention under authority of the League of Nations
or regional organisations such as the Pan American Union [PAU] and subsequently
the Organization of American States [OAS], was accepted.i" Article 10 of the
Covenant for example, stated that "[t]he Members of the League undertake to
respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and
existing political independence of all Members of the League.Y'" While the
Covenant of the League of Nations furthermore provided for collective intervention
specifically to prevent disturbances of peace in article 11,41 and some writers
ascribed to the League the ability to protect nationals against their own government,
the League was loath to exercise such powers.42
It seems that states had difficulty deciding where they stood with regard to
intervention and the possible restriction of sovereignty in this era. At the 1936
Inter-American Conference in Buenos Aires, for example, the United States
subscribed to the practice of absolute non-intervention, which all signatories had
committed to. Two years later at the Lima Inter-American Conference, the US
successfully pushed for a new practice of collective action to protect the security of
the member states.43
Since much uncertainty existed with regard to whether and by whom intervention
could take place, even some of the more vigorous advocates of non-intervention
allowed for intervention in certain situations. Hall maintained, for example, that
intervention as a result of "the prevalence of ideas which are opposed to the views
37 Grewe World War I to World War II 841
38 Wehberg Civil War and International Law in The Professors of the Graduate Institute of
International Studies (ed) The World Crisis (1938) 160 163
39 Grewe World War I to World War II 841; Younger Intervention 19
40 Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 10
41 Wehberg Civil War and International Law 189
42 Grewe World War I to World War 11841
43 idem 842
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held by the intervening state or its rulers,,44 ceases to be legitimate. Whether the
prevalence of certain ideas in the governing state included the execution of these
ideas is unclear. The fact is that if these ideas included the abuse of human rights, it
would mean that intervention for the protection of human rights was illegal. This is
because the mere fact of intervention would mean that the ideas of the intervening
state about the protection of human rights would be different from the ideas of the
governing state. At the same time, however, intervention with the aim of freeing
people from tyranny, among other things, was acceptable.Y Such a situation would
form part of one of the four acceptable grounds for intervention, which is the "right
of opposing wrong-doing ... ,,46Because international law was only concerned with
the relations between states, and massacres, tyranny and persecution were assumed
not to have anything to do with the relation between states, these wrong-doings
would fall under the ground mentioned above only if international law was
competent to take notice of them.47 These conflicting views on intervention and
when it would be acceptable is telling of the hesitance regarding a focus on the
individual in the early twentieth century.
It seems that the major powers in this era were more concerned about the
legitimacy of intervention in civil war, which often occurred because of the tension
between different political factions in newly recognized states, than about other
kinds of intervention. This was because newly recognized states, jealously guarding
their recently found independence, were frequently very sensitive about any kind of
intervention by foreign states. Nevertheless, one of the grounds on which
intervention in civil wars could happen then, seems to be closely related to the
possible grounds for humanitarian intervention. This ground arose when a civil war
was conducted "in defiance of all the principles of humanity ... ,,48 It appears that
intervention for such humanitarian purposes, could only be undertaken if
intervention were truly the only way in which the observance of humanitarian
44 Hall A Treatise 295
45 idem 299
46 idem 294
47 idem 298
48 Wehberg Civil War and International Law 190
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principles could be ensured. In addition, it was considered that intervention could
not be illegal if the rebels engaged in cruel and inhumane practices, such as the
blinding and maiming of their prisoners, since such an intervention had as its
purpose the protection of human beings and their basic rights. In truth, it seems that
the more inhumane and appalling the practices, the greater the inspiration to
intervene as a result of the revulsion of the international community for such
atrocious behaviour in the waging of civil war. Even so, such inhumane practices
did apparently not happen frequently.Ï' something that cannot be said about
contemporary practices, as the mutilation and maiming committed by the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the ousted Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council (AFRC) in Sierra Leone demonstrate'". The idea that intervention could be
lawful in the face of such inhumane practices is a possible standard for
humanitarian intervention today; as such an idea would form part of the basis of
human rights law.
Similar to humanitarian intervention before World War I, the responsibilities of the
intervening forces after intervention were hardly considered in the time between the
two world wars. Although the lack of consideration given to this issue might have
something to do with the fact that humanitarian interventions were scarce, the main
reason is probably simply that as the protection of human rights and the
responsibilities it brings were not an accepted institution, the debate about
intervention and sovereignty dominated the international legal field during this era.
3 2 2 3 The Use of Force
After the damage done by World War I, the need to prohibit or firmly regulate the
use of force was an important purpose of the League. But, since it was never
intended to be a super State, the League did not have any executive power in the
form of collective armed force or peacekeeping units to enforce the decisions made
under the Covenant. At the same time, however, the lack of provision for collective
49 ibid
50 http://web .amnesty .orgllibrary/lndexlEN GAFR51 0 151998? open&of= ENG-3 12 [Accessed 2
March 2004]
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armed force rendered the prohibition of armed force as instrument of national
policy deficient.51
An additional effort to regulate the use of force was the 1924 Geneva Protocol for
the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, which never became valid. It
provided in article 2 that states could not resort to war, except in self-defence or as
part of collective coercive measures. 52 Although these measures were vague, they
seem to have constituted an attempt at regulating collective armed force. Had they
been validated, this Protocol would have been more effective than the League.
Ultimately, it was the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 that proved to be the most
enterprising effort to regulate the use of force. However, while the Pact established
a more comprehensive prohibition of specifically war as a form of armed force, the
sanctions for contravening the treaty terms included only the denial of the treaty
benefits. Added to this was the fact that states now used force that fell just short of
war to escape the insignificant effect that contravention of the treaty terms had.
On the whole, it seems that although efforts were made to regulate the use of force,
the political will to effectively enforce it was lacking where both the League and
the Kellogg-Briand Pact were concerned and as such, neither succeeded in
preventing the unregulated use of force. 53 Nevertheless, these efforts helped to
transform the idea of war as an acceptable instrument into the idea of a more
regulated use of force. The importance attached to these efforts is seen in existing
opinions that the regulations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, including the prohibition
of war subject only to the exception of self-defence, are part of today's customary
international law.i"
3 2 2 4 Human Rights
The new world order was still cautious with regard to the protection of human
rights. The concept was mentioned neither at the Versailles Peace Conference that
51 Grewe World War Ito World War II 845
52 Randelzhofer Use of Force 266
53 Grewe World War I to World War II 846
54 Randelzhofer Use of Force 267
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brought an end to World War I, nor in the Covenant of the League. The closest the
Covenant came to mentioning human rights was in article 23, in which members
"promised 'just treatment' to natives in Trust territories and [promised] that they
would 'endeavour to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions of labour'''. 55
In this era the political will to protect human rights came second to the concern of
the colonial powers that the recognition of such rights would render the people in
"their" colonial domains restless. As such, these nations quashed a proposal made
by Haiti at the League in 1934 to create a treaty guaranteeing the human rights of
ethnic minorities.i" which was probably the only time that the protection of
minorities was ever mentioned at the League.
The virtual silence that existed on the subject of the protection of human rights in
this time should not be mistaken for a portrayal of the degree of adherence to
human rights. From 1936 to 1938 the so-called show trials in Moscow, which was
used to justify the extermination of Stalin's political opponents, masked the
elimination of more people than the six million Jews that died in the Holocaust. In
Moscow alone 30 000 defendants, whose confessions were mainly obtained
through torture, were sentenced to death by firing squad. 57 Regardless of the
tentative moves toward a stronger focus on the rights of the individual, however,
nothing was done to stop these atrocities.
International legal instruments regarding human rights were limited at this time and
since the League did not comprise a central law-making authority, the codification
of customary international law and the conclusion of law-making treaties increased
as a kind of substitute. Two treaties that emphasized the focus on the growing
humanitarian sentiment in particular were the Geneva Convention relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Geneva Convention for the Relief of the
Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field. Both were adopted in 1929.58
55 Robertson Crimes against humanity 16
56 idem 21
57 idem 17
58 Grewe World War I to World War II 844
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322 5 Roots of the United Nations
While the jury was still deciding on the acceptability of intervention by individual
states, it seems that intervention by "the body of states, or ... some of them acting
for the whole in good faith with sufficient warrant" was tolerated. 59 The term
"sufficient warrant" here seemed to refer strictly to international interests/" Even
though intervention by international bodies in affairs of states was becoming
tolerable, it is unclear whether the protection of human rights would necessarily
have been included in such interests." The idea that only international interests -
and not the domestic affairs of states - could warrant intervention is an early sign of
the principles found in the UN Charter.
Early signs of what would become a "threat to international peace and security", the
justification for armed intervention under the Security Council relevant to this
study, are found in the writings of Hall, who claimed that when the "safety of a
state is gravely and immediately threatened either by occurrences in another state,
or aggression prepared there",62 the self-preservation of a state could take
precedence over its duty to respect the other state's freedom to do as it pleases
within its borders. It seems that the threatened state could take the steps necessary
to prevent such a threat, although it is not clear what such steps could include.
While such a situation might look more like self-defence, it was clear that by this
time threats to international peace and security were not tolerated any longer.
In addition to these early signs of some of the principles that would eventually be
found in the UN Charter, the roots of two other principles are also found in the
League system. The first of these is the provision for permanent membership of the
five great powers to the League. This idea precedes the permanent membership of
the five great powers to the Security Council today. Another principle involves the
notion that only collective intervention is acceptable, while intervention by a single
state would be illegal. While the League only existed until shortly after the Second
59 Hall A Treatise 303
60 ibid
61 Younger Intervention 19
62 Hall A Treatise 55
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World War, it played a valuable role in shaping the post-World War I international
order.
3 3 Relevant Theories and Views
Towards the 1930's a new international human rights debate ensued. One of the
prominent contributors was the British author H.G. Wells. In a series of letters
written to The Times in 1939, he advocated the adoption of a Declaration of Rights.
This seems to have played quite a significant role in the human rights revival. This
document would be "a fundamental law defining rights in a democracy". 63 He and a
few friends drafted a declaration existing of nine principles that were printed as a
booklet, "H.G. Wells on the Rights of Man". According to Robertson, this debate
and these principles so influenced the president of the United States that after
America joined the Allies in the Second World War, the Allied powers stated that
"complete victory over their enemies [was] essential.. .to preserve human rights
and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands".64 Wells was probably the
first to demand the "New World Order" in which fundamental human rights of
individuals would be protected against "governments of whatever political
complexion. ,,65
Another author of significance is the French jurist Georges Scelle. During the first
half of the twentieth century he played an important role in removing the state from
its central position in the system of international law. Scelle included the individual
as a subject of international law and saw the world order as quasi-federal, with the
League having a superior role in this order.66 Under his influence, "the concept of
sovereignty was all but banished from the research and teaching of the international
law faculties of French universities". 67
63 Robertson Crimes against humanity 22
64 ibid
65 idem 23
66 Grewe World War I to World War II 843
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In his 1932 work, Précis du droit des gens, he emphasized the futility of the desire
to build international law on the idea of sovereignty and maintained that "[i]n
practice, this concept only leads to the release of governments' will from the grip of
law, to destroy the notion of competence, and with it the notion of legality".68
Additionally he stressed the League and governments' responsibility to protect
"individual rights". In the same work, while hinting at the persecution of Jews and
other minorities in Germany, which was brought to the attention of the Assembly of
the League of Nations, he wrote the following about individual freedom:
"It may perhaps seem paradoxical to devote this first chapter to what the
classic legal literature calls individual rights at a time when in many
countries these rights are openly ignored or brutally violated by
governments while other governments, and the League of Nations itself,
which, it is submitted, have a duty to intervene and safeguard the law,
do not appear willing to make the necessary effort to fulfil this legal
duty. Their excuse can perhaps be found in their impotence. Without
question, the law is in a period of regression. Is this a reason to refrain
from setting forth the rules? Quite the contrary, it is important not to
weaken their expression. ,,69
Scelle's writings can be seen as a portrayal of the interest in human rights
protection, which developed progressively under the influence of the reviving
naturallaw.7o
3 4 Humanitarian Interventions
In this era, it became clear that the non-intervention principle was unequipped to
deal with the emerging nature of armed conflict. During the Spanish Civil War,
Communist Soviet Union and fascist Germany and Italy clashed on Spanish
territory in an international conflict under the guise of civil war. While Britain and
68 ibid
69 ibid
70 Grewe World War I to World War II 843
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France tried to contain foreign infiltration, it became apparent that non-intervention
restrained government support, but not volunteers or support through private
channels.Ï'
Since this is about the closest thing to humanitarian intervention in this era, it seems
strange that in the midst of the debates about intervention and sovereignty and the
increasing focus on human rights, there were no significant humanitarian
interventions during this time. If anything, a blind eye was turned at gross human
rights abuses such as the elimination of Stalin's opponents.
3 5 Conclusion
While debates were still being waged, especially on sovereignty and intervention, it
seems that human rights definitely saw some progress in this era. In addition, the
developments of some of the principles of the United Nations system are now
clearly visible in the League structure.
While the potential value of the League of Nations and all its deliberative bodies
was obvious from early on, even though the League did not comprise a central law-
making authority, the inability of the different states to reconcile their political
agendas could ultimately have paralysed the League.f This is seen in the fact that
states accepted the international agreements after the Great War with great
enthusiasm in so far as the agreements "offered obvious technical advantages and
only slightly restricted their national freedom of action ... ,,73 However, "it was quite
different when they were asked to sign political pacts directly involving their
national sovereignty.v'" It seems that even after the devastation of World War I, the
nations of the world had still not accepted the fact that peace and the promise of
individual freedom would not leave their sovereignty untouched.
Another reason for the blows sovereignty was dealt is to be found in the Spanish
civil war. Even though Britain and France's efforts to suppress the conflict of the
71 idem 842
72 Rappard What is the League of Nations? 42
73 idem 52
74 ibid
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Spanish civil war were not in any way a humanitarian intervention, the uncommon
features of the armed conflict they faced, gave the world a taste of the kind of
conflict that would dominate the rest of the twentieth century. Unlike the Second
World War in which conflict happened between states, most conflicts today seem to
include gross human rights abuses and happen within the borders of a single state.
Because of the nature of such conflicts, it becomes increasingly difficult to
maintain the integrity of such borders if the human rights of its citizens are to be
protected by the international community. It is the extent to which this kind of
conflict would occur, which could not have been foreseen between the two world
wars or right after the Second World War and has now caught the world legally
unprepared to deal with its effects.
In commenting on the "foolish talk after 1918 about not interfering in internal
affairs of. ..member[s] of the League of Nations",15 Wells recognized the fact that
the domestic affairs of states often have significance for the body of nations and
argued that "[i]t is time we recognized fully that the making of any lethal weapon
larger than what may be required for the control of big animals, is a matter of
universal concern ... ,,76 Although this comment did not concern the gross violation
of human rights, it was indicative of the development of the idea that sovereignty
cannot be absolute in nature and should under certain circumstances, for instance in
the interest of the international community, be subject to piercing.
One of the most important developments with regard to intervention at this time
was the notion that it should be legal only if carried out by the community of
nations or a group of states, arid not by a single state. Other developments included
that intervention should be the last resort and that it should be specifically for the
well being of the country being intervened.Ï' While it might be unrealistic to think
that states will intervene if they do not have any interest in such an intervention,
75 Robertson Crimes against humanity 24
76 ibid
77 Wehberg Civil War and International Law 192
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this can be seen as the humble beginnings of the notion of "the responsibility to
protect" as promoted by the ICISS.78
While international law was coming to terms with the influence of the increasing
focus on the individual and its rights, however, it continued to regard intervention
as beyond the legal authority of states and to see the only justification for
intervention, as a moral one.79 Hall, who was an advocate for non-intervention, felt
that a state that "grossly and patently violates international law in a matter of
serious importance ... ,,80should be prevented from continuing such violation by any
state or the body of states. While the sensible standard was set that interference
should not be unproportional to the offence," the significance of this statement is
its recognition of the necessity of protecting international values of serious
importance. And is human rights not a value worth the protection of the
international community?
While some writers maintained that there can be no exception to the non-
intervention principle, others felt that the community of nations cannot refuse to
take action in the face of "tremendous offences against justice and humanity ... ,,82
Even though it was supported by a majority of writers, it remains debatable whether
humanitarian intervention was clearly established in this era,83 as many regarded
the earliest humanitarian interventions with much suspicion. It comes as no surprise
that critics maintained that economic and political interests usually motivated such
interventions.I" This notion was supported by the fact that even when interventions
were truly morally justifiable, "the paternalism of intervening powers - which were
self-appointed custodians of morality and human conscience, as well as guarantors
of international order and security - undermined the credibility of the enterprise. ,,85
This is especially true as the intervening powers were most likely the "advanced
78 ICISS Supplementary Volume 17 V
79 Hall A Treatise 304
80 idem 56
81 ibid
82 Wehberg Civil War and International Law 188,189
83 Beyerlin Humanitarian Intervention 927
84 ICISS Supplementary Volume 17
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nations" of the mandate system that were assigned the tutelage of Trust territories.
However, by the 1920s the protection of non-nationals and nationals abroad was
included in the rationale for intervention and the institution was increasingly
invoked against "a state's abuse of its sovereignty by brutal and cruel treatment of
those within its power ... " It seems that such an abusing state incurred the liability
of action by any state willing to intervene in the abusing state.86 This is echoed in
Stowell's description of humanitarian intervention in 1921 as:
"the reliance upon force for the justifiable purpose of protecting the
inhabitants of another state from the treatment which is so arbitrary and
persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of that authority within
which the sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice.t''"
It is evident that at this time, the reference to humanitarian intervention as
something done outside of the authority of the accepted international legal system
has not existed yet. According to Duchêne the problem is not stopping intervention,
but rather to change it from a "military or quasi-military force into a civilian
process and from a civilian process in which there is a strong sense of exploitation
into one of joint decision-making, which implies joint responsibility by consent.,,88
On the eve of World War II it was clear that such growth, however necessary, was
still a long way off. To reach it, international law possibly had to be viewed as legal
decision-making that would become established practices and norms. As such,
rather than being the objective application of rules, international law would be seen
as a "process of authoritative decisions" and would be able to deal with changing
ideas and societies more successfully." In such a system it might be easier to
change the nature of humanitarian intervention into a more acceptable form, while
maintaining the integrity of the independence of states.
Right before World War II the situation thus stood as follows: While the focus on
human rights gained more support, states were reluctant to give up their absolute
86 idem 16, 17
87 idem 17
88 Jaquet Introduction in Jaquet (ed) Intervention in International Politics (1971) VI VII
89 Higgins Problems and Process 2, 3
60
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
sovereignty, even though the very act of setting up an international organisation
such as the League of Nations dictated a compromise of sovereignty, as individual
members would have to compromise if the international organisation of which they
became members were to function properly. In addition, the League was the basis
for some of the principles seen in the United Nations system today, such as the idea
of collective security instead of intervention by a single state, the notion of
permanent membership of the great powers and the additional authority that gave
them in the international organisation, intervention for international interests only,
and the idea of a threat to international peace and security. One subject that did not
get nearly enough attention was the responsibilities of the intervening forces after
intervention. Whether this would be regarded with the importance it deserved
remained to be seen.
While no significant humanitarian interventions happened in this era, it did not stop
writers from calling for intervention for the protection of human rights. According
to Trotsky, "[a] means can be justified only by its end. But the end in its tum needs
to be justified.T" While we value the protection of human rights in a free and fair
society, might we not to that end, intervene in some way to stop gross violations of
human rights?
90 Trotsky Their Moral and Ours in Ishay (ed) The Human Rights Reader: Major Political Essays,
Speeches, and Documents from the Bible to the Present (1997) 338 342
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CHAPTER FOUR
Developments after World War II: The Establishment of the
United Nations and the Security Council
"War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest of things: the decayed and
degraded state of moral and patriotic feeling which thinks nothing worth a
war is worse. As long as justice and injustice have not terminated their ever
renewingfightfor ascendancy in the affairs of mankind, human beings must
be willing, when need is, to do battle for the one against the other. ,,1
- John Stuart Mill
4 1 Introduction
After World War II, it seemed that almost the entire globe was focused on
preserving international peace. People appeared to believe, as they still do, that as
long as states did not violate the borders of foreign countries, the devastation and
loss of life caused by the Second World War would not come to pass again. In
striving towards this goal, the coexistence between states that was indicative of
earlier relations was replaced by a more co-operative intemational law.r which was
a consequence of the movement towards positive peace. This meant that instead of
just avoiding conflicts to achieve international peace and security, states were
joining forces to enhance the lives of people in attaining "international social
justice'Y and to do whatever was necessary to maintain peace." It is this attitude
that was probably the biggest incentive for the notion of collective security and that
appears to have heralded the coming of humanitarian intervention.
This kind of intervention developed from the notion that individuals were included
in international law as much as states were; one of the biggest changes in the time
after World War II. The escalating number of refugees that were uprooted and
1 Holliday "When is a cause just?" 2002 Vol28 Issue 3 RlS 557562
2 Kirnminich History of the Law of Nations Since World War II in Bemardt (ed) EP/L Volume 2
(1995) 849 850
3 ibid
4 Wolfrum Chapter J: Purposes and Principles in Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary (1994) 49 50
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migrated "from their traditional homes where they suffer[ ed] ... political oppression
and inadequate economic conditions", gradually banished the earlier notion that
international law did not include individuals.5 While states are generally seen as
subjects of international law and thus as bearing rights and responsibilities under
this law, there is much debate about what position individuals have under
international law. Some authors maintain that individuals are objects of
international law, thus part of the group of entities that are not subjects, while
others claim that individuals, just as states, should be seen as subjects." Higgins, on
the other hand, argues that it would be better to see states and individuals as well as
any other entity under international law, including international organisations,
multinational corporations and private non-governmental groups, as participants in
international law. Thus, instead of treating the claims of individuals to the
protection of their rights as exceptions to a system in which only subjects have
claims, the claims of individuals will be "part and parcel of the fabric of
international law, representing the claims that are naturally made by individual
participants in contradistinction of state-participants"."
The growing focus on the individual that placed the debates about humanitarian
intervention on the centre stage of international law after the atrocities suffered by
many in World War I, was something in which South Africa played a considerable
part. This was significant, as apartheid "forced states to choose between the
supremacy of domestic jurisdiction and human rights". 8 In its attempt to block
United Nations interference in its racial policies since the early days of UN
existence, South Africa stated that the non-intervention principle in article 2(7) of
the UN Charter took precedence over the human rights provisions in the Charter.
As the discriminatory practices in South Africa increased, however, the
international community became less eager to support this contention.Ï Therefore,
5 Kimminich Since World War 11853
6 Higgins Problems and Process 49
7 idem 50
8 Dugard International Law 239
9 idem 238, 239
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when the UN decided to institute an arms embargo against the country in 197710
they chose human rights above the protection of the supremacy of domestic
jurisdiction. II
This early attitude of the UN is supported by Falk, who in recent years stated that
"genocidal behaviour cannot be shielded by claims of sovereignty, but neither can
these claims be overridden by unauthorised uses of force delivered in an excessive
and inappropriate manner.,,12 It is regrettable that instead of moving towards criteria
to offer some kind of legal footing for possible interventions, the UN today seems
to rely on the circumstances, an ever-changing variable, to dictate the character of
intervention.13 While it is necessary to take the circumstances into account,
according to Higgins, "[e]xessive 'flexibility' is a recipe for operational uncertainty
and non-compliance ... by the protagonists."!" The argument in Falk's statement
regarding unauthorised force 'delivered in an excessive and inappropriate manner',
begs the question whether the non-excessive and appropriate use of force could be
acceptable in situations of 'genocidal behaviour'. While there are many arguments
about what criteria would be suitable to establish whether intervention would be
appropriate, it seems that Falk's statement implies that if criteria such as
proportional enforcement action focused on the protection of civilians and the
ending of gross human rights abuses are met, intervention would be acceptable.
In light of all the new actors on the international stage, such as newly independent
states, individuals and international organizations, the biggest challenge for
international law after World War II seems to have been to find a balance between
"repressing sovereignty in favour of international co-operation and maintaining it as
a buttress of the political independence and cultural uniqueness of each nation.,,15
Finding this balance would go a long way towards finding an answer to the debates
10 Spence "A New International Order: Lessons of Kosovo" 2000 Vol 7 Nr 1 South African Journal
of International Affairs 139 140
II Dugard International Law 239
12 Falk 1999 Vol93 AJIL 848
13 Higgins "Second-Generation Peacekeeping" 1995 in Hargrove (ed) 89 ASIL Proceedings:
Structures of World Order 275278
14 ibid
15 Kimminich Since World War II 853
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regarding humanitarian intervention. This has, however, proved to be a lot more
difficult than may have been anticipated.
While considering the changes brought about by the UN and the Security Council,
specifically with regard to human rights, sovereignty, intervention, the
responsibilities of intervening forces after intervention and the role of regional
organisations, it is necessary to remember that according to the definition used, the
term humanitarian intervention describes action taken by states and not by the UN.
Interventions for humanitarian purposes authorised by the Security Council do not
amount to humanitarian intervention, even though they might be preferable to
interventions outside of the UN system. It is therefore necessary to explore some of
the issues that exist with regard to humanitarian intervention as a result of the UN
structure itself, as well as the role of these UN authorised interventions. These
issues include the use of force, the decision establishing a threat to peace and the
use ofthe veto.
4 2 United Nations
In contemplating the United Nations and its influence, it is necessary to consider
international organizations in terms of their connection with political ideas and
forces of the time, "the configuration of power, the impact of technological
developments, the sweep of political unrest, the urge for political stability, the
drives for domination, [and] the clashes of interests and of ideologies't.l" Because
these organizations are products of international politics, the shape of such politics
determines the profile and development of'these organizations.l" This is especially
true of the United Nations as it was established in the aftermath of a world war and
expected to maintain international peace and security from then on.
The term "United Nations" developed during the Second World War among the
Allied powers and was telling of the idea that a system of collective security was
necessary to discourage aggression and promote co-operation in economic and
16 Claude Swords into Plowshares 6, 7
17 ibid
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social matters. ISWhile these matters are still very important, a wide rarige of new
perspectives arid interests have appeared as the member states grew from 51 in
1945 to 191 today,I9 with East Timor arid Switzerland the latest to join.2o Among
these matters are human rights arid the protection of civilians against murderous
factions in their own countries. As the UN purports to promote "universal respect
for, and observance of human rights arid fundamental freedoms'Y' it is dangerous
to ignore the status that these issues have acquired in the years after the
establishment of the United Nations.
42 1 Establishment of the United Nations
The UN Charter seems to have been conceived because of the recognition that
"without a clear, definitive, arid mutually acknowledged system of
objective rules to govern international uses of force, the entire
system of ordered international interaction which international law
has traditionally sought to provide becomes moot in its
ineffectiveness to provide for the most basic protections of human
life, freedom arid prosperity.,,22
The Charter was supposed to provide a forum for dialogue arid diplomacy between
states arid certainty in an area of law previously laden with ambiguity, by means of
a set of rules.23 More specifically, the structure of the UN reflects the influence of
the League system, as is evident from numerous principles of the UN. The part
played by the great powers in the formation of the UN shows not only the influence
of American planning arid leadership, but also the compromises reached in the
midst of extreme conflicts of interest between the great powers.i" The influence of
the hopes of millions of ordinary people around the world to have a "just arid
18 Conforti Law and Practice 1
19 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 3
20 http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm [Accessed 29 October 2003]
21 UN Charter, Article 55
22 Joyner "The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis and a More Persuasive Paradigm" 2002 Vol 13
Issue 3 El/L 597 604, 605
23 idem 605
24 Claude Swords into Plowshares 55, 58
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durable peace" should also not be underestimated." In spite of the hope that the
Charter would prevent another war, the Charter itself was not to be identified as a
symbol of the military triumph of the Allied forces as, for example, provisions
excluded any concerns regarding the treatment of defeated states_26Even though the
international juridical personality of the UN was not the subject of the text of the
Charter, the UN does possess juridical personality in the fields of both international
law and the national law of member states and therefore, is the subject of legal
rights and duties and can perform legal transactions.t ' After a series of negotiations,
the Charter was finally unanimously adopted and signed by all the participating
states at the San Francisco conference in 1945.28
The signing of the Charter thus signalled the beginning of an era of co-operation
between states with regard to political issues, economic and social issues and
human rights, in an effort to collectively address matters that concerns states all
over the world, such as the unregulated use of force and the maintenance of
international peace and security. In April 1946, when the League was dissolved, the
UN had already come into torce."
Despite the influence of the League system on the formation and structure of the
UN, there are noteworthy differences between the two systems. The Assembly of
the League became the General Assembly, but retained the same responsibilities
while the Council became the Security Council, which acquired the exclusive
responsibility to maintain international peace and security with a variety of
sanctions to their disposal. The Economic and Social Council was created as part of
the UN structure, with the specific responsibility to develop co-operation in social
and economic matters.i'' It seems that with regard to the priority of obligations of
member states, the League Covenant and the Charter had almost the same
provisions, Of importance here is that under both the League and the UN, the
25 idem 58
26 idem 59
27 Kelsen The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its fundamental Problems (1951)
329
28 Conforti Law and Practice 6
29 ibid
30 idem 3
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obligations of members to the respective organisations would prevail in the case of
conflict between obligations members had towards the organisations and
obligations under any other international agreement."
These obligations include obligations regarding the purposes of the UN, counting
the human rights purposes. It should be noted that the Charter bestowed all the
"privileges and immunities as are necessary for the fulfilment of its purposes", on
the UN.32 While these purposes involve several political issues and action has been
taken concerning almost all these issues, the focus of the UN has shifted from time
to time.33 Until 1950 the biggest concern was the maintenance of peace and security
and after that great results were achieved with regard to de-colonization and the
self-determination of peoples. From the seventies onwards the focus was
progressively on the protection of human rights and the eradication of inequality
and discrimination. In the midst of widespread domestic conflicts, international
peace and security has become more important in the last few years."
Part of the reason for the shifts in focus seen in the UN system is the effect of the
Cold War on the functioning of the UN organs.
"Because of the massive voting bloc of pro-Western, anti-
communist Latin American republics in particular, there were
always clear Western majorities in the [General Assembly] GA; the
Soviet Union was isolated, and the [Secretary Generals] SG's were
recruited from Western neuons.':"
Because of this initial isolation of the Soviet Union, "a bitter and protracted
confrontation developed, namely the Cold War, in which the Soviet
Union ... gradually succeeded in manoeuvring itself over to the ranks of the majority
through systematically supporting the Third World".36 During this war, the Soviet
31 Kelsen The Law of the United Nations III
32 idem 337
33 Conforti Law and Practice 8
34 ibid
35 Grewe The History of the United Nations in Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary (1994) 1 13
36 ibid
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Union boycotted the Secretary General, specifically Secretary General Dag
Hammerskjeld.f and the Security Council suffered severe paralysis as the West
and the Soviet Union respectively vetoed decisions regarding the allies of these
opposing parties.
Even without the strain of the Cold War, the interpretation of the Charter has been
the focus of much debate. It seems that as it is an international agreement, the rules
governing the interpretation of treaties should also apply to the Charter.38 This is in
particular true of article 5 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatiesr"
which states that this Convention applies to any treaty constituting "the founding
charter of an international organisation'v'" However, because of the fact that the
Charter contains both contractual and normative elements, different rules of
interpretation apply to these different elements.41 The general rule with regard to
the interpretation of treaties laid down in article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention, is
that the meaning that is clear in the text and consistent with the object and purpose
of the treaty should be assigned to the treaty.42 The ICl "now qualifies charters as
'constitutions' and employs the functional method for their interpretation't.Y This
method is oriented towards the fulfilment of the purposes of the organisation."
When these rules are applied, it appears that in its deliberations regarding its duties
under the Charter, the Security Council should interpret the Charter in such a way
as to give expression to the purposes of the Charter, including the human rights
purpose. This is something that does not seem to be happening, as expression is
mostly given to the purposes regarding the unregulated use of force threatening
international peace and security. Furthermore, the Council should interpret the
Charter in such a manner as to promote the fulfilment of its duties. Article 24(2)
states that "in discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance
37 idem 15
38 Conforti Law and Practice 12
39 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) article 5
40 Ress The Interpretation of the Charter in Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: A
Commentary (1994) 2530
41 idem26
42 Conforti Law and Practice 13
43 Ress Interpretation of the Charter 27
44 ibid; Case of Certain Expenses of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICI Reports (1962)
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with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations". It appears that the Council
considered this when it became practice that non-procedural matters could validly
be decided with the abstention of one or more of the permanent members, if the
permanent member in question did not vote against the matter.45 This happened
despite the clear meaning in article 27 that non-procedural matters had to be
decided with the concurring vote of all five the permanent members and had the
effect that the Council could make decisions regarding more issues than would
otherwise have been the case. According to Ress, this is the kind of "evolutionary
dynamic interpretation" needed to ensure that the Charter stays able to fulfil its
changing tasks.46
In light of the fact that the practice of the Charter has already been adapted to
further the deliberations of some of its organs, as well as the fact that there has been
considerable change in interests and global concerns since the UN was established,
it has been argued for quite some time now that the Charter should be revised. This
view is due to the number of states that have joined the UN since its formation
almost 60 years ago, as well as the fact that the change in the ideological conflict
between East and West has been substituted by the conflict of interest between the
rich developed world and the poor developing markets.47 As the Security Council,
which has often been blocked from action by the use of the veto, plays an
unavoidable role in any amendments as shown below, it will however not be as
simple to amend the Charter.
While persistent non-compliance with an established norm may be sufficient to
show that a specific norm is no longer valid and so account for changing global
concerns, such persistent non-compliance will not provide the level of certainty that
a revision of the Charter could do. In addition, because the Charter does not in all
cases provide for changing global concerns such as the protection of human rights,
states sometimes act unilaterally and, in doing so, undermine the authority of the
UN in international matters, an alarming development, as the structure provided by
45 Conforti Law and Practice 66
46 Ress Interpretation of the Charter 28
47 Conforti Law and Practice 19
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the UN plays an invaluable role in international law. The actions of one of the
major organs of the UN, the Security Council, seem to give rise to many of these
unilateral acts.
4 3 Security Council
In article 24(1) of the UN Charter, the pnmary responsibility of maintaining
international peace and security is placed on the shoulders of the Security Council.
In addition, the signatories of the Charter "agree[ d] that in carrying out its duties
under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.,,48 The five great
powers, Britain, China, France, the Soviet Union and the United States, were given
permanent membership of the Security Council as weU as the right to a veto vote,
which is discussed below. With this vote any permanent member could block
possible action taken by the Council regarding non-procedural matters, by
withholding a concurring vote."
While the Council emphasizes the need to respect and observe human rights and
undertakes to "give special attention to the humanitarian consequences of armed
conflicts", it fails to state clearly whether and how it is going to deal with gross
human rights abuses. 50 It is the uncertainty created by the wide discretion of the
Council, as weU as the inability of the Council to take effective care of the
horrendous humanitarian consequences of some armed conflicts, that seems to lead
to unilateral state action. As such it is necessary to explore what exactly the
responsibilities of the Council have become with regard to human rights.
4 3 1 The Use of Force
It is clear that humanitarian intervention cannot be justified in relation to the
Charter's prohibition of the use of force or the exceptions to it, as it is not self-
defence and does not happen under authority of the Security Council under Chapter
48 Joyner 2002 Vol13 Issue 3 EJIL 599
49 Claude Swords into Plowshares 133
50 Steiner & Alston International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals 2nd ed (2000) 652
71
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
VII of the Charter," as shown in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, there are arguments that
humanitarian intervention would not be in contradiction with the purposes, or spirit
of the Charter if the human rights purposes were taken into account,52 especially
since article 2(4) not only prohibits the use of force against states, but also prohibits
the use of force in "any other marmer inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations". When the promotion of human rights is taken into account as one of the
purposes of the Charter, the illegality of humanitarian intervention does not seem so
unyielding any more. Indeed, according to Robertson, armed attacks launched to
uphold the purposes of the Charter are not necessarily included in the uses of force
prohibited in article 2(4), except if they are " ... contrary to or condemned by a
specific Security Council resolution". 53
An interesting feature of the provisions in the Charter that prohibits the use of force
is that it does not include the use of force within a state. 54The articles in the Charter
that concern the use of force, address the regulation of military hostilities between
states and not conflicts within states. 55The wording of the Charter thus seems to
suggest that it is not unlawful under international law to wage a civil war; only wars
between states would be unlawful in terms of this approach. This is unfortunate, as
more than 90 percent of armed conflict today, including most gross human rights
abuses, is intemal " rather than inter-state, as it was when the Charter was
conceived. It is therefore necessary to recognise that the Charter might have
become legally inadequate to deal with the political realities of the present. Such
internal conflicts include the "disintegration of the former Yugoslavia", state
collapse in Somalia, the numerous civil wars in Africa and "political instability in
Haiti, Indonesia and the former Soviet states ... ,,57 Consequently the ICl
51 Beyerlin Humanitarian Intervention 927
52 Welsh "From Right to Responsibility: Humanitarian Intervention and International Society" 2002
Global Governance 503505; Ramsbotham & Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention 62; lICK The
Kosovo Report 186
53 Robertson Crimes against humanity 408
54 Randelzhofer Use of Force 269
55 Higgins Problems and Process 239
56 Steiner & Alston International Human Rights 651
57 Thomashausen Humanitarian Intervention 2
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emphasized the fact that the Charter does not cover "the whole area of the
regulation of the use of force in international relations", in the Nicaragua case.58
As a result, it is necessary to establish how effective the regulation of the use of
force through collective security within the UN system is. Collective security can
be seen as the principle that "everyone is his brother's keeper", in that the use of
force against one state, will bring about the combined enforcement action by all
other nations.59 The idea of such security is first mentioned in article 1(1) of the
Charter as one of the purposes of the Charter.
"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of
threats to the peace ... ,,60
The execution of these collective measures is governed by Chapter VII of the
Charter, which makes provision for the authorisation of appropriate action by the
Security Council in cases of threats to international peace and security, breaches of
international peace and security and acts of aggression." The different actions that
can be authorised by the Council include provisional measures, as the sanction least
likely to violate the rights of states, and usually comprise a call from the Council
for "the suspension of hostilities, troop withdrawal, and the conclusion or
adherence to a truce".62 If such provisional matters are inappropriate or prove to be
inadequate, the Council will normally call upon member states to employ measures
that do not involve the use of armed force, including "complete or partial
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations".63 Only
if these measures are deemed to be insufficient or prove to be ineffective can the
Council take action "by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain
58 Nicaragua v US ICJ Reports 4 (1986)
59 Claude Swords into Plowshares 224
60 UN Charter, article 1(1)
61 idem article 39
62 Frowein Chapter VII: Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and
Acts of Aggression, Article 39-43 in Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary
(1994) 605619; UN Charter, article 40
63 UN Charter, article 41
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international peace and security".64 While the value attached to the non-use of force
is clear from the previous articles, in that only after all other measures have failed
will armed force be instituted and only if the members of the UN, through the
Security Council, approve it, the problems regarding the protection of human rights
are evident. The fact is that in some cases, immediate armed action is necessary to
end gross human rights abuses and the process of first instituting measures that do
not involve armed force, may prove to be too long to prevent the death and torture
of thousands.
Another problem with the collective measures in Chapter VII is the fact that the
military contingents envisaged in article 43 for utilisation by the Security Council
under international command, never materialised.Y Member states were supposed
to enter into agreements with the Council to establish the number, deployment and
degree of readiness of the forces to be supplied by the members, but this has never
happened/" This means that when the Council authorises action, it now delegates
the use of force to member states while maintaining firm control of the
undertaking.Ï" This authorisation usually contains a call to member states to
participate, although states have the freedom to decide whether they want to
participate or not.68 The fact that states have been able to rely legally, economically
and politically on the unilateral use of force, seems to be a direct consequence of
the UN failure to put the collective security forces envisaged in article 43 in place.i"
The collective security system was supposed to be a substitute for the system of
alliances that caused the devastation of the Second World War.70 The latter system
points to the maintenance of security by alliances in the framework of the interests
of the alliance, while the collective security system indicates the maintenance of
security through the collective effort of all nations. The effect of the failure of the
military contingents to materialize has led to the fact that instead, in cases of
64 idem article 42
65 Conforti Law and Practice 196
66 ibid
67 idem 203, 204
68 idem 204
69 Higgins 1995 Vol6 ElIL 446
70 Claude Swords into Plowshares 225
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authorised action; the UN is relying on alliance-based enforcement action such as
NATO.7l In the light of Security Council resolutions, the UN clearly sees NATO as
"one of the regional organizations which might be entrusted with specific
enforcement actions". 72 The organisational character of NATO seems to transform
the alliance into a more structured defence system73 and thus enhances the ability of
the organisation for the maintenance of security within the borders of the alliance.
The fact remains however, that the reason NATO is useful, is because "it offers
realizable alternatives to the currently unobtainable benefits of collective
security"." And while NATO has now emerged as an international defence pact
and even comes to the defence of non-members such as Kosovo, it was initially
intended to be a selective security system and not a collective security system as
many claim.75 This means that in the context of UN collective security, which
provides security for everyone, the NATO security system is selective in the sense
that it only means security for members of NATO. Thus, to depend on NATO to
enforce the resolutions of the UN, is to rely on the hope that the specific situation
requiring enforcement action falls within the scope of NATO's interest.
Because the lack of article 43 forces made an "obligatory call upon members to
participate in military enforcement" impossible, even though such enforcement was
nevertheless sometimes needed, UN peacekeeping was born.Ï" Military
interposition was now still possible at the request of any receiving state and with
UN member states volunteering to participate.f Peacekeeping operations, normally
mandated by the Security Council, usually appear to have one of four basic
functions. The first is observation, which "includes verification of cease-fire,
disengagement, or withdrawal agreements and/or that SC [Security Council]
71 idem 243
72 Ress Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements, Article 53 in Simma (ed) The Charter of the United
Nations: A Commentary (1994) 722 730
73 Claude Swords into Plowshares 244
74 idem 245
75 idem 243
76 Higgins 1995 Vol6 ElIL 447
77 ibid
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Resolutions to that effect are being observed".78 Additionally, there is the function
of interposition, that is, to serve as a buffer between hostile forces with the aim to
reduce tension and prevent fighting from breaking out and the function of
maintaining law and order, which can be quite difficult in situations of internal
dissension.Ï" Peacekeeping forces are also occasionally expected to give
humanitarian assistance, as well as perform any other function deemed necessary
by the Security Council to successfully maintain the peace in a region.t" While
peacekeeping in itself seems to be a valuable instrument in the maintenance of
international peace and security, the reality is that peacekeeping forces seem to be
used where far more aggressive forces are needed. While for example, the United
Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) played a valuable role in
the winding-down of the Iran-Iraq war and the United Nations Angola Verification
Mission (UNAVEM) was proficient in disengaging Cuban forces from Angolaj"
peacekeeping forces appear to suffer a large number of failures.
This is as much due to the fact that the financial commitment necessary for the
success of these missions are lacking, as the fact that the mandates given to
peacekeeping forces are occasionally wholly inappropriate. The cause of the first
problem is that there does not seem to be formal agreements regarding the
distribution of costs between the UN and participating states82 and further that the
payment of budgetary requirements are sometimes just not forthcoming. The UN
Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), for example, received the first
instalments of the budget deemed necessary to successfully support the mission,
more than a month after the 1994 genocide had ended.83 The mandates of
peacekeeping forces are often meaningless, as SCR 836 that authorised the United
Nations Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR), showed. Here it
seemed that the safety of the peacekeepers became the sole consideration, as the
78 Bothe Peace-Keeping in Simma (ed) The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (1994)
565588
79 idem 588, 589
80 idem 589
81 Higgins 1995 Vol6 EJIL 454
82 Bothe Peace-Keeping 594
83 Jones Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure (2001) 107
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mandate allowed the peacekeepers to take the necessary measures "to reply to
bombardments against safe areas ... " while acting in self-defence.f"
As such, it appears that the band-aid of peacekeeping should carefully be
considered before it is authorised in cases of gross human rights abuses, as such
grave situations asks for well-equipped and appropriately mandated forces. Again,
the absence of a collective security system causes that the forces and the money
necessary for successful peacekeeping operations that can possibly contain or end
gross human rights abuses, depends on the interests of coalition forces.85 It is this
situation that leads to the inability of peacekeeping contingents to be effective
forces in the ending of gross human rights abuses .
.
Although the prohibition of the use of force in the Charter, which is aimed at
preventing the devastation and injustice caused by war, is valid and necessary, it
does not seem to make sense if it is upheld in the face of the grave injustice of gross
human rights abuses. This is true, especially if the importance attached to human
rights and its protection is considered, as well as the fact that armed intervention is
often the only way to end gross human rights abuses. The challenge is then to
reconcile the valid prohibition and regulation of the use of force under the present
UN system, with the fact that gross human rights abuses can sometimes only be
ended by armed intervention.
While deliberations about the regulation of the use of force continues in the face of
state superpowers only taking note of the prohibitions in the UN Charter when it
suits them, the question is whether the just war, which developed as a result of the
"Christianisation of the Roman Empire and the ensuing abandonment by the
Christians of their pacifism'V" still has a place in the international order.
Humanitarian intervention certainly seems to happen regardless of the prohibitions
of the use of force and is instead justified by the justness of the cause, usually the
gross violation of human rights. The fact is that when the idea of a just war was
conceived, it was meant to deter and regulate the use of force in a time when there
84 Higgins 1995 Vol6 EfIL 457
85 idem 459
86 Shaw International Law 777, 778
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was no international order such as the UN system of today. As a system exists
today and different states have vastly different ideas about what is a just cause, it
might be better not to rely on this principle to validate interventions. While the
justness of intervention for humanitarian purposes is not denied, the point is that it
is necessary to regulate these interventions within the current international law
system, lest superpowers abuse the integrity of the institution for their own interests
and lead the world into anarchy once again. In fact, "[t]he most effective way to
deter change by violent means is to provide the procedures and institutions for
change by peaceful means.,,87 If this can be done, humanitarian interventions might
not even be necessary to change situations of gross human rights abuses. Until such
'procedures and institutions for change by peaceful means' exist, however,
regulated interventions for humanitarian purposes seem to be the best option to
change these situations.
4 3 2 Discretion establishing a Threat to the International Peace and Security
When the United Nations was established, the authors of the Charter agreed that the
Security Council should decide when the use of force would be acceptable and thus
also when a situation would pose a threat to international peace and security. The
three situations authorised by the Security Council that would justify force were
therefore not defined in the Charter.88 At the time of the San Francisco Conference
a threat to peace was understood to be "limited to overt cr~ss-border aggression"
and civil wars were considered to be part of the domestic jurisdiction/" It seems
that now any "serious violations of international law which could provoke armed
counter-measures may generally be seen as a threat to the peace, even when the
admissibility of counter-measures may be doubtful".9o
The "threat to peace" justification for the authorisation of armed force can almost
be seen as a safety net for situations that require the use of armed force but cannot
87 http://members.aol.comlbenferenlunconsen.htm# edn1 [Accessed 17 October 2003]
88 Neuhold Peace, Threat to in Bernardt (ed) EPIL Instalment 4 (1982) 100 100
89 Thomashausen Humanitarian Intervention 10
90 Frowein Chapter VII Article 39-43 612
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be viewed as breaches of peace or acts of aggression. This concept seems to have
been used to cover situations of internal conflict that would usually "be shielded
from UN action by article 2(7) of the Charter".91 As gross violations of human
rights have to be categorised as a threat to international peace and security to enable
the Security Council to authorise the use of force against such violations, the
Security Council has become more willing to classify such violations as threats to
peace.92 The "somewhat questionable" hypothesis of the US Secretary of State in
1948 that international peace was reliant on the respect states had for human rights,
as states abusing human rights would most likely do so through coercion and
force,93 was probably the beginning of the classification of human rights abuses as a
threat to peace. Signs of this endeavour have already been seen at the San Francisco
conference. In one subcommittee report it was maintained that although human
rights are primarily a domestic concern, they will cease to have this characteristic if
the "fundamental freedoms of individuals 'were grievously outraged so as to create
conditions which threaten peace or. ..obstruct the application of the provisions of
the Charter",.94 It was also seen when the Security Council imposed the mandatory
arms embargo on South Africa in 1977. When referring to the apartheid policies in
South Africa, the Council stated that "the policies and acts of the South African
government are fraught with danger to international peace and security't."
The interventions authorised in Iraq and Somalia, were furthermore not justified in
humanitarian terms, but rather in terms of the threat posed to international and
regional peace and security by the human rights abuses.Ï" Although this would
seem to mean that the Council is prepared to play a more "active role in redressing
urgent humanitarian problems", the trouble is that the differences between the west
and the Socialist bloc about human rights, still have the potential to derail any effort
to protect individuals against gross human rights abuses through Security Council
action.
91 Shaw International Law 855
92 Beyerlin Humanitarian Intervention 932; Conforti Law and Practice 244
93 Robertson Crimes against humanity 31
94 Claude Swords into Plowshares 168
95 SCR418
96 Henkin "Kosovo and the law of 'Humanitarian Intervention" 1999 Vol 93 AJIL 824 825
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The issue of determining a threat to peace came to a head when the Council
imposed sanctions aimed at ending the white minority rule in the then Southern
Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, in 1966.97 The parties opposed to economic sanctions
maintained that the situation did not "menace international peace", while most
observers, including the Security Council, insisted that the "violation of
fundamental human rights ... has international implications In today's
interdependent world.,,98 The Council furthermore described the situation as being a
threat to international peace and security.Ï'' In truth, the answer to what would
constitute a threat to peace depends largely on the position of the permanent
members regarding the issue under consideration.i'" as the decision determining
whether a position does constitute a threat to international peace and security
includes wide discretionary powers.l'"
The fact is that some circumstances of gross human rights abuses do pose a threat
to international peace and security, usually when they have escalated to the extent
that neighbouring states have become involved. However, these gross abuses can
go on for quite some time before they begin to threaten peace. Although they may
not be perceived as a threat immediately, these abuses are not any less grave.
Nevertheless, because the Security Council must classify human rights abuses as a
threat to peace, already grave abuses must escalate even further for intervention to
legally be authorised. This causes abuses to continue far beyond the threshold of a
global community that values human rights so much.
The legal fiction of classifying human rights abuses as possible threats to
international peace and security is strengthened by the fact that the Secretary-
General can bring to the attention of the Security Council "any matter which in his
opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security,,102. The
General Assembly may also "call the attention of the Security Council to situations
97 SCR's 221, 232
98 Neuhold Peace 100
99 Thomashausen Humanitarian Intervention 11
100 Shaw International Law 855
101 Conforti Law and Practice 173
102 UN Charter, article 99
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which are likely to endanger international peace and security".103 This means that if
legal intervention in gross human rights abuses were not dependent on the abuses
being classified as a threat to international peace, it would have been legally
possible to intervene earlier.
Although the General Assembly does not play the primary role in maintaining
international peace and security, the Assembly attempted to strengthen its authority
regarding this issue by adopting the Uniting for Peace Resolution in 1950. The goal
of this resolution was to enable the Assembly to make the suitable
recommendations for collective measures in the event that the Security Council is
"blocked" by the veto and consequently fails to fulfil its primary responsibility with
regard to article 39.104This would include any situation that has been established as
a threat to peace, such as the gross human rights abuses in Kosovo, where the
Security Council is prevented from authorising the measures necessary to deal with
the situation because of a veto vote. Although critics of this Resolution argue that
the maintenance of peace is not the responsibility of the General Assembly, it must
be noted that article 24 of the Charter does not say that the maintenance of peace is
solely the responsibility of the Security Council. Thus, even though the members of
the UN agreed that the Security Council would carry the primary responsibility for
the maintenance of international peace and security, it does not mean that in the
event that the Council fail to fulfil its duty, the General Assembly are helpless to
take appropriate action. An affirmation of this resolution has developed during the
last number of years in the argument that humanitarian intervention would be legal
in the above situation.
Therefore, while the classification of gross human rights abuses as a threat to peace
has lead to interventions in some situations of abuse, a negative aspect of this
classification is that human rights abuses have to go on for so much longer before
anything can be done about it. In addition, the protection of one of the most
fundamental aspects of international law is now dependent on the political fancies
103 idem article Il
104 Neuhold Peace 101
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of five powers that hold vastly different ideas about the importance of human
rights.
433 The Veto
According to article 27(2) of the UN Charter, decisions regarding procedural
matters will be made by the affirmative votes of any nine of the fifteen members of
the Council. Decisions regarding all other matters will be made by the affirmative
vote of nine members including the five concurring votes of the permanent
members. IDS Although in practice this rule has been adapted and today the
abstention of a permanent member will not frustrate a decision any longer, the
negative vote of a single member can still frustrate efforts to intervene. This veto
system, called the 'Yalta formula' after the Yalta conference in 1945 when the
voting procedure of the Security Council was discussed.l'" was granted to
permanent members, and although it includes the power to abolish their own veto
power by amendment of the Charter.l'" this is obviously not likely to happen as the
permanent members would be reluctant to give up such an influential power.
It is important to understand why the veto was assigned to the Security Council in
the first place. In the aftermath of a war in which the most powerful nations caused
unthinkable devastation and destruction, it seemed necessary to make the use of
force subject to the "collective consent" of these nations, which had the ability to
tangle the world in another global conflict.l08 As such, uncommitted states would
not be dragged, by way of their UN membership, into clashes between the great
powers.l'" However, while it appears to be a feasible solution, the political reality
was that both the US and the Soviet Union vigorously fought for the incorporation
of the veto.IIO Since the establishment of the UN, this reality has overshadowed the
possible guarantee "that whatever action is undertaken will be supported by the
105 Dugard International Law 399; UN Charter, article 27(3)
106 Conforti Law and Practice 3
107 Claude Swords into Plowshares 135; UN Charter, article 108, 109
108 Joyner 2002 Vol 13 Issue 3 EJIL 608
109 Claude Swords into Plowshares 146
110 idem 135, 136
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states which control the bulk of the world's economic, military, and political power,
and that its success will therefore be almost a foregone conclusion". III As the
interests of the permanent members have often played a significant role in whether
action is undertaken to protect people from gross human rights abuses or not, 112 the
fight was worth it for the permanent members, but not always for the people
suffering abuses.
The initial idea of the veto, as understood between the five permanent members,
was that it is to be used "only if the passage of a resolution could otherwise
culminate in military action against one of them" .113 This was one of the
compromises in the process of setting up the United Nations. At this stage,
however, it has become a defence mechanism for the permanent members against
any sanction directed against them or their respective allies.114 Nevertheless, some
commentators state that the inability to authorize intervention for humanitarian
purposes because of a veto vote against it, does not constitute a paralysis of the
Security Council, but rather is a sign that the Council is working exactly as
planned. I IS
The problem with this assertion is that it is very dangerous to leave the
responsibility of the protection of human rights to the ability of five of the most
powerful nations in the world to agree on sornething.v'" as seen by the use of the
veto during the Cold War. While even the most powerful nations deem
international peace and security, the primary concern of the Security Council, of the
utmost importance, they differ fundamentally about the importance and protection
of human rights. This prevents effective protection of these rights, as indicated by
some of the vetoes that have been cast. Those that blocked peacekeeping operations
in Macedonia and Guatemala, those that protected North Korea "despite its
breaches of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty" and those that protected Saddam
III idem 139
112 Thomashausen Humanitarian Intervention 11
113 Higgins Problems and Process 174
114 ibid
115 Joyner 2002 Vol13 Issue 3 EJIL 608
116 idem 606
83
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Hussein against UN weapons inspections throughout 1999117 are among the most
notable.
It is important to note that although the veto gives the permanent members the
ability to block action regarding disputes involving themselves, except action
relating to peaceful settlement of disputes.l " the permanent members are not
allowed to use the veto vote to "wilfully ... obstruct the operation of the Security
Council.,,119 If the Security Council is therefore in a position to put a stop to human
rights abuses, but the use of the veto prevents them from doing so, might this not
constitute wilful obstruction of their operations? If the fact that a threat to
international peace and security is progressively used to authorize intervention in
human rights abuses is posed against the initial reason for the existence of the
Security Council, maintaining international peace and security, the purpose of the
Council and its actions are contradictory.
How legitimate are the outcomes of the deliberations of the Security Council,
which has the "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace
and security ..." if it cannot protect people from gross human rights abuses?120 Since
norms such as the prohibitions on genocide and crimes against humanity have
become part of customary international law, this question is particularly important.
If the Security Council is unable to deal with the violations of such norms because
of the veto, it appears that it has failed in the role assigned to it by the Charter.Y'
4 4 Conclusion
While the establishment of the United Nations brought much hope for a peaceful
future, the fact that, when the UN was formed, it was structured so that the UN, and
specifically the Security Council system, would work only if the five great powers
were united in their political ideals has lead to many problems. A system forcing
117 Robertson Crimes against humanity 410
118 Claude Swords into Plowshares 136, 137
119 Four Sponsoring Powers Statement of the Four Sponsoring Powers on Voting Procedure in the
Security Council (1945) Part I: 8
120 UN Charter, Article 24
121 Joyner 2002 Vol 13 Issue 3 EJIL 601
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the great powers to co-operate was assumed to be the best chance the world had of
preventing another world war.122 However, since the formation of the UN, the
notion that the international realm is governed by power certainly seems to have
been true at times.123 As a result of power politics, the UN has stood by as hundreds
of thousands of civilians, such as those in Rwanda, were massacred and displaced.
It is as a result of such instances that for example, the International Association of
Lawyers has called for reforms of the UN Security Council. 124 According to the
Association, the Council does not mirror current geopolitical realities. In addition to
the removal of the veto, which is "totally unadapted to the current reality of
international society", the Council "should be expanded to include other
nations ... ,,125 in order to be representative of the many countries that have joined
the UN since its establishment, and of the changing political roles of these
countries. While the changes called for by the International Association of Lawyers
are not necessarily generally accepted, the Council definitely needs some reform if
the protection of human rights is going to be one of its responsibilities.
Additionally, the practice of abstention from voting by permanent members does
not thwart decisions taken by the Council and has resulted in the adoption of
resolutions that the Council would not have been able to adopt otherwise.
Unfortunately it has also weakened the hope that the action authorised by the
Council would almost always succeed, as it may often not have the support of all
the major powers ofthe world.126
This is not the only flaw in the collective security system, as the failure of article 43
forces to materialise shows. While preferable to the alliance-based system that
caused the world wars, the idea of collective security is still at times rejected in
favour of the use of alliance interests to persuade clear alliance based organisations
such as NATO, to take charge of maintaining international peace and security. In
truth, an alliance such as NATO, offers only "a means of dealing with an immediate
122 Claude Swords into Plowshares 69
123 Wheeler Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (2000) 4
124 http://www.vanguardngr.comlarticles/2002/nationaUnr201092003.html[Accessed 17 October
2003
125 ibid
126 Conforti Law and Practice 68
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and specific situation, and not a pattern for a permanent and general system of
world order".127 The fact is that if there were to be forces under international
command, the selectivity regarding humanitarian intervention would be much less,
as the interests of alliances dictating if action is going to be taken or not, will not be
an issue any more. Unfortunately, the lack of article 43 forces causes the UN to be
dependent on military alliances, with their own agendas and interests, for
enforcement action. Thus, the protection of human rights has become and issue of
interests, regardless of the fact that it is one of the fundamental purposes of the UN
and has become one the most important issues in international law today.
This is also the problem with UN peacekeeping forces, which often suffer from a
lack of financial support and appropriate mandates to complete their missions
successfully. According to Higgins, peacekeeping forces should in the first place be
mandated to keep the peace and should be awarded responsibilities of monitoring
human rights, additional to their peacekeeping responsibility and not in lieu of it, as
it is this situation that leads to the kind of peace-keeping "which endeavours to
provide food while allowing the slaughter to continue".128
Today conflict is very different from when the Charter was signed. It is also
difficult to gain the support necessary for action to protect human rights. While the
most common conflict then was between states, today it is within states. While the
Charter therefore makes provision for the regulation of conflict between states, it is
not legally capable to deal with conflict within states, let alone with human rights
abuses within states. Since the Security Council has justified intervention for
humanitarian purposes by maintaining that gross human rights abuses pose a threat
to peace, it has not been able to intervene timely where gross abuses have not been
seen to pose a threat. This does not mean that human rights abuses do not in some
cases present a threat to international peace and security, especially since opposing
factions in a state eventually do attract the alliance of foreign states and the conflict
then spreads beyond the borders of the state. It only presents the unfortunate reality
that until gross human rights abuses are seen to pose a threat, if ever, no action can
127 Claude Swords into Plowshares 245
128 Higgins 1995 Vol6 EJIL 460
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legally be taken to intervene. As the primary responsibility of the Security Council
is the maintenance of international peace and security, the classifying of human
rights abuses as a threat to peace has been inevitable, especially since the other
main bodies of the UN, the General Assembly and the Secretary General can only
bring matters regarding international peace and security to the attention of the
Council. If these bodies wanted to bring human rights abuses to the attention of the
Council, they would necessarily have to phrase it as a threat to peace.
Occasionally even being classified as a threat to peace does not guarantee the
support of the permanent members. The case of Rwanda clearly shows that the
financial and military means for intervention are sometimes still not forthcoming.
The fact remains that the veto results in some countries being more sovereign than
other countries, not because their governments are more legitimate or they protect
the human rights of their citizens so much better, but because "[s]heer power still
counts".129
It is evident that in the founding of the United Nations, the international community
has gone a long way in reconciling differences and in doing so, seems to agree that
the maintenance of international peace and security is of the highest importance.
The structure given to international relations by the UN is invaluable; however, the
warning of Secretary General Kofi Annan should not be forgotten:
"If the collective conscience of humanity ... cannot find in the United
Nations its greatest tribune, there is a grave danger that it will look
elsewhere for peace and justice.,,13o
The fact is that effective interventions for the protection of human rights do not
seem to be forthcoming from the UN system. It is therefore necessary to ensure that
interventions by other actors are appropriate and well managed in order to protect
and promote human rights adequately. However, if the international community
does not want to accept humanitarian intervention as a protection mechanism for
129 Steiner & Alston International Human Rights 588
130 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 2
87
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
human rights, the treatment by the UN of gross human rights abuses and In
particular by the Security Council needs to be a lot more effective.
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CHAPTER FIVE
Developments after World War II: Influence of the United Nations
"If in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide [in Rwanda), a
coalition of states had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi
population, but did not receive prompt Council authorization, should such a
coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold? "J
- Kaft Annan
5 1 Introduction
As noted in Chapter Four, a new period in the history of international law
commenced with the proclamation of the Charter of the United Nations, in which
the protection of human rights is one of the principal aims. This is emphasized by
the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 in response, to
among other things, the "disregard and contempt for human rights [that] have
resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind ... ,,2
The different types of treaties concluded to protect human rights constitute quite a
long list, which include the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (1948), the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), the
International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(1966), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (1981).3 While
these treaties are binding upon the signatories that voluntary ratified them, none of
the numerous human rights treaties seems to lay down any rules regarding
humanitarian intervention.4 This is probably because most treaties are deferential to
the UN Charter, which itself does not say anything about humanitarian intervention.
As shown in Chapter Four, the questions regarding the Charter's position on this
kind of intervention have remained unanswered, as the frequent use of the veto by
I Wheeler "Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo: emergent norm, moral duty or the coming
anarchy?" 2001 Vol 77 No 1 International Affairs 113 114
2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights Preamble
3 Henkin Human Rights 888
4 JAL "Human Rights International Instruments: Chart of Ratifications as at 30 June, 1995" 1995
Vol 39(2) JAL 237 237 - 239
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permanent members of the Security Council during the Cold War in situations of
possible intervention, placed sovereignty in an almost unassailable position.'
This was possible because the members of the UN undertook to "accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter".6
Although resolutions of the UN General Assembly do not constitute sources of
binding international law, they are recognized as forming international law, which
is "still in its infancy"," as "an accumalation of resolutions ... may amount to
evidence of collective practice on the part of states'". Since this kind of
international law develops within the realm of supranational organisations.Ï its
resolutions regarding human rights are very important in influencing international
opinion regarding such rights. In the face of the ever-growing human rights culture,
the ambiguities in the charter with regard to the relationship between human rights
and sovereignty have already encouraged re-interpretation.i'' which in tum could
lead to the much needed change in position regarding the protection of human
rights.
In considering the influences of the UN system regarding human rights and its
protection, specific mention is made of its influence on notions about sovereignty,
intervention, the responsibilities of intervening forces after intervention, and the
role of regional agencies in the protection of human rights. The state practice
regarding some of the humanitarian interventions that did happen are explored, as
well as contemporary views and theories about humanitarian intervention.
5 Mayall Introduction 5
6 UN Charter, Article 25
7 Kimminich Since World War II 852
s Dugard International Law 32
9 Kimminich Since World War II 852
10 Spence 2000 Vol 7 Nr 1 SAJIA 139 140
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52 Influence of the United Nations
5 2 1 Sovereignty
With the growing importance attached to multi-lateralism and co-operation between
states after World War II, the end of the nation state seemed to be in sight. Instead,
while international law experienced an increasing unity on universal level, states
became more diverse at regional level." The rising numbers of independent states
claiming their sovereignty after the defeat suffered by colonisation played a big role
in strengthening the nation state, with membership of the United Nations seemingly
still the ultimate symbol of sovereignty.V Unfortunately, in the effort to abandon
the era of colonialism, the UN did not ensure that the newly decolonised states had
a basis substantial enough to guarantee the continuing security of the system of
sovereign states. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples "gave the blessing of the United Nations to the rapid
creation of new independent states, with little regard for compliance with the
traditional requirements of statehood".13 As a result, it is doubtful that the
traditional Montevideo criteria for statehood, developed to ensure the birth of stable
states competent to function on an equal level with other states, were observed.!4
While many of these new states saw sovereignty as an absolute barrier against the
colonial powers that used to rule them, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in his Agenda for
Peace, called to the leaders of states to accept that the theory of absolute
sovereignty never could have been matched by reality. He appealed to them to find
a balance between "the need [for] good internal governance and the requirements of
an ever more interdependent world".!5 As it does not seem that this call will be
answered soon, it is necessary to explore the concept of sovereignty and what it
means.
IIKimminich Since World War lI853
12 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 13
13 Dugard International Law 86
14 idem 87
15 Boutros Boutros-Ghali An Agendafor Peace: Preventative Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-
keeping; Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting
of the Security Council on 31 January 199219929
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According to Ratner, sovereignty does nothing more than to describe claims made
by states in terms of their independence." The efforts to find a coherent definition
for the changing sovereignty of today may therefore begin by stating which of these
claims are legitimate and which are not.17 Meanwhile, however, Steinberger sees
the fact that sovereignty protects the independence and freedom of states as one of
the fundamental principles of international law.18 Nevertheless, the existence of
sovereignty does not exempt a state from international law. In truth, it is the fact
that a state is sovereign that enables it to conclude the international treaties that so
often limit its freedom of action."
The limitation of freedom of action experienced by states because of the numerous
legal obligations flowing from international agreements does not deprive states of
their sovereignty. Neither does it diminish the sovereign status of countries. It is
merely a consequence of exercising sovereignty in a certain way. The political and
economic effects of the conclusion of such agreements can even enhance the
preservation of sovereignty." As such, the argument, that the UN human rights
covenants are illegal as they are in conflict with article 2(7), is unsubstantiated.
When the government of Poland, which had signed the human rights covenants,
was accused of committing gross human rights abuses in 1982, it advanced this
argument"
Although there are many views on what the functions and duties of states include,
currently there are still no definite criteria of what they constitute.r' The idea exists
that the respect for the sovereignty of states is justified by the role of the state as
guardian of the basic human rights and freedoms of its nationals.f and therefore,
"governments that commit crimes against humanity within their borders should
16 Theme Panel IV "The end of Sovereignty?" 1994 in Hargrove (ed) 88 ASIL Proceedings: The
Transformation of Sovereignty 71 75
17 ibid
18 Steinberger Sovereignty 410
19 idem408
20 idem 413
21 Conforti Law and Practice 144
22 Steinberger Sovereignty 408
23 Reus-Smit 2001 Vol 27 No 4 RlS 520; Kostakopoulou 2002 Vol 22 (Nr 1) OJLS 149; Mertus
"Assessing the NATO intervention under the UN Charter" 2000 in Stephan (ed) 94 ASIL
Proceedings 3 10 3 10
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forfeit the protection afforded them by the rules of sovereignty and non-
intervention.,,24 This is a confirmation of the initial idea that sovereignty itself is
not the basis of the society of states, but that sovereignty is based on certain
existential values such as human rights, which is the true basis of this society.f
Presently it is widely believed that one of the basic functions of the state is to
protect and observe the human rights of its citizens.i" According to Kostakopoulou,
the authority of the state depends on the effective performance of these basic
functions. In addition, the state is "no longer ... able to command the loyalty of its
citizens, but [has] to purchase it through its capacity to meet societal needs [and] ...
fulfil the basic functions widely believed to be fundamental to its purpose.,,27 Two
questions remain: Does the international community has a responsibility to protect
these citizens and their human rights if the state in question cannot or will not fulfil
this duty and secondly, does such a government enjoy the right to non-intervention
in its domestic affairs.
This forms part of the controversy about the requirements for attaining and
maintaining sovereignty as the previously mentioned failing states will often not be
able to protect the human rights of their citizens. According to Bodin, sovereignty
means, "there can only be one ultimate source of law in a nation"_28However, the
legitimacy of the state, which seems to be at the centre of the UN non-intervention
principle.f" does not exist in failing states, where no ultimate source of law exists.
These failing states seems to be a direct consequence of the hasty decolonisation
process that did not ensure that prior to independence, potential independent state
were developed and stable enough to successfully overcome the growing pains of
new independence. As a result the difficulties these states progressively faced such
as poverty, economic underdevelopment and an inability to ensure internal stability,
were not foreseen.
24 Wheeler 2001 Vol 77 No 1 International Affairs 127; Welsh 2002 Global Governance 512;
Ramsbotham & Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention 38
25 Reus-Smit 2001 Vol27 No 4 RIS 528
26 idem 520
27 Kostakopoulou 2002 Vol22 (Nr 1) OJLS 150
28 Luban Just War and Human Rights 368
29 idem 369
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It appears that the "legitimate state has a right against aggression because people
have a right to their legitimate state".30 It should be noted that when Luban writes
about the legitimate state, it is in reality a reference to the government of such a
state as a government can cease to be legitimate but a state not. This is because
once a state is recognized under international law its legitimacy cannot be disputed
again. Only the legitimacy of its inevitably changing government can be disputed,
something which usually happens when the change in government is not
constitutional, but rather the result of for instance, revolution." If then, a legitimate
government of any state does not exist anymore, the right against aggression and
intervention also falls away.32 Philpott's notion that "[n]orms of sovereignty are
not solely matters of legal freedom of action but also of basic authority", and that
these norms "are not solely matters of power, but also of legitimate authority", is an
affirmation of this idea.33 In addition, there are views that the legitimacy of a
government depends on its respect for the human rights of its own citizens.i"
According to Dugard, the respect for human rights and self-determination has
become a criterion for statehood along with the traditional criteria set out in the
Montevideo Convention.f Rather than being a limitation of sovereignty, human
rights have thus become a qualification for it, along with the observation of the
right to self-determination.
While this right to self-determination was traditionally closely associated with
decolonisation, this right is now to be exercised within the borders of a state. Thus,
with newly independent states appearing all over the world after the 1960 General
Assembly Declaration, the right of people to "determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development" became an internal
right. Rather than the right to secede and form an own state, the sovereign state
became the framework in which the human right to self-determination, including
30 ibid
31 Dugard International Law 97
32 Luban Just War and Human Rights 368
33 Philpott 1995 Vol48 No 2 Journal of International Affairs 368
34 Ramsbotham & Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention 49; Falk Sovereignty and Human Dignity:
The Search for Reconciliation in Steiner & Alston (ed) International Human Rights in Context:
Law, Politics, Morals 2nd ed (2000) 581 582
35 Dugard International Law 78
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the right to freely exercise their political and social beliefs, could be exercised by
the different peoples within the state.36
The idea that human rights have become a qualification for sovereignty is also seen
in the fact that the UN can "block the acceptance of a state by means of collective
non-recognition't.V In the course of this practice, certain criteria, including the
"prohibition of systematic racial discrimination and the suppression of human
rights", have been acknowledged." While consideration of the initial recognition of
states does not produce any answers regarding the sovereignty of existing states
abusing the human rights of their citizens, it does show the important link between
legitimate governance and the respect for human rights.
The importance of this link is affirmed by Cassese who maintains that the gravest
human rights abuses since 1945 have taken place in countries that lacked "the
social structures and government machinery to mediate inner conflict." The reality
is that the preciously mentioned failing states, which can be described as states in
which governments have lost the ability to enforce law and order, have become
havens for terrorists. Lloyd, for example, writes, "The most obvious place for
[terrorist] activities is in a state where authorities do not bother [them]; and these
are likely to be states in which government and institutions have failed. ,,40
In addition, domestic instability caused by cases of state collapse often leads to
regional and international instability." While it might be desirable to intervene in
such states before the breakdown of law and order starts to claim lives, "the
problem with going in before there is a collapse, is that there is rarely any apparent
crisis, and thus to get people to intervene is very hard".42 This problem remains
even though the sovereignty of a state like Somalia, "which is a mere cartographic
expression including two breakaway states and a "government" which cannot even
36 idem 94
37 Dugard International Law 88
38 idem 90
39 Ramsbotham & Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention 38
40 Lloyd "Poverty, criminal networks, destructive leaders: when does a collapsing state create a
haven for terrorists?" Financial Times (07/03/2003) 13 13
41 Spence 2000 Vol7 Nr 1 SAJIA 139,140; Welsh 2002 Global Governance 509
42 Lloyd Financial Times (07/03/2003) 13
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control all of the capital, Mogadishu" does not have much substance.Y While there
has been a call to establish rules for intervention and to prevent the collapse of
states, and agreement exists on the fact that sovereignty cannot be used to justify
the abuse of a state's own citizens, the commitments such an agreement might
require, has not been made.44
An even bolder idea than that a state will lose the right of non-interference attached
to sovereignty if such a state cannot or will not protect the human rights of its
citizens, is the idea that human rights do not fall within the scope of domestic
jurisdiction any longer. The debates about whether "a consistent pattern of gross
and reliably attested violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms",45
should be a concern of the international community, were especially fierce between
the west and the "Socialist bloc".46 Part of this debate is about what such a
"consistent pattern" would entail in the first place." In the time of the Cold War,
the political will and practical conditions did not allow for principles of human
rights to translate into any kind of intervention for their protection. At the time,
human rights standards had not been accepted as "internally binding" and
humanitarian intervention was seen as just another name for Western domination.48
While these issues supposedly do not exist any more, the debates continue about
whether the protection of human rights has become more important than the
preservation of sovereignty. Although the legal basis of sovereignty is still stronger
than that of human rights, there is overwhelming support for the contention that
current legal grounds need revision to keep up with the enormous changes in the
international arena, especially with regard to the importance of human rights and
their protection. If such revision does not take place, the protection of human rights
will be pursued outside of the present legal boundaries, as has already happened in
Kosovo and Liberia.
43 ibid
44 ibid
45 Beyerlin Humanitarian Intervention 929
46 ibid
47 ibid
48 lICK The Kosovo Report 189
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5 2 2 Intervention
While the principal reason for the existence of the non-intervention rule is the
protection of the sovereignty of states, the exercise of sovereignty can limit the
"sovereign sphere ... including 'domestic affairs'"," as shown above. When this has
happened, other states acquire the right to intervene in those matters with regard to
which sovereignty has been limited. UN Secretary General Pérez de Cuéllar
therefore argued that the non-intervention principle could not be used as a
"protective barrier behind which human rights could be massively and
systematically violated with impunity'V"
According to the Charter itself, any intervention by the UN in matters falling within
the domestic jurisdiction of states is prohibited by article 2(4). Specifically armed
intervention is effectively prohibited by article 2(7), which outlaws the use of force
between states. The importance attached to non-intervention in the early years of
the UN system, is also confirmed in the Corfu Channel case in which the court
stated that "the alleged right of intervention [is] the manifestation of a policy of
force, such as has, in the past, given rise to most serious abuses" and that such a
policy of force cannot find a place in international law. SI
In later years, this notion was upheld in the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of
Intervention adopted in 1965 by the UN, as well as the Resolution approving the
Declaration on Friendly Relations adopted in 1970.s2 "This Resolution prohibits all
forms of interference directed against the personality of a State or against its
political, economic and cultural elements and especially lists, inter alia, economic,
political and any other types of measures aimed at securing advantages of any
kind".s3 As a result, some authors view the Resolution as the General Assembly's
most damaging action against international law.s4 At the same time however, the
Friendly Relations Declaration affirms that states "shall co-operate in the promotion
49 Opperman Intervention 1437
50 Ramsbotham & Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention 60
51 Corfu Channel (UK v Albania) IC] Reports 4 (1949)
52 Opperman Intervention 1436, 1437
53 idem 1437
54 Robertson Crimes against humanity 41
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of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all, and in the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination and all forms of
religious intolerance. ,,55 The same kind of conflict is caused by the 1981
Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention adopted by the UN General
Assembly.
While it seems that the non-intervention principle in article 2(7) of the Charter was
included to avoid interventions regarding issues such as the human rights notions in
article 55 and 56,56the phrase "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" appears
to provide for changing political ideas about what falls within domestic jurisdiction.
Even though a significant number of authors argue that human rights now fall
outside the domestic jurisdiction of states. " claims are still made to the contrary.
Nevertheless, even the sources of these claims allow for the exception in cases of
gross violations of human rights. 58
Although the argument exists that humanitarian intervention has developed as a
customary international law norm, because of the numerous examples of unilateral
intervention to prevent or stop gross human rights abuses, this argument does not
survrve scrutiny. Although the alleged interventions that took place certainly
provide sufficient evidence of state practice, the other criterion for the
establishment of customary international law, opinio juris, does not exist to the
same extent. The interventions that took place appear to be motivated by moral
obligation rather than a sense of legal obligation, which is required to establish
opinio juris. 59The truth is that while the gross human rights abuses committed until
about 1993 have been denounced by intervening forces, these forces seem to have
been careful not to offer "'humanitarian intervention' justifications for their
recourses to armed force".6o Governments have been careful to prevent the creation
55 UN, Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations UN GA Res. 2625
(XXV) 1970
56 Conforti Law and Practice 137
57 idem 144
58 idem 143
59 Joyner 2002 Vol13 Issue 3 EJIL 601, 602
60 idem 602
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of any custom that might make interventions in their own states easier. This
position is reaffirmed in official statements by the NATO governments regarding
the intervention in Kosovo, in which no mention is made of "prior state practice
or ... the long tradition of academic writing on humanitarian intervention". 61
According to Joyner, the lack of reliance on an established legal right of
humanitarian intervention causes a "fatal deficiency of relevant opinio juris,,62 and,
as intervention authorized by the Security Council does not constitute state
practicer" arguments for a customary international law principle of humanitarian
intervention are unsustainable."
Although the claims of a norm for emerging customary law thus appear to be a little
too optimistic.f it does not change the fact that tolerance of UN authorized
interventions for humanitarian purposes is growing'" and that current state practice
indicates that a promising guiding principle is developing regarding human rights
protection/" This suggests that intervention would be acceptable in the face of
gross human rights abuses if the state were unable or unwilling to end the abuses.68
According to Welsh, wider Security Council definition of a threat to international
peace and security, the revolution in information technology that creates a
heightened awareness of human rights abuses and the increasing weight of human
rights principles have caused this development. 69 The permission of the Security
Council to '''use all means necessary' to secure humanitarian objectives" and the ex
post facto endorsements of interventions by regional arrangements such as the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention in Liberia
in 1990 have also contributed to a readier acceptance of humanitarian
intervention.Ï'' However, most interventions for humanitarian purposes in the post-
61 ibid
62 ibid
63 ibid
64 idem 603
65 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 15
66 Welsh 2002 Global Governance 510
67 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 15
68 idem 16
69 Welsh 2002 Global Governance 510
70 idem 506, 507
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Cold War era involved Security Council resolutions that invoked Chapter VII and
are therefore based on the existence of a threat to peace.
Even though case law does not play such a big role m decisions regarding
humanitarian intervention, it seems that the courts have also been cautious about
intervention. In the Corfu Channel case before the ICl7! for example, the court said
that "from the nature of things, [intervention] would be reserved for the most
powerful states, and might easily lead to perverting the administration of
international justice itself."n Although the legality of peacekeeping missions was
confirmed in 1962 therefore.Ï'' various other kinds of interventions were still
viewed as unlawful. However, in the Barcelona Traction case the ICl stated, "all
states have a legal interest of the protection of the international community from the
perpetuation of those gross and systematic human rights violations that are
recognised as being prohibited as a matter of jus cogens".74 Thus it seems that
international courts also struggles to find a suitable balance between the protection
of human rights and the protection of sovereignty.
While it is of paramount importance that timely action is taken when reports are
received of human rights abuses, Spence warns that third world countries may be
loath to support intervention, which may be perceived as new Western
imperialism." Ayoob does in fact suggest that "humanitarian intervention carries
shades of neo-colonialism"." However, the fact is that with humanitarian
intervention comes a responsibility and duty "not to make conditions worse for a
threatened population and the obligation to respect the civil, political, economic,
social and cultural rights of all civilians.,,77 In this light, the unfortunate bombing of
Serb civilians taints the NATO intervention in Kosovo. 78 This kind of action calls
the humanitarian qualifications of humanitarian intervention into question.
71 Corfu Channel (UK v Albania) ICJ Reports 4 (1949)
72 Ramsbotham & Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention 42
73 Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case Advisory Opinion ICJ Reports 151 1962
74 Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co Ltd ICJ Reports 3 (1970)
75 Spence 2000 Vol 7 Nr 1 SAJIA 143
76 Welsh 2002 Global Governance 509
77 Chinkin 1999 Vol93 AJIL 844
78 Wheeler Saving Strangers 1308
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Because of possible abuse of the institution, most states are still uncomfortable with
supporting intervention for human rights violations. It appears that when they
undertake interventions they are careful not to establish any practice that might
allow interventions in their own affairs later on. Nevertheless, there is mounting
support for the argument that intervention should be legal in cases where the
occurrence of gross human rights abuses are generally accepted, even without UN
authorisation. While this debate is continuing, it appears that the issues regarding
sovereignty have in fact been more problematic after intervention, when
intervening forces decide how far their commitment in rebuilding the country
should stretch.Ï'' The cost of the responsibilities that intervening forces face after
intervention, seems to be a significant discouragement to intervention as the
pressure on intervening forces to stay and rebuild becomes stronger.f"
5 2 3 The Responsibilities of Intervening Forces after Intervention
When aiming to explore these responsibilities, it is necessary to consider the
relevance of humanitarian law, as the law "governing the waging of war and the.
treatment of combatants and civilians in time ofwar.81 Because the rights and duties
of armed forces form an integral part of humanitarian law, also known as jus in
bello,82 the application of this law is relevant in the context of the responsibilities of
intervening forces in the midst of intervention. Intervening forces have to comply
with international law principles regarding warfare and the treatment of civilians
and non-combatants, including the Law of Geneva that has its roots in The Hague
Regulations of 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and subsequently 1949 and
the additional Protocols of 1977.83 The Law of Geneva aims to protect combatants
no longer involved in the conflict.84 However, as the responsibilities of intervening
forces after intervention deal with the duties and responsibilities of these forces in
79 Welsh 2002 Global Governance 507
80 Spence 2000 Vol 7 Nr 1 SAJIA 142
81 Dugard International Law 431
82 ibid
83 idem 435
84 ibid
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the rebuilding and administration of a war tom country after intervention,
humanitarian law is not specifically relevant in this context.
The basis for these responsibilities is found in Chapter XII of the UN Charter that
deals with the international trusteeship system. Of specific importance is article 76
that dictates the aim of this system as the promotion of "political, economic, social
and educational advancement of the people in the territory in question", the
promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights, and the assurance of
equal treatment of people in all matters.f
While decolonisation seemingly brought an end to "international tutelage",
transitional administrations have increasingly been established after interventions
that brought an end to previous regimes.
"Narrow peacekeeping mandates have increasingly been replaced by
'peace-building' operations, which, besides keeping order, also
involve (re)building institutions and the economy, fostering
democracy, punishing war criminals and promoting reconciliation. ,,86
In the midst of the seeming revival of temporary international administrations, it
appears that the same questions with regard to "who should govern, with what
power, with what aims, and for how long ... " have to be answered every time.87
In some cases the role of temporary administrations is to smooth the path from
"subjection" to independence, in others they "provide a cooling-off period before
reintegration into another country" and in yet others they "pick up the pieces after
civil war.,,88 In East Timor, where the UN had full administrative and military
powers, it was the sovereign legal power after Indonesia withdrew until East Timor
became independent. 89In Kosovo, on the other hand, the UN resolution provided
for an interim autonomous administration until the final status of this administration
85 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 43
86 The Economist "Special Report: The lessons of experience" The Economist (12/04/2003) 27 27
87 The Economist The Economist (12/04/2003) 27
88 ibid
89 idem 28
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had been decided.9o Here the interpretation of resolution terms such as "democratic
development" and "substantial autonomy" was left to the interim authorities that
consisted of UN and NATO officials.91 While in Bosnia a relatively clear deadline
existed for elections within "six to nine months after the Dayton agreement" and for
the exit of foreign troops within twelve months, the representative of the
transitional authority "increasingly made use of his discretionary powers and,
among other things, ended up sacking more than 70 elected officials." This is an
example of what happens in the case of disagreement between transitional
authorities and the local population about "economic and political
reconstruction'V'
Such problems and uncertainties can further be seen in the recent intervention
launched by the United States to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. This
intervention happened after the UN weapons inspections teams were authorised to
"remove, destroy, or render harmless all prohibited weapons ... ,,93The authorising
resolution did make provision for the fact that Iraq might not cooperate, in which
case, the weapons inspections teams would report back to the Security Council,
which would then consider the appropriate way to respond." However, the United
States intervened outside of this process. Although this intervention was initially
not humanitarian, the humanitarian angle was later emphasized as the US began
losing public support when the weapons of mass destruction did not materialize. As
such, this intervention is sufficient to show the unease that accompanies many
humanitarian interventions.
Intervening forces usually end up "remaking human lives,,95 after ending the reigns
of terror responsible for gross human rights abuses. In Iraq, for example, the group
of Americans responsible for creating a democracy are attempting to return the
workforce to work and restore order by reinstating the police force. As many police
officers are products of the old regime and thus not trusted by Iraqi's to enforce law
90 SCR 1244
91 The Economist The Economist (12/04/2003) 27,28
92 idem 28
93 SCR 1441
94 ibid
95 Bennett, Ghosh, Robinson & Rosen et al "Who's in Charge?" Time (28/04/2003) 31 31
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and order in the new regime, this is very difficult to achieve. This kind of problem
leads to administrative confusion. When Kurdish children with "rocket-propelled
grenades" told Arabs, for example, to move out within two days or die, the
intervening forces directed the Arabs to the "civilian administration" for help. Since
neither accepted responsibility, however, the Kurdish "civilian administration" sent
the Arabs back to the American forcea."
In contrast with East Timor, Kosovo and Bosnia, the new Iraqi government will
progress in three stages of which the first is an American-led military
administration. The second will be an interim authority that will gradually take over
the day to day running of the administration, while the third will consist of the
elections of a permanent Iraqi government." However, while the uncertainty
continues about what exactly the responsibilities of the intervening forces are, the
people of Iraq are increasingly rejecting the foreign control and are calling for the
American-led forces to teave."
It is therefore important that occupation by intervening forces only continues for as
long as is needed to establish good governance, peace and security. These forces
should take sufficient notice of the cultural practices and should include local
personnel to prevent the impression that the local population is the enemy." The
aim of intervening forces should be to "do themselves out of a job" by supporting
and rebuilding war torn communities and enabling them to gain control of the
political processes in their country.l'" As members of the international community,
states are likely to accept and "internalise" principles such as human rights only if
their "national soils" become receptive to it, which is "primarily a business for
insiders, not outsiders."IOI The fact is that despite the efforts of intervening forces
to convert a country to democracy or to respect for human rights; these values will
only become a reality if the citizens of a country choose to accept them. However,
96 idem 31, 32
97 The Economist "Special Report: Fighting for authority" The Economist (12/04/2003) 24 24
98 Bennett et al Time (28/04/2003) 32
99 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 44
100 idem 45
101 Best "Justice, international relations and human rights" 1995 Vol 71 No 4 International Affairs
775794
104
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
if humanitarian intervention fails to address the underlying conflicts that caused the
humanitarian disaster, it is likely to conclude without the guarantee of "no
recurrence".102
One of the issues that need to be addressed to prevent recurrence of human rights
abuses is the punishment of the perpetrators of crimes against humanity. In the
agreement of 9 June 1999 in which the Serbs agreed to leave Kosovo, there was no
provision for the punishment of the perpetrators of Operation Horseshoe. "Security
Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June, concluding the war, asked only 'full co-
operation of all concerned, including the international security presence, with the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia' .,,103NATO diplomats failed to
insist on the surrender of the perpetrators, as a condition for the end of the war,
even while the object of the agreement was the supposed punishment of these
individuals. As a result of this lack of justice, the KLA murdered hundreds of Serbs
as a part of reprisal killings, something that could have been prevented had the
intervening forces fulfilled the responsibility of restoring justice, which had been
promised. 104
The notion of a "responsibility to protect" forwarded by the ICISS, includes the
implication of rebuilding peace and "promoting good governance and sustainable
development'vl'" This rebuilding involves a commitment to provide sufficient
funds and resources.l'" In the 1998 report 'The Causes of Conflict and the
Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa', UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan described the "nature of and rational for post-
conflict peace building". 107
"By post-conflict peace-building, I mean actions undertaken at the
end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a recurrence of
armed confrontation ... Peace-building does not replace ongoing
102 Wheeler Saving Strangers 170
103 Robertson Crimes against humanity 419
104 ibid
105 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 39
106 ibid
107 idem 40
105
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
humanitarian and development activities in countries emerging from
crises. Rather it aims to build on, add to, or reorient such activities in
ways that are designed to reduce the risk of a resumption of conflict
and contribute to creating conditions most conducive to
reconciliation, reconstruction and recovery."
" ... emphasis must be placed on critical proprieties such as
encouraging reconciliation and demonstrating respect for human
rights; fostering political inclusiveness and promoting national unity;
ensuring the safe, smooth and early repatriation and resettlement of
refugees and displace persons; reintegrating ex-combatants and
others into productive society; curtailing the availability of small
arms; and mobilizing the domestic and international resources for
reconstruction and economic recovery. Each priority is linked to
every other, and success will require a concerted and coordinated
effort on all fronts."I08
Further issues of vital importance that need to be addressed after intervention are
the security and protection of all members of a population, justice and
reconciliation, and developrnent.l'" A need therefore exists for the establishment of
some kind of standard of responsibilities intervening forces should have after
intervention, adaptable to the particular situation to ensure maximum efficiency.
Intervening states should realise that intervention is not a quick fix, but only the
beginning of a long, difficult and costly road in rebuilding a state. If they are not
prepared to carry this burden, they should not undertake an intervention.
5 2 4 Regional Arrangements or Agencies
When Boutros Boutros-Ghali became the UN Secretary General in 1992, he sought
to make regional arrangements central to the workings of the UN system.l " The
108 ibid
109 idem 40-42
110 Higgins 1995 Vol6 EJIL 450
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"new complementarity" he proposed between the UN and regional organizations in
the Agenda for Peace had a dual basis. Firstly, regional organizations were to
mcrease the military capabilities of the UN and secondly, the involvement of
regional arrangements in matters of international peace and security were to
contribute to "a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratisation in
international affairs". 111
First of all, it is necessary to consider what exactly would constitute a regional
arrangement or agency as provided for in article 52 of the Charter. It seems as if
these terms should be seen as alternatives, as states need to have the discretion to
decide which kind of organisation is most suitable "for their secure political
union".112 As article 52 provides for the existence of regional arrangements "for
dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and
security, it seems as if such arrangements have to have the same purpose as the
Charter, to qualify as a regional arrangement.l':' Thus, the term regional
arrangement or agency,
"refers to a union of states or an international organisation based
upon a collective treaty or a constitution and consistent with the
Purposes and Principles of the UN, whose primary task is that
maintenance of peace and security under the control and within the
framework of the UN. lts members, whose number must be smaller
than that of the UN, must be so closely linked in territorial terms that
effective local dispute settlement by means of a specially provided
procedure is possible."II4
It appears that by 1994, the list of organisations unanimously accepted as such
regional agencies in the literature included the OAS, the League of Arab States and
the OAU, now the African Union (AU).II5 This would probably mean that now, the
III idem 451
112 Hummer & Schweitzer Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements, Article 52 in Simma (ed) The
Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (1994) 679 694
113 Kelsen The Law of the United Nations 320
114 Hummer & Schweitzer Article 52 699
115 ibid
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European Union (EU) would qualify as such a regional agency as well.
Furthermore, the UN accepted the claims of the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to be a regional arrangement, because it shows all
the characteristics of such an arrangement.i'" even though it is not based on an
international treaty. All these organisations would thus have valid claims to an
active part in regional peace and security, including, according to Security Council
conduct, intervention in cases of gross human rights abuses posing a threat to
regional peace. In light of the criterion for regional arrangements, it is not
surprising that the legitimacy of interventions by some regional organisations is
under attack by the argument that they are sub-regional rather than regional, and
therefore falls outside of the framework for regional arrangements in Chapter VIII
of the Charter.l " However, it seems that at least one of the organisations open to
this critique, has made the necessary arrangements to allow it to take an active part
in regional peace and security. ECOWAS signed the Protocol on Non-Aggression
in 1978 and the Protocol Relating to the Mutual Assistance of Defence, in 1981 and
thus made itself "both a defensive alliance and a regional system of collective
security under Chapter VIII". 118
The African Union is also taking steps to ensure an active part in maintaining peace
and security by adopting the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace
and Security Council of the African Union. This Council will be the "standing
decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of
conflicts".119 While staying mindful of the provisions of the Charter and the
position of regional arrangements according to the UN Charter as discussed below,
the principles of the Protocol include both the respect for sovereignty and "the right
of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision ofthe Assembly
[of the heads of state of the African Union] in respect of grave circumstances,
namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity ... ,,120 Since the 2000
116 idem 705
II? Thomashausen Humanitarian Intervention 19
ns Hummer & Schweitzer Article 52 707
119 African Union, Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union, Article 2(1)
120 idem Article 4(e), 40)
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Constitutive Act of the African Union itself does not significantly focus on
prevention of conflicts and human rights abuses, it is clear that this focus only
developed afterwards. At least one of the later calls for an active part by the African
Union in maintaining and establishing peace and security in the region included
specifically the need for preventative efforts.121 This call was answered in the
Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council where "early warning and
preventive diplomacy" is part of the functions of the Council.122
Something that is of further importance is that both the Constitutive Act and the
Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council make specific mention, not
just to the promotion and encouragement of respect for human rights, but
specifically to the protection of human rights as an objective.123 It is apparent that
the protection of human rights is part of the progressively active part the African
Union plan to take in the security of the region, as the principles of the Peace and
Security Council regarding the respect for sovereignty, as well as the right to
intervene in grave circumstances, are also found in the Constitutive ACt.124 The
specific reference to the protection of human rights and the right to intervene in
grave circumstances increases the responsibility of both the Union and the Council
regarding human rights and paves the way for initiating intervention in such
circumstances. This idea is further affirmed by the envisaged establishment of an
African Standby Force, consisting of standby contingents from member states "for
participation in peace support missions decided on by the Peace and Security
Councilor intervention authorised by the Assembly" of the Union.125 As such, it is
noteworthy that specifically the Council have the function of "peace-building and
post-conflict reconstruction't.V" something that many intervening forces still has
trouble with.
121 http://www.justiceafrica.orgjissuespaperafricanunionsymposium.htm [Accessed 2 February
2004]
122 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,
Article 6(b)
123 idem Article 3(f); African Union, Constitutive Act of the African Union. Article 3(h)
124 Constitutive Act of the African Union. Article 4(a), 4(h)
125 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,
Article 13( 1), 13(2)
126 idem Article 6(e)
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In general, however, it seems that the role of regional arrangements in the
protection of human rights is still uncertain. The reason for this is that while
regional arrangements are progressively taking an interest in the security of their
regions, most are not "fitted for military collective security". 127 In addition, while
these arrangements may be more intimately familiar with the problems of the
region, they may inevitably be in cahoots with one of the parties.128 The Arab
League would for instance not be the best entity to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli
dispute.129
Further disadvantages exist with regard to the actions of regional arrangements in
conflict situations within their regions. History has shown that in several conflict
situations, regional arrangements did not or could not contribute towards the
conflict resolution. The Gulf Cooperation Council, for example, did not play a
significant role in the Iraq-Kuwait dispute, the OAV was unable to assist in
Somalia and Angola and the Association Of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has
made "a negligible contribution to the problems of Cambodia". 130
Another problem with a focus on regional solutions for regional problems is that
more often than not international organizations such as the UN will become
involved anyway. This is illustrated in Georgia where a UN Observer Mission in
Georgia (UNOMIG), the CSCE and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees were
already involved when the Security Council ex post facto approved the
peacekeeping activities of the Commonwealth ofIndependent States (CIS).l3l
According to article 53 of the Charter, the Council may utilize "regional
agreements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority". It further states
that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements ... without
the authorization of the Security Council. .. ,,132 Although the earlier restrictive
interpretation of article 53 required prior Security Council authorization for
127 Higgins 1995 Vo16 EJIL 451
128 Ramsbotham & Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention 161
129 Higgins 1995 Vo16 EJIL 451
130 idem 452
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enforcement action by regional arrangements, the Council has recently deferred its
authorization of such action by regional arrangements until after the event. 133
Interventions by ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone have for example not been
authorized by the Security Council, but have been "treated with implicit approval
afterwards".134
The role that NATO has been assigning itself with regard to the execution of UN
enforcement action is also problematic'Y. In article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty,136the NATO members agreed "that an armed attack against one or more of
them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all". In
doing so, the treaty was affirmed as a self-defence pact and NATO as a self-defence
organisation. However, during the nineties, NATO adopted the role of supporting
peace operations. When Secretary General Boutros-Ghali asked for the assistance
of NATO in future UN resolutions regarding the former Yugoslavia in 1992,
NATO confirmed their preparedness to support peace-keeping operations under
authority of the Security Council and stated that they "are ready to respond
positively to initiatives that the UN Secretary-General might take to seek Alliance
assistance in the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions'v" While
NATO only assisted implementation of Security Council resolutions here, the
NATO bombing in Kosovo in 1999 was undertaken unilaterally. Because NATO
claims to be a regional arrangement, this, together with its association with UN
enforcement actions, leads to uncertainty about the place of regional arrangements
in conflict resolution.
According to Charney, a change in the existing regime can pave the way for
responsible regional involvement.l " This could include the following process:
After proof has been established of widespread grave international crimes, which
could include gross human rights abuses, the regional arrangement of that area
should call upon the state in which the crimes is being committed to take action to
133 Wedgwood 1999 Vo193 AJIL 832
134 ibid
135 Higgins 1995 Vol 6 ElIL 453
136 NATO North At/antic Treaty, Article 5
137 ibid
138 Charney "Anticipatory humanitarian intervention in Kosovo" 1999 Vol93 AJIL 834 838
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end the crimes. Once the regional arrangement has exhausted all remedies such as
"negotiations, political initiatives, non-forcible countermeasures such as economic
sanctions",139 the situation should be brought to the attention of the General
Assembly and the Security Council. If the Council does authorize action under
Chapter VII, the action should remain under the control of the Council, but if the
Council fails to authorize such action and neither the Council nor the Assembly
expressly prohibits action by the regional arrangement, a UN-based remedy should
"be deemed exhausted" .140 Only then should the regional arrangement be permitted
to take action, starting with notifying the target state of impending use of force
against it. Before intervening, the states participating in the intervention should
have to consent to ICJ jurisdiction with regard to any violation of international law
that may occur in the course of the intervention. The intervention itself should only
be to stop the violation of international law and should be undertaken with
proportional means. In addition, the intervening forces should be required to
withdraw once the objective has been achieved.141
While Charney's proposal seems reasonable, two problems remain, the first of
which is that by the time the process has been completed and a regional
arrangement intervenes, gross human rights abuses have been going on for far too
long. The second problem is that if the Security Councilor the General Assembly
expressly prohibits enforcement action by the regional arrangement, the channels
through which assistance can be given are blocked again.
Because of the unwillingness of states to intervene where they have no interest,
however, some authors think that, "the most promising experiments in multilateral
peace operations are likely to remain at the regional level" in the foreseeable
future.142 Since states share this interest at regional level, "sufficient unity of
139 ibid
140 ibid
141 idem 838 839
142 Stremlauï'The 1999 Kosovo War through a South African Lens" 2000 Vol 7 Nr 1 South African
Journal of International Affairs 131 137
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political values" might be created to surpass the usual disagreements about the
legitimacy of intervention.143
5 2 5 Human Rights
The big difference between human rights law and other fields of international law is
that obligations arising from human rights law are owed to individuals themselves
instead of to states, or more accurately, the governments of states.144 'Human'
rights are held by virtue of being human and are not dependent on the fact that
different states or groupings of states behave differently with regard to politics,
economics and social issues.145While states may implement the rights differently,
the content of these rights should not vary as they depend on an international
standard.l'"
When the Charter was compiled, the inclusion of the human rights purpose was the
source of much disagreement between the great powers. While some insisted the
United Nations be an organization solely concerned with international peace and
security, others felt that human rights should also playa significant role.147 This
was possibly part of the conflict between Western and socialist ideas of human
rights. While the Western tradition "emphasizes civil and political rights as liberal
fundamental rights and freedoms in the sense of negative rights directed against the
states and the abuse of power",148 the socialist concept focused on collective
aspects such as those concerning social and economic rights, which had to be
guaranteed by the state.149 Nevertheless, the reconstruction of the international
community after 1945 was done with reference to western liberal democratic values
and it is these values to which the promotion and respect for human rights became
linked.
143 Kaiser The Political Aspects of Intervention in Present Day International Politics I in Jaquet (ed)
Intervention in International Politics (1971) 76 86
144 Higgins Problems and Process 95
145 idem 96 97
146 idem 98'
147 Thomashausen Humanitarian Intervention 8
148 Malanczuk Akehurst 's Modern Introduction to International Law 7th ed (1997) 210
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Although various human rights clauses were included in the Charter, they have
several defects, such as their vagueness with regard to the rights protected, except
for the right to non-discrimination, and their lack of clarity regarding whether any
legal obligations are in fact created. ISOIn addition, no enforcement machinery was
provided, except when "the denial of human rights assumes such egregious
proportions that it constitutes a threat to international peace ... " Article 2(7) is also
in conflict with the human rights clauses. lSI
Article 56, on the other hand, is normative. In this, "[a]ll members pledge
themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the [UN] for the
achievement of the purposes set forth in article 55". The purpose that is relevant
here is the promotion of universal respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms and the observance of these rights. While the exact scope of this
responsibility is the subject of much debate, it seems that at least "deliberate, gross
violations of human rights by a UN member would appear to be a violation by that
state of its pledge."ls2 This is why the ICJ condemned apartheid as a "flagrant
violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter" .153
As the development of international human rights law were frozen to a standstill by
the Cold War, the focus that human rights did enjoy after World War II was short
lived. Although the "power blocs" did not seem to deny the idea of universal
human rights, meaningful enforcement was prevented by the use of the veto in the
Security Council. 154 In truth, the violations of human rights were frequently used as
a "propaganda weapon against the other side".155 The great powers were not
prepared to be subject to international standards where the treatment of their own
nationals was concerned and thus, the human rights clauses did not impose any
legal duty on member states.IS6 Similarly, the Universal Declaration, I57 which
150 Dugard International Law 237
151 ibid
152 Henkin Human Rights 887
153 Legal Consequence for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South-West
Altica) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 Advisory Opinion ICJ Reports 16 (1971)
1 4 Robertson Crimes against humanity 406
155 idem 407
156 idem 26
157 see eh 1 n 33
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includes the right to life, liberty and security of the person, non-discrimination,
freedom from torture of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment,
freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, equality before the law and equal
protection of the law and the right to a fair trial,158 is not a legal guarantee.V"
Nevertheless, the Declaration that was compiled by the UNCHR, chaired by
Eleanor Roosevelt, is still valid today. According to article 28, "[e]veryone is
entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth
in this declaration can be fully realized." In the light of this right, which called for
an enforcement system in the event of the abuse of human rights, 160the inability of
the Security Council to act effectively in the face of gross human rights abuses is a
bleak image.
However, it seems that within the unenforceable traditional "future-directed 'soft
law'" a growing mass of hard international human rights law exists that is
considered observable and is "equipped with institutions of supervision and
jurisdiction to make sure that it is observed.,,161 Despite this growing hard law,
many countries that have signed numerous human rights treaties are still guilty of
human rights abuses. One of the reasons for this hypocrisy is the importance states
attach to their sovereignty and non-interference by other states.162Human rights are
furthermore usually exercised against the state, while the state itself is the power
that has to protect these rights. Another reason is the continuing charge that human
rights are a western value being forced on non-western states.163
Despite this critique, the increasing belief that the observance of human rights by
states is not considered to fall within the domestic jurisdiction of states anymore, is
telling of the growing importance of human rights after World War 1.164 According
to Malanczuk there is no doubt that at least "severe human rights violations no
longer belong to the 'domain reserve of states, irrespective of [a]rticle 2(7) of the
158 Henkin Human Rights 888
159 Robertson Crimes against humanity 27
160 idem 30
161 Best 1995 Vol 71 No 4 International Affairs 786
162 idem 787
163 idem 788
164 Steinberger Sovereignty 411
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UN Charter ... ,,165This growing importance is also seen in the fact that the human
rights provisions of the Charter is increasingly linked to the Universal Declaration
of Human RightS.166
Another much debated issue is whether the protection of human rights must be the
sole reason for an intervention to qualify as a humanitarian intervention. While the
influence of political and economic interests tends to result in expeditious
intervention in certain situations and no intervention mothers, "[a]n absolute
singular motivation, a pure good will, is a political illusion.,,167 The truth is that
interventions of any kind are "essentially .. .instruments of power politics". 168
Morgenthau even goes further to say that as states only intervene when it is in their
interest to do so, "moral and legal arguments serve no other function than to
'discredit the intervention of the other side and to justify one's own,,,.169
While it is thus clear that human rights have gained tremendous support, the legal
basis for its protection remains precarious. This is, among other things, a
consequence of the conflict caused by the efforts to find a global consensus
concerning human rights in the midst of the cultural, political and economic
diversity of the growing interdependent international community .170 The UN
Charter does not really provide for it and it does not seem as if member states are
prepared to revise the Charter to reflect the importance that the world has come to
attach to the protection of human rights. This in itself continues to display the lip
service paid to human rights by world leaders. Until human rights are given the
place they deserve in the UN Charter, the time and energy necessary for their
protection will be wasted on debates and arguments.
165 Malanczuk Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law 220
166 Henkin Human Rights 887
167 Holliday 2002 Vo128 Issue 3 RIS 568
168 Friedman Intervention and International Law I in Jaquet (ed) Intervention in International
Politics (1971) 40 66; Ramsbotham & Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention 56, 57
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116
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5 3 Contemporary Theories and Views
In a General Assembly debate in 1999, some states claimed that human rights have
become more important than sovereignty and that the international community
should intervene to end gross human rights abuses with or without Security Council
authorization. Other states argued that the institution can potentially destroy the
Charter, undermine sovereignty and overthrow legitimate governments, and that the
protection of human rights is a duty that falls within the context of state
sovereignty. Yet other members maintained that intervention could only happen
with Security Council authorization.!"
It seems that the ethical objections to humanitarian intervention fall into two
categories, the first of which contains the non-intervention arguments considered
earlier172and the second the possibility of negative outcomes of interventions. The
truth is that the outcomes of interventions are virtually impossible to predict
because of the wealth of variables involved in every intervention.l " Nevertheless,
Wheeler argues that the exchange between enemy and intervening soldiers cannot
be "a 1: 1 exchange, because the eonsequentialist ethics that justify humanitarian
intervention demand that any loss of life, as a consequence of intervention, be
outweighed by the number of lives saved as a result of it.,,174
Further objections relate to the apparent conflict between protecting human rights
and engaging in devastating armed force to do it. The connection between two
seemingly contradictory concepts, 'humanitarian' and 'intervention' as enforcement
action, is problematic. The contradiction follows from the fact that the idea of
humanitarianism suggests compassion and assistance for people in need, whereas
intervention would imply the occurrence of violence associated with military force.
This would be the exact opposite of what humanitarianism stands for. While
'humanitarian' describes a range of activities "that aspire to improve lives and well-
171 Steiner & Alston International Human Rights 653
172 see 5 2 2
173 Welsh 2002 Global Governance 508, 509
174 idem 512
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being of individuals",175 intervention points towards a use of force, that is
inconsistent with the explicit prohibition of such force in the UN Charter.176 For
critics of the institution, this inherent conflict in the term, points to the unlawfulness
of the institution. While there is truth in this critique, the fact remains that
sometimes if diplomacy and coercion have failed, swift and proportional armed
intervention is the only way to protect human beings.
The argument of Higgins that international law should be seen as a process rather
than rules and that all parties in such a model should be seen as participants rather
than subjects or objects of the law, seem to provide some answers in this constantly
changing field.177 According to her, if international law is seen as unchanging
formal rules, it is condemned to "stagnation and absurdity in the face of the variety
of phenomena and changing circumstances't.i" In addition, she maintains, a rule-
based approach ignores the fact that in international law new norms are formed
through the persistent violation and rejection of existing norms. 179
While this argument might seem to mean that the constant abuse of human rights is
leading to a new norm, the fact is that states abusing the human rights of their
citizens have never justified their actions by claiming that a new norm has been
formed.18o The justifications have always been that the treatment of their nationals
was a domestic affair and therefore not open to interference from foreign states or
international organisations. This claim has always been countered by the
developing norm of the respect and observance of human rights. Thus, while new
norms can be formed by consistent actions to the contrary, these actions will not
form new norms if they are justified on the basis of being an exception to the norm,
but rather will strengthen the existing norm.181
As advocates of humanitarian intervention are finding new arguments to strengthen
their cause, one particular argument seems to persist between the advocates
175 Thomashausen Humanitarian Intervention 1
176 ibid
177 Higgins Problems and Process 50
178 Polat 1999 Vol19 (Nr 1) OJLS 59; Wheeler Saving Strangers 5
179 ibid
180 Higgins Problems and Process 20
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themselves. Some authors maintain that an intervention based on humanitarian
motives would be a legitimate humanitarian intervention. Thus the only incentive
for the intervention must be to prevent or stop gross human rights abuses. Others
argue that humanitarian incentives cannot be used as legitimating factors for
humanitarian interventions as such incentives will never be the only kind of
incentive for intervention. Therefore, the legitimating factor should rather be
whether a humanitarian outcome has been wielded by the intervention. In truth, the
end of gross human rights abuses is often an inevitable outcome of interventions
that did not have humanitarian incentives as their sole motive. This is because the
regime, against which intervention is put into operation, is usually also the regime
responsible for the abuses and the abuses come to an end because of the
intervention. A case in point is Vietnam's intervention in Cambodia. Although
humanitarian purposes were never used as justification for the intervention, one of
the inevitable outcomes of the intervention was the end of the genocidal regime of
Pol Pot.182
Wheeler further maintains that an intervention based on non-humanitarian motives
should only be legitimate if the motives and the enforcement action taken do not
undermine a humanitarian outcome.183 In support of this contention, he forwards
four criteria that a legitimate humanitarian intervention would have to meet. First of
all, there has to be an extreme human rights violation, such as will "shock the moral
conscience of humanity".184 Then it must be certain that all non-violent remedies
have been exhausted. The force used in the intervention must be proportional to the
violations and a strong belief must exist that the intervention will render a positive
humanitarian outcome.18S
He further tries to "tip the balance away from pluralism and toward a solidarist
understanding of international society".186 In such a society the state would accept
182 Wheeler Saving Strangers 106
183 Wheeler 2001 Vol 77 No I International Affairs 122
184 ibid
185 ibid
186 Welsh 2002 Global Governance 510
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the responsibility of protecting the security and human rights of their citizens 187and
would look to find ways to overcome the conflict between inter-state order and
justice by "developing practices that recognize the mutual interdependence'<"
between these issues. This is in stark contrast with the pluralist view that states and
not individuals are the primary subjects of international law and that the pursuance
of individual justice in the face of gross human rights abuses is unsuitable, as it will
endanger the "structure of inter-state order" .189Pluralists are further concerned that
because states have conflicting claims of justice and will act "on their own moral
principles",190 it will weaken the international order built on state sovereignty.
Their arguments against humanitarian intervention include that the institution will
be abused and that it will be selective as it will be dependant on the shifting
political views of states.l'" However, while the non-humanitarian motives behind
an intervention may suggest the abuse of the institution, the claims of abuse will
only survive if these motives undermine the humanitarian purposes and
outcomes.192 The "solidarist" or monist argument for humanitarian intervention
includes the idea that to be a legitimate intervention, an intervention has to satisfy
certain criteria.l'" as it has never been advocated that interventions should be made
without standards.
Wheeler states that while the recognition of a right to humanitarian intervention
might allow previously prohibited actions, it is no guarantee that intervention will
take place if and where it is necessary, without delay.194The right to intervene puts
the interests of the intervening states at the centre of the intervention, while that
place should be reserved for the interests of the victims suffering grave violations
of their human rights.195 The reason for this is that the focus on a right to
intervention does not take the need for preventative efforts and assistance after
187 ibid
188 Wheeler Saving Strangers Il
189 ibid
190 idem 29
191 idem 29, 30
192 idem 39
193 idem 33
194 Wheeler 2001 Vol 77 No 1 International Affairs 126
195 Wheeler Saving Strangers 38
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intervention into account.l'" This is the rationalization of the 'Responsibility to
Protect' as suggested by the ICISSI97
The idea that obligations are owed to human beings is also found in the InterAction
Council's idea of A Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities and is
supposed to serve as a balance between freedom and responsibility.l'" "[W]hile
rights relate more to freedom, obligations are associated with responsibility" and as
such freedom and responsibility are interdependent.l'" Part of the ICISS notion of
the responsibility to protect, is that sovereignty should be seen as a responsibility.
The significance of this is that it implies that state authorities have the
responsibility for the protection of the safety and lives of their citizens and that the
"national political authorities are responsible to the citizens internally and to the
international community through the UN"_2°0It also means that state agents will be
accountable for their actions or the lack of action. The growing human rights norms
playa particularly big role in putting sovereignty in a context of responsibility.é'"
This context is expanding in a time when the anger and compassion of people
around the world has been rekindled by media coverage of gross human rights
abuses_2°2When this is taken into account, it is shocking that the superpower of our
time, the United States, is jeopardizing the humanitarian efforts of the UN by
threatening to stop payments to the UN budget "if the ICC ever indicts an American
or the UN ever acquires its own military force" _203The obstruction of the first
permanent international tribunal able to bring the leaders of genocidal regimes to
justice is yet another example of the lip service world leaders pays to the protection
of the rights of human beings around the world. Nevertheless, from current views
196 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 16
197 Welsh 2002 Global Governance 511
198 InterAction Council A Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities in Steiner & Alston (ed)
International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals 2nd ed (2000) 351351
199 ibid
200 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 13
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202 Robertson Crimes against humanity 438
203 idem 446; http://www.hrw.orgipress/2003/08/belgium080103.htm [Accessed 2 March 2004] The
jeopardising of humanitarian efforts is further seen in the fact that the US threatened Belgium that it
could risk losing its status as host to NATO headquarters if it did not rescind its universal
jurisdiction legislation. The Belgian parliament repealed the 1993 legislation in 2003
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and theories it is clear that the protection of human rights have become far too
important for states that are able to help, to accept being frustrated by the inability
of the Security Council to authorise effective protection, especially since the notion
of the responsibility to protect is gaining so much support.
5 4 Humanitarian Interventions
From previous humanitarian interventions, it seems that intervention will only
happen in the face of a humanitarian emergency, as "it has never been suggested
that a state's poor human rights record could justify armed intervention'Y"
However, it appears that some states have been allowed to get away with grave
abuses for longer than is tolerable, before the international community would take
action to protect the abused civilians.
541 Liberia
The relevance of the ECOW AS intervention in Liberia is the fact that it illustrates
the role of regional organisations in the protection of human rights. In 1980, after
an era of democracy in which 20 consecutive presidents were democratically
elected, the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), led by Samuel K. Doe, overthrew the
government of William V.S. Tubman in a coup d'état. The autocracy that followed
was toppled in 1989 by a "popular but excessively destructive insurgency" led by
the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) with Charles Taylor at the head.
This marked the start of the civil war. Taylor's forces soon had control of
significantly more territory than the government and when the AFL, at this time the
forces of government, suffered severe losses, Doe appealed for help to the UN and
the United States. When no help was forthcoming, he appealed to ECOW AS, who
established the ECOWAS Cease-firing Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in 1990, to
stop Liberia from descending into further anarchy.i'"
204 Robertson Crimes against humanity 406
205 ICISS Supplementary Volume 81
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While ECOMOG did restore law and order in Monrovia, the capital of Liberia, and
an Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) had been formed under the
auspices of ECOW AS,206 ECOMOG could not broker a peace deal. Five months
after the intervention, the Security Council commended the efforts of ECOW AS to
promote peace. Shortly after, as the NPFL started killing and torturing ECOMOG
troops, the Council adopted Resolution 788, which stated that the situation in
Liberia posed a threat to international peace and security. After 1992, the Security
Council established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) in cooperation
with ECOMOG.207 In 1996 conflict erupted once more and atrocities and
displacements were extensive even though ECOMOG eventually restored their
control. At least 200 000 Liberians were killed throughout the conflict, and almost
800 000 became refugees.i'" Through a series of peace accords that did not hold,
ECOMOG seems to have been the only constant force in Liberia.
After the disarmament and demobilisation of warring factions as a result of
negotiations involving the OAU, ECOWAS, UN and the United States,209 Charles
Taylor was elected as president of Liberia in 1997, perhaps primarily because of the
fear that war would once again erupt if Taylor should lose.2lO In this context, it is
not surprising that the problems of Liberia were not at an end after the ECOW AS
intervention and that the Taylor administration did little to better the lives of
Liberian people. Rather, it supported the bloody RUF in Sierra Leone that created
much unrest in the region, behaviour for which the United Nations imposed
sanctions on Liberia in 200 1.2ll On August 11, 2003 President Taylor resigned
office and departed into exile in Nigeria under intense US and international
pressure. This move paved the way for the deployment by ECOWAS of what
became a 3 600-strong military peacekeeping mission in Liberia (ECOMIL).212
206 http://www.state.gov/r/paJei/bgn/6618.htm [Accessed 12 November 2003]
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Regardless of the concern expressed for the "wanton destruction of human life and
property",213 the intervention by Liberia was controversial, as it was neither
authorised by the Security Council, nor backed by all the ECOWAS members.214
Furthermore, the ECOWAS treaty does not require ECOW AS to provide any
regional-security mechanism to deal with internal conflicts. However, the 1981
ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mutual Assistance of Defence does provide that
"internal armed conflict that is likely to endanger security and peace in the
community would be dealt with by the authority of the member states
concerned"_215
The situation in Liberia was clearly not breaching international or regional peace
and security, and by the time ECOMOG intervened in 1990, was not even seen as a
threat to peace by the Security Council. It was nevertheless clear that Liberia were
in need of outside intervention, which is why ECOMOG intervened and its
intervention is seen as justified. The fact that ECOMOG was familiar with the
situation in Liberia, made this regional organisation suitable to intervene, even if it
was without Security Council authorisation. While this kind of intervention might
be used as a standard by which to measure intervention by regional actors, the
problem however, is that the same critique of selectivity aimed at the UN, is true of
regional actors. The relatively speedy intervention in Liberia stands in stark contrast
to the non-intervention in Rwanda, although granted as a result of a UN decision.i'"
542 Rwanda
The genocide in Rwanda will remain a testament to the inefficiency of the UN
system to protect the "peoples of the United Nations,,217 it purports to represent and
stands as a warning of the outcome of indifference. The country's civil war should
be seen in the context of the superior treatment the Tutsi people received
throughout the German colonisation from 1897 to 1919 and the Belgian
213 ICISS Supplementary Volume 81
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215 ibid
216 Wheeler Saving Strangers 301
217 UN Charter, Preamble
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colonisation from 1919 to 1962_218In truth, the Hutu people were severely
repressed with specifically Belgium equating the Tutsis with a "ruling class"_219As
Rwanda was awaiting independence after World War II, a group of Hutu emerged
as elite after being given access to jobs. In the last part of the Belgian
administration, these people started calling for Hutu freedom, "not only from
Belgian colonisation but from Tutsi overlordship (sic)".22o
What is described by Jones as the "first phase" of Tutsi genocide started as the
Tutsi elite made plans to eliminate members of the emerging Hutu elite. When
these plans collapsed, the Hutu targets retaliated and sparked the killing of an
estimated 20 000 people and the displacement of an estimated 160 000 Tutsi's in
1959.221 After independence in 1962 the Party of the Movement and of Hutu
Emancipation, Parmehuith, won the first elections_222 It is from this ethnic
competition and the long years of Tutsi rule that the mobilization towards the
genocide, for which Rwanda has become known, would grow.223
In 1973 Juvénal Habyarimana lead a coup d'état that shifted power from the
Southern Hutu clans to the Northern clans224 and after that, the superior place in
commercial, intellectual and cultural life, of especially the Bushiru Hutu, was
maintained during the one party administration until at least the late 1980's_225It is
said that the civil war really began when the rebel group, the Rwandese Patriotic
Front (RPF), invaded Rwanda from Uganda in the South in 1990_226Sporadic
fighting, claiming the lives of tens of thousands of Hutu's and Tutsi's,227 continued
between the RPF and the Rwandan government army through the next three
years228 until the Habyarimana government finally reluctantly agreed to a multi-
218 Jones Peacemaking in Rwanda 17
219 idem 19
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224 Wheeler Saving Strangers 25
225 Jones Peacemaking in Rwanda 26, 27
226 idem 15
227 idem 36
228 idem 15
125
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
party constitution.r'" This happened under pressure to democratise as the price of
coffee, the main export of the Rwanda at the time, collapsed and foreign assistance
all but dried Up.230Although opposition parties signed a peace agreement, the
Arusha Accords at the Tanzanian town of Arusha in 1993, the terms of the
agreement was not conducive to reconciliation, as it significantly favoured the
minority Tutsi group,231 something that the Hutu's found almost impossible to
accept.
When a Neutral International Force (NIF) was contemplated to oversee the
transition process after the signing of the Arusha Accords, it was argued that the
neutral force should be provided by the OAV. This was resisted by the UN that
seemed to feel that if they were to provide the financial and logistical support the
OAV would need from them, they should command the force. In effect, the UN
rejected a regional lead force and preferred UN lead forces,232 which led to the
deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission, UNAMIR, in 1993_233On 18 April
requests for $61 million, the budget approved on 6 April and estimated necessary to
successfully support UNAMIR, were issued to contributors by the UN. The first
instalments were received on the 26th of August, more than a month after the
genocide, which lasted from 6 April to 17 July 1994, had been ended_234
The genocide started when the aeroplane carrying both the presidents of Rwanda
and Burundi after peace talks was shot down.235Militant Hutu's claimed that it was
the deed of Tutsi rebels and retaliated by killing the prime minister and seizing the
government. In this way, they provoked action against the Tutsi population.r'" In
the almost 100 days of well-planned and coordinated genocide,237 the estimates of
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Tutsi's and moderate Hutu's killed ranged from 500 000 to 1 000000.238 Estimates
of women raped ranged from 250000 to 500000.239 Out of a population of 7
million, more than 2 million fled to neighbouring countries and around 3 million
were internally displaced.i"
"If we consider that probably around 800,000 people were slaughtered
during that short period ... the daily killing rate was at least five times
that of the Nazi death camps.,,241
At the time the genocide started, UNAMIR, assigned to monitor the Arusha
process, consisted of 2 500 peacekeepers.V The UN Secretary General, stating that
the position of UNAMIR had become inadequate, outlined a few alternatives for
the Security Council and advocated the alternative of the deployment of 5 500
troops in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda. The Council issued Resolution 912 and
"adjusted the mandate of UNAMIR"_243While the force commander of UNAMIR
"pleaded for 5 000 well trained soldiers,,244 and requested the mandate to be
adjusted to include the protection of civilians, the Council voted to reduce the
numbers of UNAMIR to 270 troops on the 21st of April in Resolution 912 and
denied the adjustment requested.i"
When reports of genocide continued, the Council imposed an arms embargo and
authorised the expansion of UNAMIR to 5 500 troops with the first phase existing
of 150 unarmed observers and "an 800-strong Ghanaian battalion to secure the
Kigali airport" on 17 May_246It seems that this expanded mission, known as
UNAMIR II, did not attract the troops necessary for the second phase, let alone all
the troops for the first phase_247 "In the absence of Western intervention'V"
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Secretary General Boutros- Boutros Ghali called on African states to supply the
troops necessary for the second phase of UNAMIR II.249However, UNAMIR II
never really succeeded as by the 1st of August, at approximately the time when the
mission was to leave Rwanda, its force still had fewer than 500 troops.250
The first time the Council named the situation in Rwanda genocide, was in
Resolution 925, in which "the reports indicating that acts of genocide have occurred
in Rwanda" were noted "with the gravest concem"_251 On the 220d of June the
Council authorised intervention by France, who requested Chapter VII
authorisation from the Council when it declared in a letter to the Secretary General
that it was prepared to intervene_252Operation Turquoise, as the French mission was
called, was authorised to use all necessary means to "improve security and protect
displaced persons, refugees, and civilians"_253While this intervention is seen by
some as primarily to secure French interests in Rwanda, it did slow down the
genocide in parts of the country_254A government of national unity was finally
formed on July 19255and Resolution 955 providing for the establishment of the
ICTR, was adopted by the Security Council on November 8, 1994_256
It seems that several early warning signs pointed to a growing threat of genocide,
almost all of which were ignored. By early January 1994 an informant reached
UNAMIR with reports of a Hutu extremist plan to oppose the Arusha peace process
and to attack UNAMIR in a effort to force them to withdraw. This informant also
revealed that lists of Tutsi throughout the country exist and that the people behind
these lists had the capacity to commit full-scale genocide. Although a cable with
this information was sent to UN headquarters in New York, no action was taken_257
While this particular informant may have been considered suspect, other warning
signals were also ignored, notably those from Tanzania and Belgium that warned of
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brewing violence. It seems that the aspirations of international actors for success at
Arusha, blinded them for the mounting evidence of opposition to the negotiations,
with the result that they were unprepared to prevent or stop the subsequent
genocide.r"
"The combination of political indifference, poor intelligence, and lack of
cultural awareness meant that the direction of the political war, and
signals of impending violence, went unheeded in New York. Even as
signals grew louder, and civil violence in Kigali and throughout the
country increased ... [n]o proactive measures to block Arusha opponents
were taken; no contingency planning occurred. ,,259
The first time the Security Council named the situation in Rwanda a threat to peace
and security, was in SCR 929 on 22 June, after more than two months of genocide.
If the protection of the human rights of people is thus to be dependant on the
decision of the Security Council establishing a threat, the protection of these rights
seem to be no more than an illusion. It is little wonder then that states will intervene
without Security Council authorisation, as would have happened in the case of
Rwanda. This is clear from the fact that only a day after the request for Chapter VII
authorisation from France was brought to the Security Council, France already
started to move its troops from African bases to Goma, which were to be the rear
base for Operation Turquoise.Y"
543 Somalia
While the Security Council was unwilling to authorize intervention in Rwanda after
the lesson learned in Somalia, namely that it is dangerous to cross the line from
Peacekeeping to Peace enforcement, the fact is that Somalia and Rwanda were two
very different situations.é'" The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM),
existing out of 500 peacekeepers, was deployed in 1992 as a peacekeeping
258 idem 114
259 idem 116 117
260 idem 124'
261 idem 128
129
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
mission,262 after the Security Council noted the human suffering caused by warring
clans and named the situation a threat to international peace and security in
Resolution 746_263As no government existed that was capable of maintaining law
and order, however, UNOSOM was unable to implement its mandate.i'" While
civil war almost destroyed agricultural and livestock production, UN humanitarian
agencies withdrew from Somalia for fear of personnel security_265When the United
States decided to offer troops to assist the UN in delivering humanitarian aid,266one
set of motivations was that the operation would be "at not too great a cost and,
certainly, without any great danger of body bags coming home".267
The Security Council authorized US intervention, for the first time on the grounds
that the human suffering is causing a threat to international peace and security_268It
seems that the lack of any mention of article 2(7) of the UN Charter in Security
Council Resolution 794 is a reflection of the fact that because the Somali
government as legitimate authority had ceased to exist, the UN action did not
breach the non-intervention principle in article 2(7)_269This reflection supports the
idea that only legitimate states are afforded the right to non-interference.
Operation Restore Hope, headed by the United States, was undertaken by the
United Task Force (UNITAF) and was mandated to "use all necessary means" to
create a secure environment for delivering humanitarian aid.27o At the start of 1993,
UNITAF handed over to a second UN operation, UNOSOM II, which had the
mandate to rebuild, disarm factions and arrest leaders of the warring factions.i" As
fighting continued between UNOSOM II and Somali militia, 18 US and 1
Malaysian troops died at the infamous "Olympic Hotel Battle"_272Even though few
262 Wheeler Saving Strangers 176
263 ICISS Supplementary Volume 94
264 ibid
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266 idem 183 .
267 idem 181
268 idem 183' SCR 794
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of their mandated objectives had been achieved, the last of the UN troops withdrew
within six months.273
Thus, while Somalia was a situation of "diffuse conflict between a fractious set of
warlords" and a population unsympathetic to containment efforts, Rwanda
harboured a leadership tightly controlling the genocide against its unarmed
population.t" As the UN and US forces withdrew from Somalia when the fighting
with warlords claimed lives that had not been anticipated, the real lesson from
Somalia was learned by Rwandan extremists. That UN peacekeeping was a bluff
called to the detriment of the Rwandan population.i"
While the case of Somalia was at first seen as a triumph as it was the first time
states had intervened in the face of gross human rights abuses without there being
any apparent political interest, it soon became clear that states were not willing to
pay the price for intervention by seeing their initial commitment through. It appears
that the US could afford to be generous and intervene, only because political
leaders thought no real disadvantage would be suffered in terms of lives. As it had
prior Security Council authorisation, after the Council established that the situation
did pose a threat to international peace and security, the US intervention was not a
humanitarian intervention. Of the interventions considered, it is the only situation in
which the human rights abuses not breaching international peace and security, did
receive relatively timely Security Council authorisation for the intervention that
was evidently needed.
544 Kosovo
The situation in Kosovo, on the other hand, is probably the first time that NATO
intervened in a non-member state and without Security Council authorisation. The
UN neglected to authorize intervention as violence mounted between the Kosovar
Albanians and the Serbs. The growing polarization between the Albanians in
273 idem 97
274 Jones Peacemaking in Rwanda 128
275 ibid
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Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia after 1981 was the product of various factors,
the first of which was progressive poverty, despite the large amounts of tax money
supposed to be used to further development in Kosovo_276While the Albanian
Kosovars believed their monetary plight was due to insufficient control over their
own economic life, Serbs demanded that economic control be recentralised, away
from Kosovo_277Another factor was that owing to the out-migration of Serbs and
Montenegrins and the high Albanian birth rate, almost 80% of the population of
Kosovo was Albanian by the eighties_278The Albanians consequently felt justified
in demanding republic status. Added to these factors, were Serb claims of
discrimination and harassment, as their community became smaller and began
losing its privileges_279 The 1986 memorandum by the Serbian Academy of Arts
and Sciences that claimed the "'physical, political, legal and cultural genocide' of
Serbs in Kosovo", was received with shock throughout Yugoslavia. At this stage,
however, official figures did not substantiate the wilder claims of rape and murder.
280
After 1989, by which time Yugoslavia's President Slobodan Milosevic had revoked
Kosovo's autonomy.i'" legislation made it illegal for Kosovar Albanians to buy or
lease property from Serbs and widespread arbitrary arrests, torture and detention
without trial occurred.282 As the human rights violations continued and faith in the
passive resistance withered by the mid-nineties, the initial relatively non-violent
resistance283 was progressively replaced by armed attacks by the radical Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA)_284
276 lICK The Kosovo Report 37,38
277 idem 37
278 idem 38
279 ibid
280 idem 40
281 Wedgwood 1999 Vol93 AJIL 828
282 lICK The Kosovo Report 42
283 idem 44 - 48, At this time a parallel state was instituted by the Kosovar Albanians who were now
subject to double taxation to maintain their 'shadow' state. This parallel state had its own education
system, trade unions, organizations for culture and sport and even transport initiatives but the
burden of maintaining the parallel state became almost too much to bear as double taxation took its
toll on the already impoverished Kosovar Albanians.
284 lICK The Kosovo Report 50 - 52
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Human rights abuses and violence between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(FRY) and the Kosovar Albanians, especially the KLA, escalated. About 12 000
refugees spilled over the Albanian border, and while OSCE was establishing an
active presence on the Albania-Kosovo border, NATO publicly considered military
intervention by June 1998_285When Milosevic rejected the Rambouillet peace
negotiations that started in February 1999,286 NATO started their bombing
campaign in March 1999. By this time, it was clear that abuses committed by
Yugoslav forces far outstripped those committed by Kosovar Albanians or the
KLA,287 and that it was part of Operation Horseshoe, an operation meant to
"ethnically cleanse" the province of Kosovo of its 1.7 million Albanians.i'" The
NATO bombing campaign was strictly an air campaign with no forces on the
ground,289 which left the Kosovar Albanians, who were by now the target of
extensive FRY retaliation, unprotected.f"
The report of the lICK notes that the international community was aware of the
imminent conflict since the early nineties, but "failed to take sufficient preventative
action" before 1998_291By this time, "a threat to regional [and international] peace
and security ... " had arisen according to Security Council resolutions_292However,
as it became clear that Russia would veto any Security Council resolution to
authorize such intervention, the NATO intervention was never directly authorised
by the Security Counci1.293Having failed to prevent massive atrocities because of
the time it took to intervene and the form it assumed, it was now also in breach of
the UN Charter, the bonafide legal basis of modern international law.
After the end of the hostilities, NATO deployed a 20 000 force that operated
"within the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo" to provide security.
285 idem 72 73
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288 Robertson Crimes against humanity 413
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This mission was responsible for interim administration and capacity building.f"
As Kosovo is a region of the FRY, it was treated as such while under the UN
military protectorate. ,,295
It is notable that despite the critique about the air strikes, the majority of the
members of the Security Council rejected a draft resolution condemning the NATO
intervention.i'" In addition, the Secretary General, Kofi Annan, declared in his
Statement on NATO military action against Yugoslavia, that "[i]t is indeed tragic
that diplomacy has failed ... but there are times when the use of force may be
legitimate in the pursuit of peace" _297At the same time however, he maintained that
"actions without Security Council authorization threaten the very core of the
international security system founded on the Charter of the United Nations".298 As
in the case of the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda,299 the NATO intervention
seemed to have been accepted eventually even if amid ongoing debates. The liCK
for example, noted that the intervention was illegal but Iegitimate.Y"
The NATO action seems to have been justified by the failure of FRY to comply
with Security Council Resolutions, the imminent humanitarian disaster in Kosovo,
the inability of the Council to take adequate steps to deal with the disaster, and the
threat to regional peace and security posed by the Serbian action.r'" These
justifications seem satisfactory, as FRY had a record of ethnic cleansing and
violence against parts of the civilian population, the actions of FRY has been
identified as threats to peace, and FRY had refused to comply with the demands of
the Security Council. 302There were furthermore reason to believe that a political
compromise would not be sufficient to protect the Kosovar Albanians given
294 ICISS Supplementary Volume 113
295 ibid
296 idem 112
297 Wedgwood 1999 Vol 93 AJIL 831
298 Wheeler Saving Strangers 294
299 see eh 1
300 ICISS Supplementary Volume 114
301 Matheson "Justification for the NATO air campaign in Kosovo" 2000 in Stephan (ed) 94 ASIL
Proceedings 301301
302 Murphy "The Intervention in Kosovo: A law shaping incident?" 2000 in Stephan (ed) 94 ASIL
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"Milosevic's past record of war crimes and illusory reassurances ... ,,303 While there
are still debates about whether the NATO action was proportional, it appears clear
that intervention was necessary to stop the humanitarian disaster and additionally,
the "Security Council did not pass a resolution condemning the intervention'v''"
Supporters of the Kosovo intervention argue that because the Council has admitted
the existence of a threat to international peace and security and after the fact, did
nothing about it, the action taken by NATO was justified. 305 Simma endorses this:
"[W]hile the threat of armed force employed by NA TO against the FRY
in the Kosovo crisis since the fall of 1998 is illegal due to the lack of a
Security Council authorization, the Alliance made every effort to get as
close to legality as possible by, first, following the thrust of, and linking
its efforts to, the Council resolutions which did exist, and, second,
characterizing its action as an urgent measure to avert even greater
humanitarian catastrophes in Kosovo, taken in a state of humanitarian
necessity. ,,306
Nevertheless critics of this intervention point to the selectivity practiced with regard
to humanitarian interventions. In the face of the inaction of Western powers in the
cases of Rwanda and East Timor, the intervention that in effect ignored the Security
Council, reeks of hypocrisy.i'" Further criticism includes the fact that the moral
high ground claimed by NATO would be more legitimate, if the "humanitarian
intervention would have been worth the lives of Westerners as well as Yugoslavs",
as the NATO air strike stayed at 15 000 feet to prevent casualties on their side.308 In
the face of this criticism, there are arguments that the General Assembly should
have used the Uniting for Peace Resolution, to add some legitimacy to an
intervention unauthorized by the Security Counci1.309
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The human rights abuses in Kosovo did not breach international peace and security,
but were established as a threat to peace in SCR 1199. However, this did not
compel the Security Council to authorise intervention. As NATO intervened only
after the Council established the situation as a threat to peace, and it became clear
that an authorisation to intervene would not be forthcoming, this intervention
appears to be one of the most "legitimate humanitarian interventions" after the Cold
War.
After looking at these four interventions, it is evident that no consistency exists
within the UN regarding the manner in which interventions are handled and even
less consistency with regard to the responsibilities of the intervening forces after
intervention. It seems that the mandate given to UN forces often do not reflect the
gravity or requirements of the situation and that the financial and political
commitment to provide intervening forces with the necessary means to effectively
fulfil their mandate, sometimes lacks even after the intervention has been
authorised by the Security Council. It appears further that the states that do
volunteer troops for UN authorised forces, are not always prepared to pay the price
and to make the commitment to rebuild, which situations of gross human rights
abuses ask. Finally it seems that states that intervene of their own accord do not
always do the job so much better than a UN authorised force could have. Thus
while UN interventions are not always effective, unilateral interventions are not
necessarily more successful. Nevertheless, the truth is that without these
interventions, the human catastrophe in all the mentioned cases would have been
even greater. All the situations considered above, although not seen as a breach of
international peace and security, were at some point established as a threat to peace
by the Security Council, and thus valid motivations for intervention to end gross
human rights abuses. Despite this, authorisation for intervention was not always
forthcoming from the Council and in most cases happened without authorisation,
even though it was evident that intervention in all the cases was necessary and well
justified.
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5 5 Conclusion
From the abovementioned presentation of the law and OpInIOnS regarding
humanitarian intervention in human rights abuses not breaching international peace
and security, it is clear that there is much uncertainty, different opinions and
seemingly still no decisive efforts to determine the content of humanitarian
intervention.
The fact that this is not just a debate about law, but also about morality, makes it
even more complex. While there is much disagreement about the place of morality
in the arguments about such intervention, the view of some writers is that
humanitarian intervention "belongs in the realm not of law but of moral
choice ... ,,310 According to Honoré, "The difference between legal and moral duties
and rights is not the difference of meaning. It is a difference between formal,
institutionally recognized duties and rights and their informal, non-institutional
equivalents.v'!' Thus the connection between morality and law here is the fact that
morality is a persuasive rather than an authoritative source of law. Therefore, while
the connection of law with morality will not necessarily result in law that is morally
reputable, it will provide the pressure to make law morally more reputable. 312 It is
therefore necessary for the international community to come to some kind of
consensus about how much the value of the protection of human rights means to
them. Only after such a consensus is reached, will it be possible for this value to
have the influence in international law that will allow it the legal basis necessary for
its preservation.
The present debate about humanitarian intervention takes place in the context of
new actors and new circumstances. The most important for this study, is probably
the tendency of "proliferation of armed conflict within states" _313 "The weakness of
state structures and institutions'Y'" has posed new challenges for the protection of
310 Walzer Just and Unjust War 365
311 Honoré "The Necessary Connection between Law and Morality" 2002 Vol 22 Nr 3 OJLS 489
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human rights and nation building after interventions. The fact is that in an
international order dependant on stable sovereign states, "the existence of fragile
states, failing states, states who through weakness or ill-will harbour those
dangerous to others, or states that can only maintain internal order by means of
gross human rights violations, can constitute a risk to people everywhere'Y'? It is
therefore necessary to prevent states falling into such disorder, if human rights are
to be protected successfully.
This is especially important since "[l]ying at the heart of prevailing ideals about the
moral purpose of the state, human rights have increasingly provided the
justificatory foundations for sovereignty.Y'" As such it seems that any situation
within a state that constitutes violations of human rights, are now to some degree of
interest to the UN, although only gross violations of human rights would probably
justify intervention. This position is supported by the growing idea that human
rights have become a qualification for sovereignty, rather than a limitation of it.
Nevertheless there are still arguments favouring a rigid observance of non-
intervention. In truth, it is easier to compel the adherence to an absolute rule than to
have to decide when intervention would be just and to construct the relevant
constraints to make such a decision valid. This is because such decisions are often
influenced and distorted by politics and they tend to favour the stronger players,
who had more influence when the decisions were taken. It is also because some
writers argue that constraints are ignored. The problem however, is that if an
absolute rule is ignored, there are no standard "by which to judge what happens
next.,,317A purely pragmatic approach is thus out of the question, also where the
responsibilities of intervening forces after intervention are concerned. The building
of stable states after intervention remains a great challenge and current UN
peacekeeping strategies, created to assist in situations of war between nations, seem
sometimes not suitable to protect civilians in conflicts between governments and
315 idem 5
316 Reus-Smit 2001 Vol27 No 4 RlS 537
317 Walzer Just and Unjust War 366
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rebels318 and neither to provide the security after intervention. This is as much a
result of the lack of commitment to the protection of human rights, as it is a
consequence of the pragmatic approach to intervention.
The responsibilities of regional actors are also still debated. As states do seem to
only intervene if there is significant state interest involved, the argument has been
made that as such, regional arrangements should have the responsibility of
"humanitarian law enforcement".319 This is because regional actors would have a
more direct interest in peace and security in the region.32o The UN certainly seems
to "welcome, encourage, and support regional and sub-regional action" and the
message from the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
(UNHCHR), is that regional organizations "have a leading role to play" in the
practical work that needs to be done to promote the human rights culture.321
However, it appears that the UN still sometimes prefers to take control of situations
of human rights abuses. This is probably as a result of the fact that regional actors
occasionally do not have the means to take successful action regarding such
situations.
Human rights now seem to focus more on the effective implementation of the
commitment of governments to human rights_322This focus is important, as despite
all the writings on such intervention in the last two decades, no effort has
previously been made by the international community to systematically develop a
theory of humanitarian intervention.Y' "[T]he inability of that community to
reconcile the question of legitimacy of an action taken by a regional organization
without a United Nations mandate, one side, and the universally accepted
318 ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 5
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imperative of effectively halting gross and systematic violations of human rights,
on the other, could only be viewed as a tragedy" according to Kofi Annan.324
According to the ICISS there should be a move away from humanitarian
intervention as the consequence of a "right to intervene", to the "responsibility to
protect". This will shift the focus from "the claims of the interveners" to the
"requirements of those who need or seek assistance".325 It seems as if this
reforming opinion might just be the basis of the new perspective that this study is
looking for, especially if the changing scope of international law is then taken into
account. The fact is that international law is dynamic in nature and "is a continuing
process of creative adjustment of old rules and principles to rapidly changing
societal interests and expectations", 326and that the field of human rights protection
is in need of change. This can for example be seen in the fact that, as a direct result
of the lack of "long-term commitment" and the non-acceptance of the casualties it
required, a humanitarian outcome could not be secured in Somalia. It seems that the
reason the US government administration intervened in the first place, was because
it was believed that these risks and costs could be avoided_J27
In line with the change in focus proposed by the ICISS, the nCK maintains that an
emergent doctrine of responsible humanitarian intervention can be conceived in a
process of three phases. These include the set up of a framework of principles with
regard to where humanitarian intervention would occur, the adoption of these
principles by the UN as a Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of
Humanitarian Intervention, accompanied by the interpretation of the Charter by the
Security Council to reconcile the provisions of the Charter with these principles,
and an amendment of the Charter to incorporate these principles.328
In the midst of all these changing ideas about human rights, sovereignty and
intervention, there has also been a definite shift in focus in the state practice of
324 Annan Implications of International Response to events in Rwanda, Kosovo; Examined by
Secretary General in Steiner & Alston (ed) International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics,
Morals 2nd ed (2000) 658 658
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humanitarian intervention. This can especially be seen in the writings of
Wheeler.329 The cases of humanitarian intervention in the Cold War, notably the
Indian intervention in Pakistan, the Vietnam intervention in Cambodia and the
Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, all happened without Security Council
authorisation.33o In the case of the Tanzanian intervention in Uganda, the issue were
not even discussed by the Security Council.331 In the other two cases the pluralist
norms of non-intervention and the protection of sovereignty had overwhelming
support in the Security Council as well as the UN and were found to be more
important than the protection of human rights, which did not justify unilateral
intervention.V' Of these three interventions, humanitarian norms were only invoked
by India after the slaughter of over a million Bengali people in East Pakistan.333
Nevertheless, while the primary motive for all three interventions were the growing
security threat on the borders of the respective states, caused by the conflict in
neighbouring states,334an inevitable outcome of all the interventions was the end of
gross human rights abuses.335 These interventions were "justifiable because the use
of force was the only means of ending atrocities on a massive scale, and the
motives/means employed were consistent with a positive humanitarian
outcome".336
The interventions after the Cold War, including the examples in this study, on the
other hand, showed a shift in focus towards humanitarian justifications. The
Security Council were involved in some or other way in the USIUN intervention in
Somalia, the Rwanda genocide, the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia and the
NATO intervention in Kosovo. The Council has referred to these situations of gross
human rights abuses and genocide as either threats to international peace and
security337 or regional peace and securizy338.It is clear that after the Cold War the
329 Wheeler Saving Strangers
330 idem 286
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Security Council widened the scope of what would constitute a threat to peace and
security by including gross human rights abuses as threats. Nevertheless, action has
not always been forthcoming, even after the abuses have been classified as threats.
While the use of force was authorised in the case of Somalia,339 ECOWAS was
authorised to enforce the terms of Security Council Resolution 788 under Chapter
VII of the Charter only after its initial unauthorised humanitarian intervention.F'''
The Council did not authorise the NATO intervention in Kosovo, but nevertheless
rejected a proposed resolution to end the air strike,341 and did not call for armed
intervention to end the Rwanda genocide, but did, at the request of France, gave
permission f~r a French intervention.Y Thus it seems that humanitarian
interventions in gross human rights abuses are more acceptable, if only after the
fact. However, prior Security Council authorisation for interventions for
humanitarian purposes, is still plagued with non-intervention arguments or appeals
that authorisation is an exceptional occurrence.if It appears that while the media
presentation of human rights abuses have played a big role in influencing political
decisions regarding intervention.I" the factor impeding intervention today has
become the price of interventions in terms of lives and money, as opposed to the
strong pluralist arguments before the Cold War.345
While at present, the dilemma of humanitarian intervention without Security
Council authorization is inescapable, it is nevertheless clear that organisations
committed to the protection of human rights are making the effort to facilitate
change. In truth, there is no clear-cut solution reconciling the tension between the
rule of international law that prohibits the use of force and the "political and moral
desire and aspiration of many states to act in the face of atrocities causing large-
scale human suffering within another state".346 Faced with this dilemma, it seems
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that the paramount question is how to "balance the wish to uphold and strengthen
the existing internationallegal order against the refusal to accept gross and massive
human rights violations without international reaction".347 The challenge, it seems,
is "to leave open the option for humanitarian intervention in extreme cases of
human suffering, where the reasons for action seem morally imperative and
politically sound but the Security Council is unable to act, while at the same time to
avoid jeopardising in a fundamental way the existing, hard-earned, international
legal order, including the central role of the Security Counci1".348
347 ibid
348 ibid
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CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion
"It is not free of danger, it will not befree of difficulty. There will be some
days you wish you were somewhere else. But never forget if we can do this
here, and if we can say to the people of the world, whether you live in
Africa, or Central Europe, or any other place, if somebody comes after
innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their
ethnic background or their religion, and it's within our power to stop it, we
will stop it. "J - Bill Clinton
6 1 Introduction
The aim of this study was to set out, in stages of development, the existing law
regarding humanitarian intervention, problems in respect of this law and cases of
intervention. This information was to be used to consider whether more adequate
provision could be made regarding circumstances of intervention to stop situations
of grave human rights abuses sooner. To reach a conclusion, a few questions
needed to be answered. Is humanitarian intervention without Security Council
authorization an acceptable option in cases of gross human rights abuses? If so,
how can it be reconciled with principles of international law such as sovereignty,
non-intervention and the monopoly of the Council on the use of force?2 Further,
what exactly is the law regarding this kind of intervention? How is the law
currently applied, if at all, and how can these rules be refined?
While humanitarian intervention is used as a means to protect human rights, the UN
has developed several other protection mechanisms, including the UNCHR, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and ICESCR. Another
protection mechanism that developed in the aftermath of the Second World War is
the notion of international criminal prosecution that has led to the establishment of
the ICTR, ICTY and, more recently, the ICC, which aims at bringing the
I Joyner 2002 EJIL 598
2 Steiner & Alston International Human Rights 653
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perpetrators of crimes against humanity to justice. Despite these numerous legal
remedies, humanitarian interventions continue to happen.
6 2 Development of Humanitarian Intervention
The analysis has shown that in the time before World War I the most important
influence on the use of force was the just war theory, but this theory had lost all its
influence when it became an excepted idea that a war could be just for both sides.
The legal concept of intervention therefore developed as the principal instrument in
the power struggles between the European Powers during the eighteenth century.
After this, wayward forcible interventions wreaked havoc, while the international
community supposedly used the non-intervention principle as an instrument to stop
interventions of any kind until World War 1.
Despite the fact that the Peace of Westphalia made sovereign states legitimate
political units, the pre-World War I society of states and the existing concept of
sovereignty did not pass the "test of the fundamental ideas of a universal
international legal order";' because it could not maintain international peace. At the
same time the focus on individuals and humanitarian principles, which reached its
peak in the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906, weakened the idea of absolute
sovereignty. The protection of minorities was increasingly accepted as a legitimate
condition to place on states that wanted to enter into the European system after the
1878 Treaty of Berlin. Despite these laudable intentions, however, minorities were
not free from persecution." At this time the questions regarding post-intervention
responsibilities such as the rebuilding of institutions and/or the economy,
promoting reconciliation and punishing war criminals, were addressed only when
they surfaced.
The study has also revealed that greater awareness that the law and adherence to it
could play a central part in international relations emerged only at the Hague
Conventions. While most of the interventions in this time were not truly
3 Steinberger Sovereignty 407
4 Philpott 1995 Vol48 No 2 Journal of International Affairs 365
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humanitarian, but rather aimed at supporting states' own nationals abroad and were
often not proportional to the injury suffered, interventions were nevertheless well
justified. As it became clear that the world could not stand by and watch an entire
ethnic group being wiped out systematically, this set a standard for the kind of
situations in which interventions could be allowed.
As the international community was organised within the League of Nations after
World War I, a new international law system, which tried to regulate the use of
force by restricting war as an executive instrument, developed. Even though the
League failed, it formed the basis for some of the principles seen in the United
Nations system today, such as the idea of collective security instead of intervention
by a single state, the notion of permanent membership of the great powers,
intervention for international interests only, and the idea of a threat to international
peace and security.
The Spanish civil war gave the world a taste of the kind of conflict that would
dominate the rest of the twentieth century: conflicts within the borders of a single
state coupled with gross human rights abuses. Since the extent to which this kind of
conflict would occur was not foreseen between the two world wars or even after the
Second World War, it caught the world legally unprepared to deal with its effects.
Finally, the idea developed between the two world wars that, in the interest of the
international community, sovereignty should be subject to piercing. However, only
collective intervention, carried out by the community of nations or a group of
states, was viewed as legal and only a moral justification could be used.' Even
though intervention was supported by a majority of writers, it remains debatable
whether it was clearly established as a legal institution in this era."
The signing of the Charter in 1945 signalled the beginning of an era of co-operation
between states with regard to political, economic and social issues and human
rights. However, the UN was structured so that it, and more specifically the
Security Council system, would work only if the five great powers were united in
5 Hall A Treatise 304
6 Beyerlin Humanitarian Intervention 927
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their political ideals, which has of course led to many problems. The influence of
the Cold War on the functioning of the UN organs is a case in point. The subjection
of force to "collective consent" in the aftermath of World War II7 was supposed to
prevent uncommitted states from being dragged into clashes between the great
powers by way of their UN membership' However, authorization for intervention
was withheld for "politically squalid reasons, which have nothing to do with justice
or morality"."
While the primary motive for intervention in all the cases of Cold War
humanitarian interventions contemplated was the growing security threat on the
borders of the respective states caused by the conflict in neighbouring states.i'' an
inevitable outcome of several of the interventions was the end of gross human
rights abuses. Il These interventions were "justifiable because the use of force was
the only means of ending atrocities on a massive scale, and the motives/means
employed were consistent with a positive humanitarian outcome" .12 The
interventions after the Cold War showed a shift in focus towards humanitarian
justifications. It is clear that after the Cold War the Security Council widened the
scope of what would constitute a threat to peace and security by including gross
human rights abuses as threats. Thus it seems that interventions, including
unilateral interventions, in gross human rights abuses are more acceptable, if only
after the fact. However, prior authorisation is still plagued with non-intervention
arguments or appeals that authorisation is an exceptional occurrence.l '
6 3 Evaluation of the Law regarding Humanitarian Intervention
The existing legal basis within the UN system for dealing with human rights abuses
is enforcement action authorised by the Security Council. For the purposes of this
7 Joyner 2002 Vol 13 Issue 3 EJIL 608
8 Claude Swords into Plowshares 146
9 Robertson Crimes against humanity 444
10 ibid 74, 106; ICISS Supplementary Volume 62
IIWheeler Saving Strangers 107
12 idem 295
13 idem 166; ICISS Supplementary Volume 96
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study, this action can only happen once it has been established that the human
rights abuses pose a threat to international peace and security. Once this has been
established, the Security Council first need to authorise the appropriate mandate to
enable the intervening force to effectively bring an end to the abuses and then find
the means necessary to successfully fulfil their mandate. Apart from calling on
member states to provide the forces necessary for the intervention, the Security
Council can also utilize relevant regional organisations for enforcement action. It
should be noted that no regional enforcement action can legally be taken without
the authorisation of the Council at any time.
When the nature of the UN enforcement system is taken into account, it is clear
that, as humanitarian intervention cannot be authorized by the Security Council and
cannot be defined as self-defence, it cannot be justified under the Charter and thus,
the institution is illegal.l" Even though no clear rules exist according to which
humanitarian intervention can be authorized, however, the growing importance of
human rights has led to arguments that the Charter does not render humanitarian
intervention illegal in cases of gross human rights abuses. IS
The rationale behind this kind of intervention is that legal enforcement action is not
forthcoming from the UN system for the protection of human rights. One reason for
this is the problem relating to the Charter's regulation of the use of force. Since the
Charter only regulates force between states and not within states, it is not legally
capable of dealing with conflict within states, let alone with human rights abuses
within states. Another problem is that the envisaged collective security system did
not materialise. This means that the UN is dependent on military alliances, with
their own agendas and interests, for enforcement action. These alliances only
intervene if it serves their interests, or if they are sure that the price in terms of
casualties will be almost zero.16 As a result, UN peacekeeping forces often suffer
from a lack of financial support and appropriate mandates to complete their
missions successfully.
14 Beyerlin Humanitarian Intervention 927
15 Welsh 2002 Global Governance 505; Ramsbotham & Woodhouse Humanitarian Intervention 62;
nCK The Kosovo Report 186
16 Wheeler Saving Strangers 300, 301
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Another reason for the existence of humanitarian intervention is the fact that the
Security Council justifies intervention for humanitarian purposes only in terms of
the legal fiction that gross human rights abuses pose a threat to peace.
Consequently, the Council has not been able to intervene in time where gross
abuses have not been seen to pose a threat. This does not mean that human rights
abuses do not in some cases present a threat to international peace and security. It
only presents the unfortunate reality that until the Security Council decides that
gross human rights abuses pose a threat, no enforcement action can legally be taken
to intervene. Furthermore, the use of the veto by the permanent members of the
Security Council, has led to situations where gross human rights abuses have been
established to be a threat to peace, but the financial and military means for
intervention have not been forthcoming, as enforcement actions were not
authorised.
It is clear therefore that in the current legal system, the provision for the protection
of gross human rights abuses is wholly inadequate. As a result states, groups of
states and various regional arrangements have taken the liberty of intervening
without Security Council authorization. While these humanitarian interventions
were clearly not legal under the UN system, the growing importance of human
rights has influenced various factors that come into play when enforcement action
is used against states that violate the rights of their citizens. The influences of these
factors have already brought about an urgency regarding efforts to protect human
rights in the absence of effective UN action and further positive changes in these
factors may lead to a more adequate system of protection of human rights. A
problem that nevertheless exists is that human rights are perceived as a western
norm that is forced on all cultures and nations. This is especially true since the
traditional western state form of democracy is almost automatically linked to the
protection of human rights. Nations and cultures that do not have democratic state
forms therefore find it easier to reject pleas to respect, observe and promote the
human rights of their citizens.
As the existing international legal order is based on sovereign states, sovereignty is
also still regarded as a very important factor. In addition, the understanding of
149
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
sovereignty as containing dual responsibilities, to respect the sovereignty of other
states and to respect the rights and freedoms of a state's own nationals, is
growing.l ' Instead of limiting sovereignty, therefore, human rights have become a
qualification for sovereignty, shifting the focus from power based "on relations of
domination and force" to "power that is legitimate because it is predicated on
shared norms".!8
As intervention is open to abuse, the inevitable infringement on the sovereignty of
states is another factor that leads many to be uncomfortable with supporting
intervention for human rights violations. Thus, it appears that when states do
intervene they are careful not to base their intervention on the protection of human
rights, for fear of establishing a practice that might allow interventions in their own
affairs later on. In truth, in the existing international legal order of sovereign states,
it is neither possible nor desirable to allow intervention for all human rights abuses.
Nevertheless, there is mounting support for the argument that intervention should
be legal in cases where the occurrence of gross human rights abuses are generally
accepted, even without UN authorisation.
The third factor, that regional organisations are progressively making the necessary
arrangements to allow them to take an active part in regional peace and security
within the UN system, has lead to questions about the place of such organisations in
the protection of human rights. Because of the unwillingness of states to intervene
where they have no interest, some authors maintain that since states share an
interest at regional level, "sufficient unity of political values,,!9 might be created to
surpass the usual disagreements about the legitimacy of intervention for the
protection of human rights.
While there is truth in the statement that "the human rights rhetoric of international
treaties, 'a plaything of governments and lawyers', has only had the adverse affect
of perverting the idea of human rights",20 it does not mean that human rights need
17 lCISS The Responsibility to Protect 8
18 Wheeler Saving Strangers 2
19 Kaiser The Political Aspects 86
20 Polat 1999 Vol 19 (Nr 1) OiLS 64
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any less protection. International courts have done much for human rights in the
face of this cynical and regrettably true statement, in bringing perpetrators of
crimes against humanity, such as those responsible for gross human rights abuses,
to justice.
The signatories of the Charter cannot ignore that human rights and their protection
have become far more important than they were at the time of the signing of the
Charter. As international law should be "responsive to the needs of the system",21 it
is necessary to contemplate the idea that the Charter might need to be revised to be
able to handle the factual realities of our time effectively.
From the law regarding humanitarian intervention, it is evident that the institution is
illegal under the present UN legal system. Yet, effective interventions authorised by
the Security Council are not forthcoming. In order to protect and promote human
rights adequately, therefore interventions by other actors must be appropriate and
well managed. Since the international community does not seem to accept
humanitarian intervention as a protection mechanism for human rights, however,
they should at least ensure that the treatment of gross human rights abuses by the
UN and specifically by the Security Council becomes a lot more effective.
6 4 Recommendations
Wheeler submits that "legal theory must march alongside political reality,,22 and the
fact is that the political reality regarding armed conflict today is very different from
when the Charter was conceived. To enable the existing system to deal effectively
with present-day conflict, which often includes gross human rights abuses, it is
necessary to make some adjustments. One possible solution might be to attribute
more importance to the Uniting for Peace Resolution. While it is true that the
authority claimed by the UN General Assembly in this Resolution may not be in
line with the structure in the Charter, the majority of states in the Assembly should
carry some weight if it is generally accepted that human rights violations of major
21 Higgins Problems and Process 49
22 Kostakopoulou 2002 Vol22 (Nr 1) OJLS 146
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proportions are continuing and the Council is unable or unwilling to do something
about it. Even though humanitarian interventions happen outside of the UN system,
intervening forces still have to adhere to the customary law principles that have
developed with regard to the methods and tactics of warfare. These include
necessity "(the use of force must be essential to achieve goals of war)",23
proportionality "(relation of means to ends; avoidance of excessive force)",24
distinction or discrimination "(methods and tactics must be directed at military
targets),,25 and humanity "(methods and tactics must not inflict superfluous
suffering on people ... )",26 and should be the first criteria for decisions on
humanitarian intervention. An intervention aimed at ending present humanitarian
disaster needs to be "coupled with a long-term commitment to address its causes
through a commitment to conflict resolution and social reconstruction'Y'
Human rights will also benefit from dependence on legitimate authority. According
to Philpott, such authority is legitimate "when it is rooted in law, tradition, consent
or divine command, and when those living under it generally endorse this notion.,,28
Since it is not impossible to find this authority in state forms other than
democracies, the protection of human rights is as valid in non-democracies, as in
any democratic state form. As most citizens of countries tom by gross human rights
abuses are usually eager to make sure that human rights are observed and protected
after intervention, it makes more sense for intervening forces to secure the idea of
human rights and legitimate authority than to force democracy on such a state.
Finally, the time has come for the members of the UN, to afford human rights
protection the importance it presumable has in the existing international order. If
the place of human rights and its protection in the Charter has been given more
significance as the importance of the human rights culture developed, the legal
protection afforded by being enshrined in the Charter could to an extent have
prevented the uncertainty that now exists with regard to human rights protection.
23 lICK The Kosovo Report 177
24 ibid
25 ibid
26 ibid
27 Wheeler Saving Strangers 306
28 Philpott 1995 Vo148 No 2 Journal of International Affairs 355
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Instead, as no changes have been made in the Charter to make explicit provision for
human rights protection, this idea that became part of the base of international law,
was left without proper legal protection. A possible way to remedy this situation, is
to make the protection of human rights an explicit part of the duties of the Security
Council in the Charter, instead of subjecting its protection to the Security Council's
duty of maintaining international peace and security. While the maintenance of
international peace and security remains as important as ever, human rights will
then finally have the legal protection needed to ensure the participation of member
states in its protection.
If the existing system cannot be made more effective, the actions that actors
inevitably will take outside of the system, needs to be well managed and at least
subject to certain standards of conduct. Any new approach to humanitarian
intervention needs to meet at least a few basic objectives, which include clear
procedures and criteria to determine when, where and how to intervene and to
establish the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention when all other tactics have
failed.29 To prevent the problem that if an absolute rule is ignored, there is no
standard "by which to judge what happens next," 30 these criteria should not
constitute absolute rules, but rather guidelines. The aim is not to find an alternative
source of authority for the Security Council, but to find ways to make the system
work better. 31
In the light of the findings of this study, the most useful criteria as part of the
process oftaking action outside of the UN system, seem to be the following:
General acceptance that gross human rights abuses constituting a crime
against humanity, have been committed in a particular instance;32
29 lCISS The Responsibility to Protect Il
30 Walzer Just and Unjust War 366
31 Welsh 2002 Global Governance 516
32 Wheeler Saving Strangers 34, 42; ICISS The Responsibility to Protect 32; nCK The Kosovo
Report 192, 193; Robertson Crimes against humanity 421; Cassese Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur: Is
International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures taking shape in the World
Community? in Steiner & Alston (ed) International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals
2nd ed (2000) 660 660
153
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
intervention must only be in the event that the Security Council had
considered the situation, but failed to authorise the action necessary to
end the abuses; 33
armed force must be used only as a last resort, but as soon as it is
evident that any further delay will cost many livesr'"
the force used must be proportional and for the sole purpose of ending
the human rights atrocitiesr"
a possibility of success must existr"
the intervening forces must strictly adhere to the laws of war3? and
they must be willing to help rebuild the country for as long as IS
necessary."
While it might be true that the Charter protects sovereignty much more explicitly
than it does human rights, the intention was never to justify the protection of
sovereignty in the face of gross human rights abuses. Except for the fact that human
rights abuses of any kind should be exposed, it is necessary that governments
responsible for human rights abuses pay "a heavy price in diplomatic, political, and
economic terms,,39 for such atrocities. The fact is that, as the international human
rights bodies cannot fight the battle alone, the protection of human rights is
everybody's business. States should not observe human rights only in their own
territories, but should also put their treaty commitments into practice by providing
the sources needed to protect these rights everywhere.l"
33 Wheeler Saving Strangers 34, 42; The Kosovo Report 192, 193; Robertson Crimes against
humanity 421; Cassese Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur 660
34 Wheeler Saving Strangers 34; lClSS The Responsibility to Protect 32; Robertson Crimes against
humanity 421
35 Wheeler Saving Strangers 34; lcrSS The Responsibility to Protect 32; nCK The Kosovo Report
192, 193; Robertson Crimes against humanity 421; Cassese Ex Iniuria Ius Oritur 660
36 Wheeler Saving Strangers 34; lClSS The Responsibility to Protect 32; Robertson Crimes against
humanity 421
37 nCK The Kosovo Report 193; Robertson Crimes against humanity 421
38 nCK The Kosovo Report 193; Wheeler Saving Strangers 42
39 Wheeler Saving Strangers 305
40 Higgins Problems and Process 110
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"After a century in which 160 million human lives were wasted
by war and genocide and torture,
the world [could] best [remember] those its pledges have failed
by determining that in the future, at whatever cost,
it is going to make these pledges stick. ,,4/ - Geoffrey Robertson
41 Robertson Crimes against humanity 454
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Appendix A: Relevant articles from the Charter of the United
. Nations
Preamble
We the Peoples of the United Nations Determined
to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime
has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and
to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the
human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and
small, and
to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and
to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
And for these Ends
to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good
neighbours, and
to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and
to ensure by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed
force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and
to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social
advancement of all peoples,
Have Resolved to Combine our Efforts to Accomplish these Aims
Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the
city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and
due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby
establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.
CHAPTER I
PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES
Article 1
The Purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for
the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring
about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations
which might lead to a breach of the peace;
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2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate
measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these
common ends.
Article 2
The Organization and its Members, in pursuit of the Purposes stated in Article 1,
shall act in accordance with the following Principles.
1. The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members.
2. All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting
from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in
accordance with the present Charter.
3. All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
5. All Members shall give the United Nations every assistance in any action it takes
in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to
any state against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement
action.
6. The Organization shall ensure that states which are not Members of the United
Nations act in accordance with these Principles so far as may be necessary for the
maintenance of international peace and security.
7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.
CHAPTER II
MEMBERSHIP
Article 6
A Member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles
contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the
General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
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CHAPTER IV
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Functions and Powers
Article 11
1. The General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in
the maintenance of international peace and security, including principles governing
disarmament and the regulation of armaments, and may make recommendations
with regard to such principles to the Members or to the Security Councilor to both.
2. The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United
Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a state which is not a Member of the
United Nations in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided
in Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the
state or states concerned or to the Security Councilor to both. Any such question on
which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General
Assembly either before or after discussion.
3. The General Assembly may call the attention of the Security Council to
situations which are likely to endanger international peace and security.
4. The powers of the General Assembly set forth in this Article shall not limit the
general scope of Article 10.
Article 13
1. The General Assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the
purpose of:
a. promoting international cooperation in the political field and encouraging the
progressive development of international law and its codification;
b. promoting international cooperation in the economic, social, cultural,
educational, and health fields, and assisting in the realization of human rights and
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.
2. The further responsibilities, functions and powers of the General Assembly with
respect to matters mentioned in paragraph 1(b) above are set forth in Chapters IX
andX.
CHAPTERV
THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Functions and Powers
Article 24
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1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under
this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the
Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the
Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI,
VII, VIII, and XII.
3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to
the General Assembly for its consideration.
Article 25
The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of
the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.
Voting
Article 27
1. Each member of the Security Council shall have one vote.
2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members.
3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an
affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent
members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of
Article 52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.
CHAPTER VII
ACTION WITH RESPECT TO THREATS TO THE PEACE,
BREACHES OF THE PEACE, AND ACTS OF AGGRESSION
Article 39
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
Article 40
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before
making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article
39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it
deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice
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to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council
shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.
Article 41
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of
diplomatic relations.
Article 42
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations.
Article 43
1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of
international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security
Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements,
armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for
the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces.
their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and
assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the
initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security
Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and
shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes.
Article 44
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a
Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the
obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so
desires, to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the
employment of contingents of that Member's armed forces.
Article 45
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In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures Members
shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined
international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these
contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined, within the
limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by
the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Article 46
Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with
the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Article 47
1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the
Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military
requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the
employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of
armaments, and possible disarmament.
2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the
permanent members of the Security Councilor their representatives. Any Member
of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be
invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of
the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its
work.
3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for
the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security
Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out
subsequently.
4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and
after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional
subcommittees.
Article 48
1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the
maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members
of the United Nations or by some of them, as the Security Council may determine.
2. Such decisions shall be carried out by the Members of the United Nations
directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which
they are members.
Article 49
The Members of the United Nations shall join in affording mutual assistance in
carrying out the measures decided upon by the Security Council.
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Article 50
If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security
Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which
finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying
out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with
regard to a solution of those problems.
Article 51
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this
right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.
CHAPTER VIII
REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
Article 52
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements
or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided that
such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes
and Principles ofthe United Nations.
2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or
constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of
local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies
before referring them to the Security Council.
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of
local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies
either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security
Council.
4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.
Article 53
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of
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measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article,
provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against
renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the
Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the
responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.
2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state
which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the
present Charter.
Article 54
The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities
undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional
agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.
CHAPTER IX
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CO-OPERATION
Article 55
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are
necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall
promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and
social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related problems; and
international cultural and educational co-operation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.
Article 56
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation
with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55.
CHAPTER XII
INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM
Article 75
The United Nations shall establish under its authority an international trusteeship
system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed
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there under by subsequent individual agreements. These territories are hereinafter
referred to as trust territories.
Article 76
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Purposes of
the United Nations laid down in Article I of the present Charter, shall be:
a. to further international peace and security;
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the
inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive development towards self-
government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances
of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples
concerned, and as may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement;
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage
recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, and commercial matters for all
Members of the United Nations and their nationals and also equal treatment for the
latter in the administration of justice without prejudice to the attainment of the
foregoing objectives and subject to the provisions of Article 80.
Article 77
1. The trusteeship system shall apply to such territories in the following categories
as may be placed there under by means oftrusteeship agreements:
a. territories now held under mandate;
b. territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second
World War, and
c. territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their
administration.
2. It will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which territories in the
foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what
terms.
Article 78
The trusteeship system shall not apply to territories which have become Members
of the United Nations, relationship among which shall be based on respect for the
principle of sovereign equality.
Article 79
The terms of trusteeship for each territory to be placed under the trusteeship system,
including any alteration or amendment, shall be agreed upon by the states directly
concerned, including the mandatory power in the case of territories held under
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mandate by a Member of the United Nations, and shall be approved as provided for
in Articles 83 and 85.
Article 80
1. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship agreements, made under
Articles 77, 79, and .[l, placing each territory under the trusteeship system, and
until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be
construed in or of itself to alter in any manner the rights whatsoever of any states or
any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which Members of
the United Nations may respectively be parties.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article shall not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or
postponement of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements for placing
mandated and other territories under the trusteeship system as provided for in
Article 77.
Article 81
The trusteeship agreement shall in each case include the terms under which the trust
territory will be administered and designate the authority which will exercise the
administration of the trust territory. Such authority, hereinafter called the
administering authority, may be one or more states or the Organization itself.
Article 82
There may be designated, in any trusteeship agreement, a strategic area or areas
which may include part or all of the trust territory to which the agreement applies,
without prejudice to any special agreement or agreements made under Article 43.
Article 83
1. All functions of the United Nations relating to strategic areas, including the
approval of the terms of the trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or
amendment, shall be exercised by the Security Council.
2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of
each strategic area.
3. The Security Council shall, subject to the provisions of the trusteeship
agreements and without prejudice to security considerations, avail itself of the
assistance of the Trusteeship Council to perform those functions of the United
Nations under the trusteeship system relating to political. economic, social, and
educational matters in the strategic areas.
Article 84
It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory
shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security. To this
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end the administering authority may make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and
assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the
Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well
as for local defence and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory.
Article 85
1. The functions of the United Nations with regard to trusteeship agreements for all
areas not designated as strategic, including the approval of the terms of the
trusteeship agreements and of their alteration or amendment, shall be exercised by
the General Assembly.
2. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly,
shall assist the General Assembly in carrying out these functions.
CHAPTER XV
THE SECRETARIAT
Article 99
The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any
matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace
and security.
CHAPTER XVIII
AMENDMENTS
Article 108
Amendments to the present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the
United Nations when they have been adopted by a vote of two thirds of the
members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations,
including all the permanent members of the Security Council.
Article 109
1. A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purpose of
reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-
thirds vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven
members of the Security Council. Each Member of the United Nations shall have
one vote in the conference.
2. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended by a two-thirds vote of the
conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective
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constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations
including all the permanent members of the Security Council.
3. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the
General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the
proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda of that session of
the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so decided by a majority
vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members
of the Security Council.
CHAPTER XIX
RATIFICATION AND SIGNATURE
Article 110
1. The present Charter shall be ratified by the signatory states in accordance with
their respective constitutional processes.
2. The ratifications shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of
America, which shall notify all the signatory states of each deposit as well as the
Secretary-General of the Organization when he has been appointed.
3. The present Charter shall come into force upon the deposit of ratifications by the
Republic of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,
and by a majority of the other signatory states. A protocol of the ratifications
deposited shall thereupon be drawn up by the Government of the United States of
America which shall communicate copies thereof to all the signatory states.
4. The states signatory to the present Charter which ratify it after it has come into
force will become original Members of the United Nations on the date of the
deposit of their respective ratifications.
Article 111
The present Charter, of which the Chinese, French, Russian, English, and Spanish
texts are equally authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of the
Government of the United States of America. Duly certified copies thereof shall be
transmitted by that Government to the Governments of the other signatory states.
IN FAITH WHEREOF the representatives of the Governments of the United
Nations have signed the present Charter.
DONE at the city of San Francisco the twenty-sixth day of June, one thousand nine
hundred and forty-five.
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Appendix B: Maps of Interventions, East Pakistan, 1971
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Appendix D: Uganda, 1979
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Appendix G: Somalia, 1992 -1993
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Appendix H: Kosovo, 1999 -
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Appendix I: Security Council Resolutions
SCR 82 Complaint of aggression upon the Republic of Korea, 25/06/1950
SCR 221 Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia, 09/04/1966
SCR 232 Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia, 16/12/1966
SCR 418 South Africa, 04/11/1977
SCR 502 Falkland Islands (Malvinas), 03/04/1982
SCR 598 Iraq-Islamic Republic oflran, 20/11/1987
SCR 660 Iraq-Kuwait, 02/08/1990
SCR 688 Iraq, 05/04/1991
SCR 746 Somalia, 17/03/1992
SCR 770 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 13/08/1992
SCR 788 Liberia, 19/11/1992
SCR 794 Somalia, 03/12/1992
SCR 836 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 04/06/1993
SCR 872 Rwanda,05/10/1993
SCR 912 on adjustment of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for
Rwanda due to the current situation in Rwanda and settlement of the
Rwandan conflict, 21/04/1994
SCR 918 on the expansion of the mandate of the UN Assistance Mission for
Rwanda and imposition of an arms embargo on Rwanda, 17/05/1994
SCR 925 on extension of the mandate and deployment of the 2 additional
battalions of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda and settlement of
the conflict in Rwanda, 08/06/1994
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seR 929 on establishment of a temporary multinational operation for
humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until the deployment of the expanded
UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda, 22/06/1994
SeR 955 on establishment of an International Tribunal and adoption of the
Statute of the Tribunal, 08/11/1994
SeR 1199 on the situation in Kosovo (FRY), 23/091998
SeR 1203 on the situation in Kosovo, 24/10/1998
SeR 1244 on the situation relating Kosovo, 10/06/1999
SeR 1441 The situation between Iraq and Kuwait, 08/11/2002
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